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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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UNTIL
1975

TURKEY.

PART VIII.

JULY TO DECEMBER 1924.

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part VIII.

[E 5842/32/44] No. 1.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 4.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople*, July 4, 1924.

MY despatches Nos. 505 and 523.

At meeting of Allied representatives yesterday Italian representative suggested desirability of protesting against Nusret Bey's appointment which is announced in the press as delegate of Ministry for Foreign Affairs in place of Adnan. Nusret was a subordinate official attached to Turkish delegation at [? group omitted], and his personality is quite insignificant. He was also legal adviser to Turkish-Irak frontier delegation.

No official communication has yet been made, but his definite appointment is certain, and, even with rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, which press states is to be conferred upon him, has the appearance of a form of pressure on and slight to foreign representatives here, especially those of ambassadorial status.

For reasons given in my despatch No. 505, further representations here would be futile, but my colleagues think that they might have some effect if made in London and at Paris and Rome.

I agreed with my colleagues to make suggestion accordingly to our respective Governments, though matter is delicate, and that any communication if made should be verbal. It is always possible that when treaty comes into force other arrangements will be made by Turks in accordance with such arrangements, of which they are as yet ignorant, as Allied Powers may make. Present intention, however, is that Nusret's appointment shall be definite.

[E 5804/4332/44] No. 2.

Sir W. Max Muller to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 5.)

(No. 342.)
Sir, *Warsaw, July* 2, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 245 of the 13th May, reporting the ratification by the Polish President of the treaties concluded at Lausanne on the 23rd July, 1923, between Poland and Turkey, I have the honour to state that normal diplomatic relations between the two countries have now been resumed.

M. Knoll, who was last year Polish representative at Moscow and has recently been appointed Minister to Turkey, has arrived at Angora and presented his credentials to Kemal Pasha on the 25th June, when he took occasion to emphasise the fact that, though relations between the two countries had been interrupted ever since the third partition of 1795, Turkey had never acquiesced in the dismemberment of Poland.

On the same day, Ibrahim Taliy Bey, who arrived in Warsaw a few days ago, presented his credentials to M. Wojciechowski at the Palais Belvédère.

I have, &c.
W. G. MAX MULLER.

[E 5836/210/44] No. 3.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July 7.*)

(No. 517.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1924.*

M. NADOLNY, the German Minister, came to see me yesterday on his return from Angora, after presenting his letters of credence. He said that he was proceeding immediately to Berlin to furnish a personal report on the position here and at Angora, and would be back in Constantinople in about three weeks' time. The instructions which he had received in Berlin had been to be careful only to act in conjunction with his colleagues. He would therefore, he said, before making his recommendations to his Government, be grateful if I would let him know exactly what were the views of His Majesty's Government on representation at Angora.

2. He then went on to say that his conversations there, not only with the Ministers but also with other responsible officials, had convinced him that the retention of Angora as the capital was a settled policy, which would not be reversed by anything short of a complete revolution against the existing régime. He had been urged to establish his entire mission at Angora, but had told Ismet Pasha that such a course was out of the question for the present, and had strongly advised him in that respect to be patient. He had, nevertheless, selected a site outside the town, in the neighbourhood, I understand, of Mustafa Kemal's villa at Tchenkaya, and proposed to set up there the temporary ready-made wooden house of which he had previously spoken to me, as reported in my despatch No. 460 of the 7th instant. He had, moreover, actually earmarked a ready-made building for the purpose. His Government had ordered one for the German consul-general at Smyrna. The latter having succeeded in hiring a house, he had at once telegraphed to Berlin, and received his Government's consent to the wooden house thus ordered being used instead for Angora. I gather that it has ten living rooms, five on the ground floor and five above it, and that its erection could probably be completed by October. His plan was, he said, to use his counsellor of legation, M. Holstein, a former German consular officer who knew Turkish and ranked, since the amalgamation of the services, as a diplomatic official, as permanent liaison officer at Angora, and to go there himself from time to time, some of the rooms in the building being reserved for his own personal accommodation.

3. I told M. Nadolny that so far as I was aware my Government had come to no absolutely definite and final decision, except on the point that under no circumstances would a British Ambassador reside at Angora. But, when I was over in London in April last, a scheme very much on the lines of his own had been evolved and accepted by the Foreign Office in principle, though so far no steps had actually been taken to put it into effect. It contemplated the appointment of a diplomatic secretary as liaison officer with a vice-consul to assist him, and a residency, either to be built or ready-made, of approximately the same size as the German wooden house.

4. M. Nadolny said that he had pointed out to the Turks the futility of attempting to induce Ambassadors to live at Angora. Not only would the Governments of the Great Powers decline to consider such a course, but no Ambassador would accept the post in Turkey if he had to reside at Angora. Nevertheless, though it was no business of his, he would like to make an observation to me. He had found the Turks still profoundly distrustful of the real intentions of Great Britain, both as regards her general future policy towards Turkey as well as in respect of actual outstanding questions (*e.g.*, Mosul). One of their preoccupations was about British representation at Angora. It would, he felt convinced, have the very best effect, particularly in view of those outstanding questions, if we lost no time in making known our intentions as regards Angora. An announcement on our part would, moreover, from a general point of view, have a practical utility. The Turks were inclined to regard the refusal of the diplomatic missions to leave Constantinople as pressure on them to make the Government come back there. They, in their turn, were considering the replacement of Adnan Bey by some official of inferior rank as a form of pressure to make the transaction of business here so impossible that the foreign representatives would be obliged to go to Angora. A statement, if he might be allowed to say so, of the arrangements which Great Britain proposed to make in order to overcome the obvious difficulty connected with representation at Angora would not only reassure the Turks as to the absence of any intention on our part to adopt a course calculated to influence Turkish internal policy, but might also induce them to set to work to co-operate with the foreigner generally in making that arrangement a workable one. He added further that in his opinion such pressure as the foreign missions might hope to exercise by stopping at Constantinople would, in any case, be inefficacious. Unity among them was unattainable. The Soviet Government proposed as it was, he said, to construct an Embassy with sixty rooms at Angora, while the Polish Government, which had, of course, no pre-war residence in Constantinople, had also decided to construct its first one in Turkey at Angora.

5. I told M. Nadolny that His Majesty's Government, in finding difficulty in taking their final decision, had no desire whatever to influence Turkish internal policy. Allies had, however, to be consulted, as we wished if possible to adopt a common procedure.

6. The German Minister's opinion was, I am inclined to think, partly inspired by the hope that we would come to an early decision, so as to enable his Government, which will probably not act without us, to adopt his own recommendations without delay. Nevertheless, I have reported his conversation at length, because I believe that his observations were well-meaning and that he had some ground for making them, and also because the views which he set forth coincide generally with my own.

7. Mr. Lindsay, in his despatch No. 419 of the 21st May last, suggested that a useful effect would be produced if the announcement of the final British ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne were to coincide with the rupture of the Mosul negotiations, which was then a foregone conclusion. This proved, unfortunately, impossible, though it is still eminently desirable that every effort should be made to hasten such an announcement. Diplomatic intervention by the British Mission here is, and will continue to be, greatly hampered if not ineffective, except in small matters, until that long overdue consummation is achieved. That is the main consideration. The announcement of our intentions as to representation here and at Angora is a minor one, but it would still serve a useful purpose if I were authorised to make it, even unofficially in the event of His Majesty's Government preferring to withhold the official announcement until after ratification. In doing so I might revert to the offer of a site which Adnan Bey made to me some six months ago on behalf of the Turkish Government, and say that His Majesty's Government proposed to avail themselves of it.

8. Generally speaking I consider that the time has come to face the fact of the necessity for representation at Angora and for the erection without further hesitation of a residence there, and advantage might well be taken of Mr. Lindsay's presence on leave in England to consult with him as to the action to be taken. It is, in my opinion, most desirable that the temporary residence, if sanctioned, should be erected and habitable before the end of the year.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 5842/32/44] No. 4.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July 7.*)

(No. 523.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 1, 1924.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 505 of the 24th June, I have the honour to state that the Constantinople press published on the 29th June an authoritative though not official announcement that Nusret Bey, one of the legal counsellors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had been selected to replace Dr. Adnan Bey as delegate of that Ministry in Constantinople. Adnan Bey confirmed this information in conversation with me later in the day, although he said that the official instructions regarding Nusret Bey's appointment had not yet reached Constantinople. The issue of these instructions appears to be mainly a question of the completion of certain formalities, such as the formal approval of the Council of Ministers and the sanction of the President of the Republic. It will, however, be interesting to see in what terms the appointment is officially announced, having regard to the obviously inferior personal status of Nusret Bey and the doubt, which is still entertained in some quarters, as to whether Adnan Bey is really disqualified for the post of delegate in Constantinople by his decision to retain his deputyship. The Government has taken the view, as Mr. Lindsay reported in his despatch No. 416 of the 21st May, that Adnan Bey must choose between membership of the Grand National Assembly and the delegation here, but should he or anyone else wish to contest this it will be for the Assembly itself to decide.

2. Even if Nusret Bey's appointment should prove to be provisional, the choice made by the Government is not a very happy one. He is amiable and, so far as I am aware, of blameless life; but he has hitherto held none but subordinate posts in the legal departments of the Sublime Porte and the new Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which has employed him principally as legal adviser to the delegation here. He is hardly known in foreign circles, except as having been an inconspicuous member of the second Turkish delegation at Lausanne. He is also, I believe, a Professor of Law in the University of Constantinople. I do not know him personally, but Mr. Ryan, who has seen a certain amount of him both here and at Lausanne, describes him as a rather retiring man, a capable lawyer of a studious type, lacking in diplomatic and social qualities and quite unlikely to take responsibility or to carry real weight with his own Government. He may, of course, develop unexpected capacity in a semi-independent post, and he may be sufficiently *persona grata* at Angora (Ismet Pasha is said to think highly of him) to exert some influence there, but I cannot believe on my present information that he is a man of sufficient calibre to handle difficult questions satisfactorily with foreign Ambassadors and Ministers. It seems probable that the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs will be more than ever a post-box so long as Nusret Bey remains at the head of it.

3. From my private conversation with Adnan Bey I gather that his own appreciation of his successor is pretty similar to that given above. He is too careful and too loyal to depreciate Nusret Bey openly, but his praise is of the faint and damning variety.

4. Adnan Bey has consistently deprecated all suggestions that he is in the running for an appointment abroad, although rumours to that effect have been frequent. His present intention appears to be to rest and, perhaps, to travel with his wife in Europe. He will most probably return to political life in due course. The fact that he has cultivated friendly relations with foreigners and that he is in excellent personal relations with some of the potential opponents of Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas, notably with Refet Pasha, may have something to do with his supersession. Personally, I shall greatly regret his departure from the delegation, quite apart from any considerations connected with his successor. He is neither morally nor physically a strong man, but he has always exerted himself to tide over difficulties, and he takes reasonable views, even when he is unable to enforce them on other departments here or on the Government at Angora. I have, moreover, established intimate personal relations with him, which I have found of no little value in the conduct of public business. I may add that his own position and importance have been enhanced, and the maintenance of social relations with him has been facilitated, by the fact that he is married to the well-known Halide Edib Hanum, a lady who has played a notable part in Turkish life, literary, feminist, and to some extent political, since 1908.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 5843/4332/44] No. 5.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 524.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 1, 1924

WITH reference to your despatch No. 594 of the 23rd May, and previous correspondence concerning the relations between Poland and Turkey, I have the honour to inform you that on the 25th June the new Polish Minister, M. Knoll, presented his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

2. The speeches exchanged on this occasion were for the most part of a conventional nature. M. Knoll, however, emphasised the fact that the two countries were resuming relations which had been interrupted in 1795 and that Turkey had never recognised the partition of Poland, and used language which might be interpreted as indicating a desire for future relations of a somewhat closer character than those of ordinary friendship between States. The President, in a cordially worded reply, echoed the reference to the resumption of relations after an interruption of over a century, but used more purely conventional language regarding the future.

3. After his audience with the President, M. Knoll visited Mme. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a fact which is duly recorded in the semi-official report of the proceedings. This

is the second occasion on which publicity has been given to Latife Hanum's reception of a foreign Minister in circumstances savouring somewhat of regality. The first was when she received the Hungarian Minister and his staff to receive a message from the women of Hungary, shortly after M. Tahy had presented his letters.

4. It is apparently the intention of the Polish Government to establish its Legation at Angora. I adverted to this in my despatch No. 517 of the 28th June, in which I reported the impressions derived from a conversation with the German Minister. The "Jumhuriet" newspaper of the 27th June reproduces a statement said to have been made by the counsellor of the Polish Legation on behalf of his chief confirming the intention of his Government in this respect and stating that a large Legation building of over thirty rooms will be constructed at Angora next year.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 5908/448/44] No. 6.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 8, 1924.

RATIFICATION of Lausanne settlement.

Irish Free State having now concurred, ratification is being proceeded with, and every effort will be made to deposit instrument in Paris as soon as possible.

Question of Indian reservation is being dealt with separately.

[E 5842/32/44] No. 7.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 95.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, July* 11, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 118 of 4th July: Replacement of Adnan Bey.

I consider that it would be both useless and undesirable to raise the question either here or elsewhere.

[E 6051/32/44] No. 8.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 536.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 4, 1924.

ADNAN BEY called on me late yesterday evening. He has been spending a few days at Therapia, and I asked him to come and see me at Yenikeuy on his way back from Stamboul.

2. I said that I wished to take an opportunity before his apparently imminent departure to complain very seriously to him of the attitude of his Government at Angora. Six months had elapsed since I had addressed an urgent communication to him on the subject of the Indian reservation to the Treaty of Lausanne. I had been waiting a month for an answer to a perfectly straightforward proposal to submit the dispute regarding the terminal charges at Smyrna of the Eastern Telegraph Company to arbitration, either before a British court or at The Hague; while a fortnight had now passed since I had, on behalf of my Government, asked him to transmit to Angora the equally plain and urgent suggestion that the Turkish Government, in accordance with the Treaty of Lausanne, should join His Majesty's Government in referring the dispute respecting the frontier between Turkey and Irak to the Council of the League of Nations.

3. I had noticed, I said, in the Turkish journal "Djoumhouriet" a significant statement to the effect that the Turkish Government did not intend to make any reply to the latter proposal, but to leave it for discussion in London by the new Turkish Ambassador, whose *agrément* would shortly be requested. I would refer to the point of a new Turkish Ambassador later, but, as regards the three questions above mentioned, the sands of time were running out. The period of nine months stipulated in article 7 of the Evacuation Protocol for the direct negotiations relating to the Turkey–Irak

frontier expired on the 6th July. As he was well aware and as I had expressly told him, His Majesty's Government, on the expiration of that period, had the right and even obligation in the matter of reference to the League to act alone if the Turkish Government declined to co-operate. If the Turkish Government preferred that contingency to come to pass, let them say so. However unwise and unfortunate such a decision would be, it was calculated to indispose His Majesty's Government less than the discourtesy of silence.

4. Nor was the attitude of Angora in respect of the Indian reservation less unsatisfactory. It was clear from your language in the House of Commons on the 30th June as well as from an inspired statement (which I handed to him) in the "Times" of the 28th June, giving the text of the resolution which was to be submitted to the Dail Eireann, that the Irish difficulty in the way of the final ratification by Great Britain of the Treaty of Lausanne would be overcome in a few days. The instrument of ratification could then be immediately signed by His Majesty the King and deposited at Paris. It was of very great importance, particularly with a view to framing its text, that the Turkish consent to the Indian reservation should be received before that instrument was drawn up in its final form.

5. Finally, the action of the Turkish authorities in forcibly sealing up the private residences of the employees of the Eastern Telegraph Company at Chanak and Tenedos was still further complicating the position in respect of that dispute and rendering an amicable solution, so desirable in the interests of the Turks themselves, doubly difficult and problematical.

6. I asked Adnan Bey whether it was the studied intention of his Government to return no answers to the proposals of His Majesty's Government and the notes of His Majesty's representative in Constantinople. Such was, by experience, the only inference which could be drawn. Apart from its utter and inexcusable discourtesy, against which I wished to protest most vigorously and categorically, it was an attitude which was calculated to serve his country an ill-turn, and to recoil upon Turkey's own head. I was making a formal complaint, and I desired Adnan Bey to convey it to Ismet Pasha in no less strong terms than I was using to himself. He was about to give up the post of delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which he had held for over a year and a half with such distinction. Our personal relations had, I was glad to recognise, always been excellent. We had worked together during periods of considerable difficulty and tension last year. I was very grateful to him for his personal co-operation and assistance, but I hoped he would do me a last favour and take advantage of his retirement from his post to use the plainest and most forcible language in reporting to his Government what I had said.

7. Adnan Bey said that he had just received the reply to our suggestion for arbitration in the case of the Eastern Telegraph Company dispute. It was, he regretted to say, unprofitable. The Turkish Government maintained their point of view that they could not accept arbitration, since they could not admit any shadow of Greek claim to the moneys. I had the honour to acquaint you with this refusal in my telegram No. 119 of the 4th instant, and I will deal in a separate despatch with the situation thereby created.

8. As regards the Indian reservation, Adnan Bey confessed that any explanation which he could give of the failure of his Government to furnish us with a reply could not be regarded as adequate. It was true that the question was complicated and had to be referred to two different Government Departments. He had been instructed by Ismet Pasha, in response to a protest made some time ago by Mr. Lindsay, to explain away the delay in this fashion. He had done so, but, in notifying the Prime Minister accordingly, he had himself represented the insufficiency of such an excuse. He undertook to telegraph immediately to Angora on the subject. He expressed great gratification at the prospect of the early ratification by Great Britain of the treaty, but asked anxiously whether I could assure him that there was no connection, in the sense of pressure on Turkey, between the Indian reservation and the accomplishment by His Majesty's Government of the final formalities of ratification. I told him that there was none, and that the final formalities would be completed whatever were the Turkish reply.

9. Adnan Bey also promised to telegraph once more on the subject of the reference to the Council of the League of Nations of the Irak frontier dispute. He disclaimed personally any desire to leave His Majesty's Government to act alone, and professed not to have seen the article in the "Djoumhouriet" to which I referred. He stated, however, that the Turkish Government and people had been greatly disillusioned by the standpoint adopted by the Cox delegation. They had deduced therefrom that

His Majesty's Government had not had the slightest desire for a direct settlement, but had been determined to force the arbitrament of the League upon Turkey. Such an attitude had rendered them suspicious both of the League and of the ulterior motives of Great Britain. They had been prepared to see Sir Percy Cox demand for Irak the present administrative frontier of Mosul, but the demand for territory outside that frontier, and actually in the possession of Turkey, had created a most unfortunate impression on, and greatly irritated, not only Government, but all circles in this country.

10. Adnan's language in this respect makes me less hopeful, even than I was before, of a satisfactory reply from Angora to the proposal for joint reference to the League. I told him, however, that I regretted that such an erroneous impression should have been caused by the exercise on the part of His Majesty's Government, acting impartially, of an undeniable right to claim a suitable frontier for Irak. Those negotiations were, however, now over and done with, and, having failed, the only course now was to refer the dispute to the League. His Majesty's Government hoped to be able to concert with the Turkish Government in making that reference, and I thought the latter would be well advised to agree to join in it. Adnan Bey undertook to telegraph accordingly, and the conversation turned to the question of Nusret Bey's appointment to succeed Adnan as delegate in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about which I am reporting in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6052/32/44] No. 9.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 537.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 6, 1924.

AT the weekly meeting of the Allied representatives on the 3rd instant, the Italian representative asked my French colleague and myself to join in protesting officially against the appointment of Nusret Bey in place of Adnan Bey as delegate in Constantinople of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I had the honour, in my telegram No. 118 of the 4th instant, to acquaint you with the upshot of our discussion on the subject.

2. I have little to add to the despatches I have already addressed to you in regard to Nusret Bey's nomination except to mention that he acted as legal adviser to the Turkish delegation appointed to conduct here the Irak frontier negotiations with Sir Percy Cox's mission. It is a fair criticism of the part played thereat by Nusret Bey to admit that I completely forgot to mention his participation in those negotiations when drafting my despatch No. 523 of the 1st July. He may be a most capable legal adviser and expert, but his calibre, in general respects, cannot be regarded as adequate for the purpose of the medium of communication between foreign Ambassadors and the Government at Angora. Adnan Bey, however, lacking, as he appears to be, in influence with his own Government, and though possibly even suspect to them, owing to his intimate relations with members of the Opposition, is at least a man of distinction and of some weight in the country. Nusret Bey is from all accounts entirely insignificant, and the functions of delegate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, if he is definitely confirmed as such after the entry into force of the treaty, will be reduced still more than ever to those of a postbox.

3. M. Montagna is of course particularly sensitive on the subject of Nusret's appointment on account of the disparity of their respective rôles at Lausanne. He described Nusret as having been there an official not even of secondary importance and was very insistent on the necessity of our taking all possible action with a view to preventing his definite nomination. I explained to my colleagues my reasons for considering that formal representations to Adnan Bey would serve no useful purpose, and it was ultimately decided to suggest to our Governments that a hint respecting the unsuitability of this appointment should be given to the Turkish representatives in London, Rome, and Paris. Though the form of such a protest is a delicate matter, I regard it as undesirable that the selection of Nusret should pass unchallenged.

4. My colleagues and I also agreed to speak ourselves to Adnan Bey on the subject, and I took advantage of the interview which I have reported in my despatch No. 536 of the 4th July to do so. I asked him whether there was any truth in a statement which I had seen in the Turkish press to the effect that the Government were

contemplating asking for the King's *agrément* to a new Turkish Ambassador in London in place of Yussuf Kemal Bey. If so, it was possible that His Majesty's decision might be influenced by Nusret's nomination. However great might be his qualities in his own sphere, I could not regard Nusret's personality as a suitable one for the recognised channel of communication between the foreign missions at Constantinople and the Government at Angora. It appeared to be certain now that the Treaty of Lausanne would come into force before the end of the month. My Government would then presumably make known their views as to the status of their representative in Turkey and as to the most practicable arrangements for the conduct of diplomatic business in this country. I laid stress on the distinction, which is so emphasised in London, between Ambassadors and Ministers. The intention of His Majesty's Government, I said, so far as I was aware of it, was to appoint an Ambassador to the Turkish Republic, provided he resided in Constantinople. There was a grave risk of this intention not being fulfilled if the arrangements which the Turks, for their part, were prepared to make for the proper conduct of diplomatic business at Constantinople could not be regarded as consonant with the dignity of His Majesty's Ambassador. I added that I recognised the invidious position in which I would place him if I were to make a formal representation to him direct; I was, however, not speaking officially, nor was I in fact authorised to do so; I was expressing to him my personal views in a friendly and perfectly frank manner, but I wished him to know that, in agreement with my French and Italian colleagues, who were taking similar action, I was reporting to His Majesty's Government my view as to the inadequacy of the personality of Nusret Bey for the post to which he had been designated.

5. Adnan Bey was considerably perturbed and anxious to know what I meant exactly by personality. I explained this to the best of my ability. He denied the truth of the rumour respecting the imminent nomination of a new Turkish representative for London. He did his best to affirm the distinguished qualities of Nusret Bey. He said that the obvious answer of his Government to any protest anent Nusret's unsuitability would be to say: "Then let the foreign missions come to Angora," and expressed regret that the Allied Powers had not seen fit to make known earlier their intentions respecting representation in Turkey.

6. I told him that the retort to the Angora answer was still more obvious. Apart from other reasons, it was impossible on practical and material grounds, not only for Ambassadors and Ministers, but even for the necessary personnel of a mission like ours, to reside at present at Angora. We must start at the commencement and not at the end. Money had first to be found and a habitation constructed. Every Government nowadays was chary of spending money unless it were convinced that the expense was unavoidable. I fully recognised the determination of the Turkish Government to maintain Angora as its capital; but the Turkish Government must also recognise that, in view of the recency of that decision, foreign Governments had the right to be sceptical as to its immutability. Many Turks themselves were no less sceptical on the subject. Let the Turkish Government also start from the commencement and do their best to smooth away the difficulties which were inherent to all beginnings. That was my object in speaking to him about Nusret Bey's appointment I could not myself regard it, if it were in the nature of a definite arrangement, as a satisfactory beginning to the renewal of full diplomatic relations with Turkey. I was unaware of the exact terms, which Adnan Bey would doubtless communicate to us, of Nusret's appointment, but, though I wished nothing but well to Nusret personally, I trusted it would be provisional, and that it would not be maintained after the treaty had entered into force and the Turkish Government been made aware of the arrangements which the Allied Governments proposed to make.

7. Adnan Bey said that the appointment was intended by his Government to be definite. He added, however, that he would make neither to myself nor to my Allied colleagues any official communication, but come and present Nusret to us in person.

8. I acquiesced in that and changed the subject, as I would consider it just as well if no written communication were to pass, in order that it may be less difficult for the Turkish Government ultimately to modify its decision. Adnan Bey's instructions may, however, not leave him the option.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6054/32/44] No. 10.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 14.)

(No. 540.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 8, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 537 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the official communication which I have now received from Adnan Bey, notifying me of Nusret Bey's appointment as delegate at Constantinople of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It will be observed that the latter has received the rank of a Minister Plenipotentiary, and took over his duties as from the 7th July. It was announced in the press yesterday evening that Adnan Bey's instructions were to make a written communication to the foreign missions on the subject.

2. Adnan Bey brought him to Yenikeuy to introduce him to me this morning. Nusret Bey appeared very amiable, but practically his only contribution to the conversation was a remark at the end of their visit, which lasted about half an hour, that he hoped that our relations would be as friendly as those which I had always maintained with Adnan Bey.

3. Nusret Bey's nomination has one advantage, in that he has been employed for some time past at the delegation, and is therefore fully acquainted with the various outstanding questions between the delegation and this mission.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Adnan Bey to Mr. Henderson.

M. le Représentant. *Constantinople, le 7 juillet* 1924.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que son Excellence Nousret Bey, Ministre plénipotentiaire, étant nommé délégué du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople, doit me remplacer et prendre possession de son poste à partir d'aujourd'hui.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
DR. ADNAN.

[E 6106/3750/44] No. 11.

Mr. Ramsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 250. Confidential.)

Sir, *Stockholm, July* 4, 1924.

WITH reference to Mr. R. Lindsay's despatch No. 453 of the 4th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the text of the Treaty of Friendship between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of Turkey, signed at Angora on the 31st May last, which I have obtained from the acting secretary-general of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

It will be observed that, while no mention is made in this treaty of the Capitulations, they are in effect abandoned by the Swedish Government, as under article 3 the contracting parties agree to regulate their consular and commercial relations, and the conditions under which their respective nationals may settle or sojourn in each other's territory, by conventions to be concluded "in conformity with the rules of international law" and on the basis of "complete reciprocity."

The acting secretary-general informed me that the treaty had not yet been published.

I have transmitted a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
PATRICK RAMSAY.

Enclosure in No. 11.

Treaty of Friendship between Sweden and Turkey.

LA Suède d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part, également et sincèrement désireuses d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre le Royaume de Suède et la République turque, et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives, ont résolu de conclure un traité d'amitié et ont à cet effet nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède : Son Excellence M. Wallenberg, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi de Suède ; et

Le Président de la République turque : Son Excellence Tewfik Kiamil Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après d'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre le Royaume de Suèd et la République turque, ainsi qu'entre les ressortissants des deux parties.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États conformément aux principes du droit des gens. Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront, à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour régler les relations consulaires et commerciales entre leurs pays respectifs ainsi que les conditions d'établissement et de séjour, dans le territoire de chacune d'elles, des ressortissants de l'autre partie par des conventions qu'elles se réservent de conclure conformément aux règles du droit international public général sur la base d'une parfaite réciprocité.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople le plus tôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y on apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double, à Angora, le 31 mai 1924.

(L.S.) G. O. WALLENBERG.

(L.S.) TEWFIK KIAMIL.

[E 6090/448/44] No. 12.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 2294.)

Foreign Office, July 15, 1924.

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith three instruments,* conveying His Majesty the King's ratification of—

(*a.*) The Treaty of Peace with Turkey and such of the other instruments signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, as require ratification by His Majesty;

* Not printed.

(*b.*) The Greek Minorities Treaty and the Treaty respecting Thrace, signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920, the ratification of which is provided for by document No. XVI of the Final Act of the Lausanne Settlement ("Treaty Series," No. 16 (1923), p. 224); and

(*c.*) The Convention for the Assessment and Reparation of Damage suffered by Allied Nationals in Turkey, signed at Paris on the 23rd November, 1923 ("Treaty Series," No. 3 (1924)).

2. I request that you will deposit these ratifications with the French Government with as little delay as possible.

3. You should at the same time hand to the French Government the formal declarations regarding the exclusion of certain portions of the British Empire from the Commercial Convention and from the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction, of which the texts are enclosed in this despatch. These declarations have, under articles 19 and 16 respectively of the two conventions, to be made at the time of the coming into force of the convention, and the French Government will no doubt arrange for them to be formally made at the time when the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications is drawn up in accordance with article 143 of the Peace Treaty, and the fact that these declarations have been made will no doubt be stated in that *procès-verbal*.

4. The same procedure should be followed in regard to the British copy of the identic declaration excluding the condominium of the New Hebrides from the commercial and establishment conventions; but if the draft declaration is not ready when this despatch reaches you the action indicated above need not be delayed on that account, although the declaration must be duly made at the time when the *procès-verbal* of deposit is drawn up.

I am, &c.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 12.

Declaration relating to the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction.

IN accordance with the provisions of article 19 of the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, the undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French Republic, duly authorised by His Britannic Majesty for that purpose, hereby declares that the provisions of the said convention do not apply to any of the following of His Britannic Majesty's dominions enjoying responsible government, colonies, possessions, protectorates or territories subject to His Majesty's sovereignty or authority :—

Canada.
Union of South Africa.
Mandated territory of South-West Africa.
Irish Free State.
Bahamas.
Gibraltar.
Sierra Leone.
Fiji.
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
British Solomon Islands Protectorate and other islands under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific.
Tonga.
Basutoland.
Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Swaziland.
Northern Rhodesia.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
Straits Settlements.
Mandated territory of Nauru.

In witness whereof the undersigned has signed the present declaration and affixed thereto the seal of his arms.

Done at Paris, this day of , 1924. (L.S.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 12.

Declaration relating to the Commercial Convention.

IN accordance with the provisions of article 16 of the Commercial Convention, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, the undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French Republic, duly authorised by His Britannic Majesty for that purpose, hereby declares that the provisions of the said convention do not apply to any of the following of His Britannic Majesty's dominions enjoying responsible government, colonies, possessions, protectorates or territories subject to His Majesty's sovereignty or authority :—

Canada.
Commonwealth of Australia.
Papua.
Norfolk Island.
Mandated territory of New Guinea.
Union of South Africa.
Mandated territory of South-West Africa.
Irish Free State.
India.
Kenya.
Mauritius.
Bahamas.
Gibraltar.
Sierra Leone.
Fiji.
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
British Solomon Islands Protectorate and other islands under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific.
Tonga.
Basutoland.
Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Swaziland.
Northern Rhodesia.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
Mandated territory of Nauru.

In witness whereof the undersigned has signed the present declaration and affixed thereto the seal of his arms.

Done at Paris, this day of , 1924.

(L.S.)

[E 6090/448/44] No. 13.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 15, 1924.

HIS Majesty's ratification of Lausanne settlement was sent to Paris 15th July for deposit with French Government.

Settlement cannot, however, come into force until date of *procès-verbal*, provided for in article 143 of treaty.

No. 14.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 470.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 17, 1924.

IT was announced on 12th July that M. Albert Milhaud had been appointed reporter in the Chamber for the law for the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. I learn to-day that it is anticipated that this treaty will be ratified soon after the reassembly of Parliament at the end of the month, and it is hoped that there will be but little delay in passing the law.

[E 6216/4795/44] No. 15.

Mr. Hodgson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 641. Confidential.)
Sir, *Moscow, July* 9, 1924.

WITH reference to telegram from Paris of which copy was transmitted to me under cover of Foreign Office despatch No. 825 of the 25th June, I have the honour to report that, in my estimation, the project attributed to Italy and the Soviet Government of a joint attack on Turkey is entirely devoid of any foundation. At all events, as far as Russia is concerned, I should say that any such scheme is wildly outside the range of practical politics.

2. It is the case that the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Mouktar Bey, has revealed some nervousness as to the trend of Italo-Soviet relations. As long ago as the 8th March he mentioned to me, in the course of private conversation, a speech of Signor Mussolini's which seemed to him to imply a menace to Turkey. He asked me if I knew anything which supported this view. I told him that I knew of nothing of the kind, but that I had heard from an American journalist here (it was, in fact, Mr. Duranty of the "New York Times") of some vague scheme for projected economic co-operation between Italy and Russia in the Near East, particularly in connection with Turkey. He asked me to let him know anything further that I should hear on the subject. I spoke to him on a subsequent occasion and told him that, as far as I could ascertain, the remarks of the journalist in question were only the expression of aspirations cherished by individual Russians and had no substantial background behind them.

I have, &c.
R. M. HODGSON.

[E 6178/448/44] No. 16.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 205.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 19, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 470 of 17th July and my despatch No. 2294 of 15th July: Ratification of Lausanne settlement.

It is desirable that settlement should enter into force for France at the same time as for the other Powers. Otherwise numerous difficulties will arise, especially as regards commissions to be set up at varying periods from entry into force, on all of which France is to be represented, and as regards questions between detached territories under French and British mandates (see your despatch No. 629 of 20th March), His Majesty's Government would, therefore, be prepared to wait until the end of the month before pressing for immediate preparation of *procès-verbal* of deposit under article 143 of treaty, if there is a reasonable prospect of French ratification being ready by then. If not, however, they cannot agree to any further delay in entry into force of settlement.

Please make necessary representations to the French Government and urge them to do everything in their power to ensure that French ratification shall not be further postponed.

(Confidential.)

We understand privately from French delegation here that such representations would be welcome as strengthening their hands in pressing Parliament to complete necessary action.

[E 6237/178/44] No. 17.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 555.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 16, 1924.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 126 of to-day's date, I have the honour to submit the following further particulars regarding the renewed seizure of the Galata bridge tolls by the Constantinople municipal authorities.

2. On the 6th July I noticed a statement in the local press that the tolls were again being encashed by the prefecture of the city. The statement was, however, so obviously inaccurate in certain details that I attached little credence to it except as an indication that payment to the National Bank of Turkey might have been temporarily suspended on the ground that the limit, which seemed to be in contemplation when Mr. Lindsay wrote his despatch No. 192 of the 5th March, had been reached. I therefore awaited further information.

3. The National Bank made no representations on the subject, and it was only as a result of enquiries made on receipt of your telegram No. 98 of the 15th July that I obtained an exact statement of what had happened.

4. It appears that on the 2nd July the head of the competent department of the prefecture informed the bank by telephone that payment of the tolls would cease. This form of intimation was similar to that employed at the end of February when the same official announced that the payments, which had been suspended from the 4th October last, would be resumed as from the 1st March.

5. The amount paid into the bank from the 1st March to 2nd July amounted to £T. 138,659·26. The amount would have been roughly equivalent to the amount required to pay the equivalent in French francs at pre-war par of the interest on the loan, and the directors of the bank at first assumed that the intention of the authorities was to cover the service of the loan on that scale for the current year.

6. On the 5th July, however, the bank received an official letter from the prefecture, dated two days earlier, which put a different complexion on the matter. The letter stated that the amount received by the bank from the 1st March up to the end of June was in excess of the sum of £T. 60,500 necessary to provide for interest and sinking fund for one year of the loan of 1,100,000 liras [*sic*] contracted by the municipality, "in accordance with the point of view repeatedly intimated by the prefecture," that it had therefore been decided to divert the tolls to the prefecture as from the date of the letter, and that the bank was requested to refund the surplus money paid to it during the period in question.

7. This letter was personally signed by the new prefect of the city, Dr. Emin Bey, who has shown in other directions the qualities of the new broom. It shows clearly that the authorities have made up their minds to ignore altogether, for the present at any rate, the sterling character of the original transaction and to treat the loan as one of £1,100,000 in Turkish currency, regardless of depreciation.

8. The bank is preparing a protest in reply to the letter. Owing to the urgency of the matter, I have been unable to see the directors personally before sending this despatch by to-day's King's messenger, but I assume that they will refuse to make the refund asked for. It seems to me hardly likely that the prefecture will push matters to the length of enforcing the refund. On at least one previous occasion, *i.e.*, when Sir A. Block discussed the matter with the late prefect on the 26th December last, it was suggested on the Turkish side that the present paper currency was equivalent to the pre-war gold currency. I imagine the new prefect to be acting in the view that this is not only a more profitable, but in some sense a more logical ground on which to despoil the holders of the loan, rather than to go on the entirely irrelevant French franc basis; but he probably realises that his real goal must be to effect an agreed compromise, when Turkey comes to terms with other and more important creditors, viz., the holders of State bonds.

9. On one point it is necessary to make a correction in Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 192 of the 5th March. As I have stated above, the intimation to the bank at the end of February that payment of the bridge tolls would be resumed was merely a telephonic communication, and it appears that the bank did not on that occasion make any protest or reservation.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6233/448/44] No. 18.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 1565.)

Sir, *Paris, July* 18, 1924.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 2294 of the 15th July, relative to the deposit of ratifications of certain treaties and conventions as enumerated in your despatch, including the Lausanne Treaty, I immediately communicated with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

It was pointed out to me that, in accordance with article 143 of the Lausanne Treaty, the *procès-verbal* of ratification could not be drawn up until three, at least, of the Allied Powers mentioned had ratified the treaty, whereas at present only Turkey and Great Britain had done so. I have therefore deposited at the Quai d'Orsay the three instruments of ratification mentioned in the first paragraph of your despatch and the declarations regarding the exclusion of certain portions of the British Empire from the Commercial Convention and from the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction. These declarations I have signed and sealed. A copy of my note forwarding these documents to the Quai d'Orsay is enclosed herein. It is understood that, as soon as three Allied Powers shall have ratified the Lausanne Treaty, the necessary *procès-verbal* of ratification will be drawn up and signed. The *procès-verbal* will contain a mention of the fact that the declarations have been made.

With regard to the identic declaration regarding the exclusion of the New Hebrides from the Commercial and Establishment Conventions, the Quai d'Orsay pointed out that it was impossible for the signature of these to take place by both parties until the French Government had ratified the treaty. On receipt of your telegram No. 203, I took up this point again with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and it has been agreed that the declarations can be signed on behalf of His Majesty's Government and the French Government as soon as the French Government have ratified the treaty and before the *procès-verbal* of ratification is drawn up. The *procès-verbal* can then include a mention of these declarations. I trust that this course will meet with your approval.

As reported in my telegram No. 470 of the 17th July, the Quai d'Orsay anticipate that the Lausanne Treaty will be ratified by the French Government very shortly after the meeting of Parliament on the 29th July.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Mr. Phipps to M. Renoult, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, July* 19, 1924.

IN accordance with instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith three instruments conveying His Majesty the King's ratification of—

(*a.*) The Treaty of Peace with Turkey and such of the other instruments signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, as require ratification by His Majesty;

(*b.*) The Greek Minorities Treaty and the Treaty respecting Thrace, signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920, the ratification of which is provided for by document No. XVI of the Final Act of the Lausanne Settlement; and

(*c.*) The Convention for the Assessment and Reparation of Damage suffered by Allied Nationals in Turkey, signed at Paris on the 23rd November, 1923.

At the same time I have the honour to enclose herein the formal declarations regarding the exclusion of certain portions of the British Empire from the Commercial Convention and from the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction. As your Excellency is aware, these declarations have, under articles 19 and 16 respectively of the two conventions, to be made at the time of coming into force of the convention. Your Excellency will no doubt arrange for the declarations to be formally made at the time when the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications is drawn up in accordance with article 143 of the Peace Treaty, and the fact that these declarations have been made will doubtless be stated in that *procès-verbal*

I am similarly empowered to sign, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the identic declaration excluding the Condominium of the New Hebrides from the Commercial and Establishment Conventions, as soon as the French Government are in a position to sign on their side.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 6355/448/44] No. 19.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 210.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1924.

YOUR despatch No. 1600 of 23rd July: Ratification of Lausanne settlement.

I approve your action and proposal to defer formal deposit until 31st July.

It is important, however, that we should know date of *procès-verbal* and consequent entry into force of the settlement as soon as possible. Please, therefore, ascertain from the French Government in advance date fixed for preparation of *procès-verbal* and report it by telegraph.

(Confidential.)

If French Parliament does not meet till 29th July, possibly French ratification will not be ready by 31st July. Provided you are satisfied that ratification is really about to be completed, there would be no objection to drawing up of *procès-verbal* being deferred for a few days after 31st July in case of need. But you should not volunteer this statement to French Government at present.

[E 6454/32/44] No. 20.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 572.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 23, 1924.

THE internal political situation in Turkey has been exceedingly stagnant, at any rate on the surface, during the last two months. The storm which raged so long round the person of the late Minister of the Interior, Ferid Bey, subsided rapidly after he made way for Rejeb Bey, whose appointment was reported in Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 427 of the 28th May. Ferid Bey thereafter relapsed into obscurity and public interest in the scandal of the Armenian and other fugitive Christians, who had managed to return to Turkey, waned. Attention has been redirected to it recently by the publication of the conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry regarding various cases. So far, however, it has created no renewed excitement, for the public mind is confused and rather bored with the whole business. All that need be said of it at present is that the scandal may again become an important factor in the situation, if the Government decide to take action against the persons incriminated by the reports of the commission, and that, if they do not, it will be a stick to beat them with when the Grand National Assembly meets again in October.

2. The ill-feeling between Angora and Constantinople continues to exist, but it does not express itself so bitterly as it did some time ago. The politicians of Angora are to a great extent dispersed and a dull depression, accentuated perhaps by the heat of summer, seems to have settled on Constantinople, despite the efforts of the press to whip up interest in the economic questions which are so large a factor in the rivalry between the old and new capitals. The much discussed Vali and Acting Prefect, Haidar Bey, was removed from his post here soon after the fall of Ferid Bey, and was appointed Prefect of Angora, where it was doubtless thought that his passion for grandiose town planning schemes would be better employed than in Constantinople, where he sought to give the population avenues and ornamental cisterns instead of the bread of which they stood in need. The opportunity was taken of again separating the offices of Vali and Prefect, the mutual adjustment of which is one of the eternal riddles that baffle Turkish statesmen. The new Vali, Rashid Bey, is a man of little note, and hardly anything is heard of his doings, which must be held to be a point in his favour. The new Prefect, Emin Bey, is more in evidence, chiefly because he has had some pretty acute quarrels with the Municipal Council. The latter is an

elective body, imbued with a critical spirit, whereas the Prefect is not only a Government official but is one brought in by Angora from outside.

3. Both these high officials collaborated in the most striking assertion of Government authority which Constantinople has witnessed since the bundling-out of the Caliph. This was the abolition some weeks ago of the privileges of the porters' guild. The porters and the lightermen, the two strongest of the old corporations, have long been two hornets' nests, composed for the most part of Kurds and Lazes respectively. Strongly held by certain chiefs, they have been a law unto themselves, and it has at times been the aim of political organisations to turn them to account. The porters had an elaborate system by which not only had the guild as a whole a monopoly of porterage, but particular centres were sacred to particular sections of it. They had their internal quarrels over which feeling ran high, but they agreed in upholding their privileges against all comers. Last month the Vali and the Prefect struck a blow both at the general monopoly and the local monopolies by decreeing that any person who obtained a permit might exercise the trade of porter anywhere. Trouble was expected and preparations were made to cope with it. The guild, however, has taken the decision with unexpected meekness, either because its members were overawed or because, as some sceptics allege, there is little real change. The leaders went to Angora and were rebuffed. It is still too early to say whether the power of the guild has been broken. Some days ago there was a fracas in Stamboul, but such incidents have occurred in the past, and the riot which occurred was not necessarily an organised protest against the Government decision, though it was an outcome of the unrest created by it. Meanwhile the public has been impressed both by the assertion of authority and by the reform.

4. On the whole, public order is well maintained in Constantinople, in spite of widespread dissatisfaction with the Government. One or two isolated instances alone have shown that inflammable material exists in the midst of a population which for the most part is cowed, and that the old respect for uniformed authority is not as great as it was. Thus, about the middle of May a very trivial incident outside the Adrianople Gate, the interference of gendarmes with a drunken man led to the gathering of a considerable mob whose sympathies with the toper were so worked upon that the gendarmes and certain "gardes forestiers" who came to their assistance were severely handled. Firing took place and there were not a few casualties.

5. Little news comes from Angora now that the Grand National Assembly is not in session. Accounts are received of the solid work done in the Government Departments. If there is little to show for it, there are also no sign of any serious deterioration in the interior of the country. It is probable that some real effort is being made to help the agricultural interest. For the rest, innumerable projects are discussed and few definite decisions appear to be taken. The plight of the new population imported from Greece is said to be pretty miserable. In short, the Government are carrying on, neither very well nor very ill, against the time when the reopening of the Grand National Assembly will again expose them to attack. Mustafa Kemal Pasha all the while keeps his state at Chan Kaya, impenetrable, if, indeed, there be more to penetrate than the apathy of a tired hero, too addicted, as his detractors periodically allege, to the use of the bottle.

6. What or how much may be brewing beneath this still surface of things it is impossible to say. Rumours that the Government, and even the republic, are fundamentally unstable revolve round various more or less definable factors, of which the principal are Reouf Bey and his group of dissident Nationalists, the khojas, the ragged but influential remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress, and, well in the eastern background, the Kurds. Reouf Bey returned from his cure in Europe some little time ago, having been as far as Wembley in the course of his travels. For the moment the most striking thing about him is that, though without personal fortune, he seems to be well supplied with funds. He has made no political demonstration. He has so long been the dark horse that one begins to wonder whether he will even emerge from the stable. The khojas represent a strong body of discontent, adverse to the irreligion of the present rulers, but lacking in cohesion, a potential rather than an actual force. One hears of occasional manifestations of their dissatisfaction: of a preacher at Selevke three or four months ago, who delivered a sermon so reactionary that it led to his arrest, a demonstration in his favour by the populace, and in due course his trial and condemnation to death at Angora; of an alleged attempt to reopen the religious schools at a place inland from the Black Sea coast; and of an old khoja of Angora, who, preaching in the presence of Mustafa Kemal himself on the 13th July, the first day of Bairam, indulged in reflections on

the uselessness of the Deputies. A somewhat indiscreet gentleman of the same class recently sought to establish contact with this mission. I need hardly say that he received no encouragement, but it is interesting to note what he said, namely, that the khojas were organising an opposition on the basis of reinstating the Caliph, that they had made terms with the Committee of Union and Progress, as represented by the notorious Kara Kemal Bey, and that they would like to work with Reouf, but considered that he should throw over Mustafa Kemal more completely than he has done. Direct news of the Committee of Union and Progress activities there is none at all, but men like Javid Bey, Rahmi Bey and, on a lower plane, the Kara Kemal just mentioned, can never cease to count, however quiescent they may be in appearance; and Javid Bey, their leading publicist, has returned from a holiday in Europe again to persecute the Government with a mordant pen. Finally, the Kurds. That turbulent people are always restless in the eastern provinces. A little while ago a message was sent to this mission that all their local committees were ready to move, and that they had sent a delegate with full powers to confer with Kurdish notabilities here. Mr. Ryan was asked to receive this person, and naturally refused to do so. According to another report, unsubstantiated however, even Zulfi Bey, the Deputy for Diarbekr, who was produced at Lausanne as a type of the inseparable Kurd, has gone into revolt. All these indications, vague as they are, show the lack of real stability in the country, and they hold out prospect of new political storms when the Assembly meets in October, even if nothing should occur to precipitate them sooner. But in the meantime Ismet Pasha holds to his course. Since he got rid of Ferid Bey, there has been no public sign of any weakening of his position. He has only had to make one further change in his Cabinet, and that an unimportant one, the appointment of a certain Refet Bey as Minister of Reconstruction in place of Jelal Bey, who left the Cabinet in order to help in the creation of a new bank of national complexion. The Pasha's health has improved. He has taken advantage of the Bairam holiday to visit Smyrna and the surrounding country. The ostensible object of his journey has been to visit his family and bring them back to Angora, but it has also a political character and Ismet Pasha is unlikely to have missed the opportunity of talking privately to Reouf and Rahmi Beys, who are also at Smyrna at the moment.

7. I cannot complete this despatch better than by a summary of Ismet Pasha's most important recent utterance; a speech delivered at Magnesia on the 16th July, one passage of which I had the honour to report *in extenso* in my telegram No. 127 of the 18th July.

8. The Pasha began with a tribute to the people of Magnesia. He wished, he said, to render an account to them and to the nation of the Government's activities up to date. He had seen people of every kind in the course of his journey and had informed himself regarding the ills from which the people suffered. He had gone into the question of the immigrants, which was more particularly a question of their settlement. In many places the immigrants themselves had grievances. Irregularities might have occurred and great vigilance was required. The exercise of it would enable the situation to be dealt with, provided exaggerated demands were not made. The country welcomed the immigrants and, despite its own distress, it was its duty to do all it could for those co-nationals from outside its frontiers, all of whom must be brought into Turkey

9. After a further admonition to the immigrants not to be excessive in their demands, Ismet Pasha said that all the abandoned property of the Greeks who had left the country legally belonged to them. He did not wish to contravene this principle and would do his utmost to overcome existing difficulties by a serious examination of the mutual position of the newcomers and the old inhabitants. He turned to the Government's reconstruction programme. The great problem was that of new buildings. It would be unsound to sink capital in the provision of them. The true solution lay in economic revival. The erection of buildings by the State would be confined to what was strictly necessary Real reconstruction would be the concomitant of prosperity resulting from economic measures, and it was for that reason that important credits had been set aside in the budget for economic purposes. The Pasha then dwelt at some lenth on the successful results already achieved by the Agricultural Bank, the distribution of seed corn, and other forms of State assistance to agriculture. Most crops promised extremely well this year and his great preoccupation was how to double them in coming years. Existing economic and financial establishments must be developed and consolidated. The Agricultural Bank had never before been so great an object of Government solicitude. Everything due to it up to 1908 had been repaid.

10. Ismet Pasha referred to the quantities of native capital which was fructifying in foreign banks. The Agricultural Bank and the Crédit national deserved every confidence. The Government sought to strengthen the situation of the latter and to encourage by every means economic and financial institutions already in existence or in process of formation. He specifically mentioned the projected Banque d'Affaires and various other schemes of a similar kind which he hoped to see brought to fruition. He went on to speak of railways and means of transport generally. £T. 13,000,000 had been set aside for the former, and by the end of the year 200 kilom of railway line would have been laid. It might be possible to do even more next year. Transport both by land and sea was of the utmost importance. The landing arrangements in the ports left much to be desired.

11. Passing to foreign affairs, Ismet Pasha first made the statement reproduced in my telegram No. 127 of the 18th July, and went on to speak of the Public Debt question in terms which are worth reproducing textually from the semi-official French version of his speech.

> "Le Traité de Lausanne n'a pas résolu l'autre problème important pour nous, celui de la Dette publique. Les dettes seront réparties et nous aurons à payer la part qui nous incombe. Le budget voté cette année-ci par la grande Assemblée nationale contient des modifications en ce qui concerne le nombre et les traitements des agents de la Dette publique. Nous avons unifié le mode de perception de tous les recettes du pays. On a prétendu, en se référant au Décret de Mouharem, que notre façon de faire n'était pas régulière. Vous savez qu'à Lausanne on nous a fait des offres en vue de nous faire accepter la reconnaissance de ce décret. Nous avons rejeté cette proposition, par notre défense sérieuse et légitime. Les changements que nous avons apportés à l'administration centrale de la Dette publique ont été motivés par un besoin d'économie et découlaient des nécessités du budget. C'est là un droit de la grande Assemblée nationale. Il n'est pas possible d'admettre que les intérêts des porteurs soient lésés et que les droits et la capacité des débiteurs soit dépassés. Nos dettes seront réglées après entente avec les porteurs et après avoir arrêté avec eux un système de paiement C'est la thèse que nous avons défendue toujours. J'ajouterai que nous n'avons pas touché à l'organisation de la Dette publique tant que nous n'en avons pas ressenti un besoin impérieux. Nous avons cherché autant que possible à maintenir le *statu quo*. Nous désirons entrer, au plus tôt en pourparlers avec les représentants des porteurs afin de résoudre cette question. Si nous n'avons pas pu entamer encore les pourparlers, la cause réside dans le fait que le traité n'est pas encore entré en vigueur."

12. The most important foreign question still remaining was, said Ismet Pasha, that of the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. The delays which had occurred had been ascribed to certain more or less valid reasons. These reasons were disappearing, and it looked as though the greater part of the necessary formalities were complete; but he wished to emphasise the fact that, in the meanwhile, Turkey had been content with the treaty which she had signed at Lausanne and had not awaited its entry into force. Normal relations had been established with States like Germany, Austria, &c., and Turkey's foreign relations were being developed on a basis of mutual respect between equal States. The evolution and stability of her internal situation were such as to inspire friends and foreigners with confidence in the solidity of her régime. There was no need to speak among themselves of internal security. Never in the past had tranquillity been so assured as under the new republican system

13. After some general remarks on public instruction, Ismet Pasha deprecated the efforts of certain *esprits chagrins* to instil pessimism into the mass of the people, and of others to trouble the public mind by factious criticism. His party sought the inspiration of their programme in the needs of the people and wished it to be approved by the people in the first instance. It had surmounted innumerable difficulties and nothing could stop its further progress. It derived its strength not only from what it had done but from what it intended to do in the future.

14. The passage with which Ismet Pasha concluded his speech (except for a final expression of thanks to the Magnesians and other conventional phrases) dealt with the question of foreign enterprise in Turkey in terms which are again worth quoting at length:—

> "Nous accordons toutes les facilités au capital étranger qui veut venir travailler chez nous. Les refrains entonnés par nos adversaires à ce sujet sont

inspirés par ceux qui ne veulent pas importer des capitaux du dehors. Nous voulons que des hommes d'entreprises sérieuses viennent chez nous travailler avec leur argent. Nous sommes prêts à coopérer avec eux. Mais nous ne voulons pas accorder au premier venu des concessions qui lui permettront de soutirer l'or du pays. Ceux qui viennent avec leur capital, leur intelligence, leur savoir-faire pour travailler honnêtement, légalement, auront toutes les portes ouvertes. Nous ne pourrions évidemment rien accorder à tel individu qui viendrait, par exemple, pour obtenir une concession de mines à Magnésie pour une période de cinquante ans dans l'intention de la céder plus tard à quelque capitaliste. La première question que nous posons à toute personne qui s'adresse à nous, c'est de vous dire combien de temps elle compte se mettre au travail. Je vais vous dire une chose qui va vous étonner. On croit généralement que notre pays possède un sous-sol inépuisable et que malheursement tous ces gisements ne sont pas exploités parce qu'on n'en a pas encore accordé la concession. La réalité est tout autre. N'importe quel gisement se trouvant dans un coin inconnu du pays a déjà son concessionnaire. Rien n'est à donner. Les concessions ont été prises; mais les travaux d'exploitation n'ont pas encore commencés. Elles passent d'une main à l'autre, et cette situation a pour résultat de paralyser la vie économique du pays et de léser ses intérêts. Nous voulons des hommes sincères dans leurs paroles et leurs promesses, car nous n'entendons pas favoriser les spéculations.

"Nous sommes de ceux qui ont l'habitude, et qui se trouvent du reste dans la nécessité, de tirer le plus grand parti possible des fautes du passé. Nous accorderons les plus grandes facilités aux personnes sérieuses qui apporteront dans notre pays, leur capital ainsi que leur savoir et leur capacité. Mais, nous ne permettrons jamais que la spéculation s'exerce dans notre pays.

"Je remercie les habitants de Magnésie d'avoir bien voulu m'entendre; j'espère qu'ils trouveront dans l'exposé que je viens de leur faire la preuve que nous autres qui sommes décidés à marcher dans le droit chemin et dans la voie du progrès, sommes toujours prêts à rendre compte de nos actes à la nation. Nous franchirons tous les obstacles qui se dresseront devant nous et nous atteindrons sûrement notre objectif."

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

No. 21.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1924.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 45 and 46 of 6th March: Indian Caliphate delegation.

Central Caliphate Committee of India desire to send as soon as possible a delegation of eight persons to Turkey. They are unable to give detailed programme of itinerary, but general plan is to visit Constantinople, Angora, and other parts of Turkey, subject to advice received on reaching Turkey; general object is to persuade Turkish nation and Government to continue association of Caliphate with Turkey and retain central position of Turkey in Islamic world. Delegation would propose on arrival to consult members of Turkish Government and Turkish notables with regard to further programme. Before starting, each member of delegation will have given local Indian authorities an undertaking to abstain from any political activities in the countries visited. Names of delegates are given in my immediately following telegram.

Please ascertain from Turkish Government whether they are willing to receive the delegation, but make it quite clear that His Majesty's Government are merely transmitting the request and are not supporting it in any way.

No. 22.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, July* 28, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Following is personnel of delegation:—

1. Dr. Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari, of Delhi.
2. Hakim Mohamed Ajmal Khan Sahib, of Delhi.
3. Maulvi Mufti Kifayetullah Sahib, president of the Jamiat-ulema-i-hind.
4. Mr. Mohamed Marmaduke Pickthall, editor of the "Bombay Chronicle."
5. Maulana Sulaiman Nadvi, of Shibli Academy, Azamgarh
6. Mr. Tassaduq Ahmed Khan Sherwani, of Aligarh.
7. Chaudhri Khuliquzzaman, Chairman of the Municipal Board, Lucknow.
8. Haji Abdullah Haroon.

No. 23.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received July* 31.)

(No. 489.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, July* 30, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 210 of 25th July.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs informs me that French Parliament will adjourn for at least a month to-morrow or next day without having discussed the Treaty of Lausanne.

French Government urge strongly that deposit of British ratification should be postponed until French Parliament meets again in the course of September, when it is hoped that French ratification will be decided upon. They lay special stress on the fact that delay of French ratification is due to the London Conference.

In these circumstances do you wish me to deposit ratification to-morrow?

No. 24.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps (*Paris*).

(No. 212.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 489 of 30th July: Ratification of Lausanne settlement.

I regret that it is impossible to comply with French Government's request, since, apart from fact that postponement until September would not be consistent with article 143 of the treaty, and other serious objections to further delay, immediate entry into force is necessary to enable us to dispose of one of principal Turkish objections to submission of Mosul frontier question to League Council at its meeting at end of August.

You should explain this to French Government, and make formal deposit immediately, asking at the same time that *procès-verbal* provided for in article 143 may now be drawn up. Date of *procès-verbal* should be telegraphed.

This supersedes Mr. Malkin's letter of 30th July to Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen.

No. 25.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 2.)

(No. 501.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, August* 2, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 212.

Ratification and declarations regarding exclusion of certain portions of British Empire from Lausanne provisions were deposited this morning. Copy of note goes by bag.

As regards New Hebrides declaration, French adhere to view that this declaration, which is a joint one, cannot be signed until French Government have ratified. I propose therefore to hold this up until they have done so, when signature by both parties can take place. Do you approve?

No. 26.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 4.)

(No. 136.)

(Telegraphic.) D. *Constantinople, August 3, 1924.*

SINCE receipt of your telegram No. 100 I have assured Turks repeatedly that British instrument of ratification had actually been deposited in Paris. Nor had I any reason to imagine that this was not so.

I now see from your telegram No. 210 to Paris, which reached me in telegram sections yesterday, that His Majesty's Government agreed to proposal to defer actual deposit till 31st July. I should be grateful for information as to whether deposit has now been made or, if not, approximate period of further delay.

Turks are exceedingly sensitive on this subject as is indicated in reference thereto in reply respecting Irak frontier reported in my telegram No. 134 of yesterday.

[**W 6425/5281/98**]

No. 27.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 575.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 26, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the various points raised in your circular despatch of the 3rd July relative to the attitude of Turkey and the Turks towards the League of Nations.

2. The attitude of the Turkish Government as such may be described as one of watching and waiting, due to a mixture of suspicion, on the one hand, and the desire, on the other, to do nothing in a hostile sense which might react on the claim of the new Turkey to figure in the European system as an equal, independent and modern State. No forward move has been made since the Lausanne Conference, where, it will be remembered, Ismet Pasha stated on the 14th December, 1922, after a good deal of discussion and under some pressure from Lord Curzon, that "Turkey would be happy to enter the League of Nations on the conclusion of peace." During the second phase of the conference he consulted Sir Horace Rumbold privately as to how soon Turkey could become a member. This aroused some hope that the Turkish Government might take the necessary steps in the autumn of 1923, but they did not do so Since the signature of the Peace Treaty the only notable indication of their intentions has been the guarded statement by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in his speech to the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March :—

> "The entry of the Turkish Republic also into the League of Nations is a point which will be considered after the coming into force of the treaties. We desire that the League of Nations should not be an instrument of domination for the strong, but should manifest itself and develop as an institution which will assure harmony and familiar intercourse among nations and will provide a means of examining and settling differences in accordance with international law."

3. A fuller record of what passed at the conference will be found in the "Lausanne Handbook," p. 75, and the context of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's speech in Mr. Lindsay's despatch No. 188 of the 5th March last.

4. Minor indications of the attitude of the Turkish Government have been afforded by their acquiescence in various clauses of the Lausanne settlement involving recourse to the League ; and, more recently, by their refusal to participate in the Conference of Naval Experts to discuss the extension of the Washington Treaty (see my telegram No. 24 of the 31st January), and their participation, on the other hand, in the Second General Conference on Communications and Transit last November. These later indications illustrate, I think, the conflict of motive mentioned above The explanation given for the refusal to participate in the Naval Experts' Conference was that Turkey was not sufficiently interested, but this polite formula probably veiled an unwillingness to get entangled in anything which might tend to hamper her freedom to develop her armed forces. She was willing, however, and probably pleased, to appear as an invited guest at a conference to discuss so much less contentious a question as communications and transit.

5. Before leaving this part of the subject I may say that the eventual attitude of the Turkish Government will probably depend a good deal on the outcome of the Irak frontier question, should the arbitration provided for in the Treaty of Lausanne actually take place ; and that their progress towards membership of the League may also be retarded by their dislike of the mandatory system and their fears regarding the attitude of the League in regard to minority questions.

6. Turkish public opinion is ill-informed regarding the League and in the main indifferent to it, except when it deals, or seems likely to deal, with questions of special and immediate concern to Turkey. So far as a positive attitude can be said to exist, it is one of mistrust inspired by the belief that the League is a combine of Western Powers, dominated more particularly by Great Britain and run by the latter in her own interest. Mandates are regarded as a device for creating dependencies, and in extreme circles, especially in those with a pan-Islamic tinge, the mandatories entrusted with detached territories are held up to odium as oppressors. This is due more to hostility in the circles concerned towards the particular Powers than towards the League itself, whose rôle is hardly understood. Articulate public opinion is also sensitive regarding the possibility of League intervention on behalf of the Christian minorities, and one episode, the proposal to investigate the alleged detention of Christian women and children in Moslem houses, has left a particularly bitter memory. What has been said above regarding the effect of any future decision of the League regarding the Irak frontier applies at least as much to future public opinion as to the future attitude of the Government.

7. There nevertheless already exists in Turkey an "Association for Supporting the League of Nations." This was brought into existence in Constantinople a couple of years ago by a group of professors of the university. The president is Churuksulu Mahmoud Pasha, a former Senator and a well-known secondary figure in public life in the time of the Constantinople Government. The prime mover is a professor of international law, named Jemil Bey. He and two other delegates of the association attended the sixth assembly meeting of the International Union at Prague in 1922. Some little time afterwards three Turkish delegates attended a council meeting at Budapest, one being again Jemil Bey, the other two, Churuksulu Mahmoud Pasha and Assim Bey, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador. No Turkish delegate attended the assembly meeting last year, but Jemil Bey attended the meeting held recently at Lyons. The fact would appear to be that the Constantinople Government favoured the activities of the association—indeed, one of Jemil Bey's colleagues at Prague was a diplomat *en disponibilité* very closely connected with the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Izzet Pasha—but that, after the collapse of the Constantinople Government and until the end of the Lausanne Conference, the leading spirits in the association were either discouraged by Angora or uncertain of its approval. It was not until after the conference that Jemil Bey secured Ismet Pasha's authority to continue his efforts. Thus the career of the association has been somewhat chequered, but it has a membership of about 100 persons, it has published statutes and one or two reports, and it hopes to develop its activities in the near future.

8. The foregoing information was supplied to Mr. Ryan by Jemil Bey himself. He spoke frankly and evidently with a sincere conviction of the value of the League of Nations, or rather of *a* League of Nations, for he made a distinction between the idea of the League and the League as at present constituted. He admitted that the League was viewed with mistrust in this country and did not demur to Mr. Ryan's suggestion that this was largely due to a belief (which Mr. Ryan said was unfounded) that the preponderance of the Western Powers, and especially Great Britain, was excessive and intentional. He related with some dissatisfaction, but with good temper, various passages of arms with Greek delegates at the international meetings which he had attended. He spoke appreciatively of his relations with such British delegates as he had met, although he had found himself in conflict with them over the question of minorities on one important occasion.

9. The Turkish Government has certainly no separate Government department for dealing with League of Nations questions. I am not fully informed as to the organisations in detail of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Angora, but I think it may be assumed that there is no separate League of Nations section in the Ministry and that any questions affecting the League would be dealt with according to their nature in the ordinary course of departmental business generally.

I have, &c.

NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6637/3189/44] No. 28.

Mr. Bentinck to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 487.)

Sir, *Athens, July 28, 1924.*

WITH reference to Sir Milne Cheetham's despatch No. 420 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that there has been a certain amount of talk of late about an effort on the part of the Greek Government for better relations with Turkey. M. Papanastassiou, lately Prime Minister, was very anxious to arrive at a kind of *entente*, and M. Rentis, lately Minister for Foreign Affairs, referred in conversation with me to the question of the exchange of populations as being the only one standing in the way of better relations.

2. I asked M. Roussos to-day when I paid my first call on him, since he has now become Minister for Foreign Affairs for the third time this year, whether he could tell me anything on the subject. M. Roussos replied that Greece's relations with Turkey were at present "agréables" but could not be called friendly. The Greek Government had recently sounded the Government at Angora, suggesting a kind of *entente* on the basis of—

(1.) A declaration by each party that neither would attempt to alter the present frontiers of the other; and

(2.) A kind of "naval holiday" for ten years, during which each party should not increase its fleet beyond a certain limit on the lines of the Washington Treaty. The Greeks would, M. Roussos added, have to obtain two ships to replace the "Lemnos" and "Kilkis" (the one now being, and the other about to be, overhauled at Malta). I asked what the Greeks would have to face the "Goeben" if, as was reported in the press, the Turks should decide to refit that ship. M. Roussos replied that the Minister of Marine had informed him that if Greece had two new ships to replace the two cruisers above referred to, he would be satisfied even if the Turks should rearm the "Goeben."

3. The Greek Government had not as yet, M. Roussos said, received a satisfactory reply from the Turkish Government, the latter insisting that they would require a powerful fleet in the Black Sea to meet the one which it was reported the Russians were about to place in these waters. He did not see, however, how the Turks would be able to construct a fleet without money.

4. A third question to which M. Roussos referred was that of the exchange of populations. Whilst, he declared, the Greeks had evacuated the Turks from Macedonia, &c., in a decent condition, the Greeks recently evacuated from Chataldja and that neighbourhood and from the neighbourhood of Mersina were in a deplorable condition. Every conceivable difficulty had been placed in the way of their selling their livestock, &c., and they reached Greece with practically nothing. The commission were, he said, protesting to the Angora Government about this. The Greeks, he added, previously evacuated from the Black Sea ports had arrived in an even far worse condition and were practically destitute.

5. I may here mention that in a recent conversation with the "Times" correspondent from Constantinople, who happened to be in Athens, the late Prime Minister asked him what the attitude of His Majesty's Government was likely to be in the event of Turkey returning a favourable reply to the recent *démarche* which he had made with a view to better relations. Mr. Macartney replied that he felt sure that His Majesty's Government would only view with favour any attempt made in the direction of better relations amongst nations.

I have, &c.
C. H. BENTINCK.

P.S.—Copy of this despatch is being sent to Constantinople.

C. H. B.

[E 6633/4332/44] No. 29.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 579.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 29, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 524 of the 1st July, to inform you that I received a visit on the 24th instant from the Polish Minister, who came back from Angora a few days ago on a brief trip to Constantinople. M. Knoll has spent a month in the capital and is returning again to-day in order to take up his permanent residence there. He has, so he tells me, rented for one year three small houses—a villa for himself outside the town and two buildings in the town for offices and as quarters for his staff. He is unmarried, but I gather that his counsellor, M. de Schwarzburg-Günther, who has a wife, will be more permanently resident in Constantinople, in order, as he explained, to keep in touch with the rest of the diplomatic body, than in Angora. M. Knoll told me that he had sent to Warsaw the plans for a Legation, containing between thirty and forty rooms, which it was proposed to build eventually in Angora. He anticipated, however, that the Polish Government would wait awhile before giving their final sanction to these plans, and spoke of the difficulty of getting locally either building material or competent workmen.

2. Poland is the traditional ally of Turkey and the two countries are united by a common danger on their eastern boundaries. Nevertheless, though professing the utmost friendliness, the Turks had, M. Knoll said, officially not been very communicative. He attributed this to the fact that Turkey was not yet sure what the future of Poland would be and whether Polish friendship would be an asset or an inconvenient complication. In his official declarations, Mustafa Kemal had not gone further than lay great stress on the need for close consultation between the two Governments in all matters. Unofficially—and M. Knoll and his staff were in close relations with various members of the President's entourage—it had been made clear that Turkey intended to entangle herself in no alliances and commit herself to no definite policy towards other countries until she had settled all her outstanding difficulties, and, in particular, the question of Mosul with Great Britain. M. Knoll said, however, that everyone whom he had seen in Angora had been very alive to the Russian danger in general, and, in particular, apprehensive of a possible Russo-Italian agreement with ulterior designs in respect of Asia Minor.

3. M. Knoll mentioned the uphill task which M. Simeon Radev was having in conducting the Bulgarian negotiations with the Turkish Government. The principal obstacle was, of course, the minorities question and the unwillingness of the Turkish Government to mention in any agreement such treaties as those of Bucharest, Saint-Germain, &c. The visit to Angora of M. Pomianov, the Political Director of the Bulgarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had helped matters to a certain extent, and when M. Knoll left, M. Radev had been somewhat more optimistic as to the possibility of finding satisfactory formula and of concluding the negotiations.

4. M. Knoll spoke of Rejeb Bey, the former secretary-general of the People's party, who succeeded Ferid Bey two months ago as Minister of the Interior, as a likely substitute for Ismet Pasha as President of the Council of Ministers. Such a selection, if it materialised, would be interesting, since it would seem to indicate a further realisation of the probable intention of Mustafa Kemal to concentrate all power into his own hands and to surround himself with his more obscure, but devoted, henchmen rather than with the more outstanding, and consequently more independent, figures of the Nationalist movement. Incidentally, M. Knoll told me that he regarded the Ghazi Pasha as being in a class by himself and as head and shoulders in strength of character and intelligence above any other Turk whom he had met. He did not believe that there was any truth whatever in the stories (about which I have always been myself extremely sceptical) as to excessive drinking on the part of the President. There is no doubt that he is fond of strong drink, but I have the late General Townshend's word for it, after two nights spent till the early hours of the morning in Kemal's company, that the latter took all and more than the general could stand without its making the least impression upon him either physically or mentally. M. Knoll also said that, though the rumour was current in Angora, possibly owing to her rare appearances in public, it had been denied to him on good authority that Latife Hanum was shortly going to provide the President with an heir.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6657/448/44] No. 30.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received August 5.)

(No. 1683.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note to the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd August, respecting the deposit of the British ratification of the Lausanne Treaty, &c.

Paris, August 2, 1924.

Enclosure 1 in No. 30.

Mr. Phipps to M. Renoult.

M. le Ministre, *Paris, August* 2, 1924.

IN accordance with instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith three instruments* conveying His Majesty the King's ratification of—

(*a.*) The Treaty of Peace with Turkey and such of the other instruments signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, as require ratification by His Majesty;

(*b*) The Greek Minorities Treaty and the Treaty respecting Thrace, signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920, the ratification of which is provided for by document No. XVI of the Final Act of the Lausanne Settlement; and

(*c.*) The Convention for the Assessment and Reparation of Damage suffered by Allied Nationals in Turkey, signed at Paris on the 23rd November, 1923.

At the same time I have the honour to enclose herein the formal declarations regarding the exclusion of certain portions of the British Empire from the Commercial Convention and from the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction. As your Excellency is aware, these declarations have, under articles 19 and 16 respectively of the two conventions, to be made at the time of the coming into force of the convention. Your Excellency will no doubt arrange for the declarations to be formally made at the time when the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications is drawn up in accordance with article 143 of the Peace Treaty, and the fact that these declarations have been made will doubtless be stated in that *procès-verbal*.

I am similarly empowered to sign, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the identic declaration excluding the condominium of the New Hebrides from the Commercial and Establishment Conventions, as soon as the French Government are in a position to sign on their side.

I have, &c.
ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 30.

Declaration.

IN accordance with the provisions of article 16 of the Commercial Convention, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, the undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary to the French Republic, duly authorised by His Britannic Majesty for that purpose, hereby declares that the provisions of the said convention do not apply to any of the following of His Britannic Majesty's dominions enjoying responsible government, colonies, possessions, protectorates or territories subject to His Majesty's sovereignty or authority :—

* Not printed.

Canada.
Commonwealth of Australia.
Papua.
Norfolk Island.
Mandated territory of New Guinea.
Union of South Africa.
Mandated territory of South-West Africa.
Irish Free State.
India.
Kenya.
Mauritius.
Bahamas.
Gibraltar.
Sierra Leone.
Fiji.
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
British Solomon Islands Protectorate and other islands under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific.
Tonga.
Basutoland.
Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Swaziland.
Northern Rhodesia.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
Mandated territory of Nauru.

In witness whereof the undersigned has signed the present declaration and affixed thereto the seal of his arms.

Done at Paris, this 2nd day of August, 1924.

(L.S.) ERIC PHIPPS.

Enclosure 3 in No. 30.

Declaration.

IN accordance with the provisions of article 19 of the Convention respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction, signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, the undersigned, His Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary to the French Republic, duly authorised by His Britannic Majesty for that purpose, hereby declares that the provisions of the said convention do not apply to any of the following of His Britannic Majesty's dominions enjoying responsible government, colonies, possessions, protectorates or territories subject to His Majesty's sovereignty or authority :—

Canada.
Union of South Africa.
Mandated territory of South-West Africa.
Irish Free State.
Bahamas.
Gibraltar.
Sierra Leone.
Fiji.
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony.
British Solomon Islands Protectorate and other islands under the jurisdiction of the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific.
Tonga.
Basutoland.
Bechuanaland Protectorate.
Swaziland.
Northern Rhodesia.
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
Straits Settlements.
Mandated territory of Nauru.

In witness whereof the undersigned has signed the present declaration and affixed thereto the seal of his arms.

Done at Paris, this 2nd day of August, 1924.

(L.S.) ERIC PHIPPS.

[E 6623/448/44] No. 31.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 501 of 2nd August: Ratification of Lausanne settlement. Proposal regarding New Hebrides declaration approved.

[E 6625/448/44] No. 32.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 110.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Foreign Office, August* 5, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 136 of 3rd August: Ratification of Lausanne settlement.

British ratification was formally deposited on 2nd August. Issue of *procès-verbal* bringing settlement into force depends also on Italian and Japanese deposits, and its date will be telegraphed to you as soon as known.

[E 6687/448/44] No. 33.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 7, 1924.

MY telegram No. 110 of 5th August: Entry into force of Lausanne settlement.

Procès-verbal of deposit has been dated 6th August and settlement comes into force as from that date.

[E 6847/186/44] No. 34.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 11.)

(No. 596.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 6, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the press has now definitely announced the appointment of Kemaleddin Sami Pasha as Turkish representative in Berlin.

2. I have been unable to obtain much information about his previous record, but, when the appointment was first suggested, Adnan Bey informed me that he was a Nationalist general of no political importance, but of great personal courage, who had succeeded in getting wounded seventeen times since 1908, when he was twice wounded by Turkish bullets. His frequent misfortunes in this respect have earned for him in the army the nickname of the "lightning conductor."

3. This appointment tends to confirm my impression that Mustafa Kemal intends, as far as possible, to select for the more important posts abroad, as well as in the interior, persons with military rather than civilian antecedents.

4. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6848/168/44] No. 35.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 11.)

(No. 597.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 5, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that Admiral Bristol, the United States representative here, proceeded yesterday to Angora on a brief visit. Though he told me some time ago that he projected this visit and was merely awaiting the return there of Ismet Pasha from Smyrna, he was not communicative in regard to its motives. He has had, however, to make material and inconvenient alterations in his personal plans for a tour in Central Europe.

2. Admiral Bristol must be regarded as a confirmed pro-Turk. He sees extensive commercial opportunities for his countrymen in Asia Minor, and strongly deprecates the not inconsiderable hostility which, under the leadership of Mr. Gerard and Mr. Morgenthau, is being shown in the United States to the ratification of their treaty with Turkey, and which Admiral Bristol treats as almost entirely sentimental and sectarian. His own opinion is that that treaty must be ratified lest only worse terms be obtainable; and, since its discussion by the Senate cannot be much longer delayed, he is anxious to endeavour, if possible, to settle beforehand by personal intervention at Angora the various outstanding questions in which he has so far been unable to obtain satisfaction from the Turkish Government.

3. The principal question will undoubtedly be that of the American missionary schools in Asia Minor. I believe that these have now all been closed on some pretext or another. The first to suffer in this respect, some two years ago, was the school at Marsovan, against which the Angora Government preferred the definite charge of having engaged in political activities. The most recent closure was that of the school at Tarsus a few months ago, when the grounds given for the Turkish decision in that case were of the most frivolous and insincere nature. Analogous institutions, such as a medical mission at Konia and a hospital at Aintab, have suffered a similar fate.

4. I doubt if Admiral Bristol will succeed in effecting much in respect of these schools. Since the laicisation of the Turkish Republic the Government is set against religious schools of all denominations, and Admiral Bristol will find himself up against an antagonism based on a principle. In such matters it generally needs more than diplomatic pressure to persuade the Turks to yield, even though to give way might be to their own ultimate advantage. It would seem, indeed, of the utmost importance for Turkey to secure the early ratification of her treaty with the United States. She sets her main hope for the rapid development of Anatolia on American money and enterprise, particularly in view of their freedom from that political taint which renders them suspicious if of European origin. Yet, in all fairness to the Turkish Government, it must be admitted that they are quite impartial in the manner in which they treat the foreigners and give expression to their xenophobia.

5. Another thorny problem which Admiral Bristol will have to discuss at Angora is that of an American marine or sailor who, having been left behind in Constantinople after the evacuation in charge of some naval stores, shot, some six or eight months ago, a Turkish Moslem whom he caught attempting to pilfer. Admiral Bristol has adopted the standpoint that this sailor must be regarded as a member of his mission, and consequently subject to American jurisdiction. Ismet Pasha has, however, consistently declined to accept this view, and has insisted on the man being tried in the Turkish courts. Adnan Bey mentioned to me some weeks ago that the last communication which before his retirement he had had to make to the admiral was a final and definite refusal on the part of the Turkish Government to consider any other solution.

6. Generally speaking, I am under the impression that Admiral Bristol's instructions are to take the Turkish Government severely to task and to remonstrate energetically with them on their attitude in these and other kindred matters.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 6850/847/44] No. 36.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 11.)

(No. 600.)

THE Acting British Representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper, a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general, Smyrna, respecting the Vali of Smyrna.

Constantinople, August 6, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 77.)
Sir, *Smyrna, July* 29, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 17th January last, I have the honour to report that Murad Bey, who has been acting as Vali since then, has now resigned from public service in order to live upon vineyards and olive groves which he has acquired during his time here. Although fitted rather for a post in the police, he has managed to carry on the Administration without any noticeable failure if without any particular success. In the smallest details he has sought orders from Angora. His chief preoccupation has been to find accommodation for the Moslem immigrants. Like several other ex-Valis of Smyrna—viz., Rahmi Bey, Tahsin Bey and Abdul Halik Bey—he was interned at Malta, but I never detected any resentment in his attitude.

2. The new Vali is a retired general, Ihsan Latif Pasha, a man of some education and experience of the world. He was at one time, I believe, military attaché at Athens. In 1914 he commanded the IXth Army Corps in Enver's advance on the Caucasus, and was captured and sent to Baikal. He escaped and walked some hundreds of miles, until he got into touch with Turkish agents in China, who helped him back to Turkey in 1915 viâ San Francisco, New York and Greece. Enver appears to have made a scapegoat of him on his return, but I understand that he held commands under the Angora régime and only retired recently. Since last winter he has had the thankless task of Director of Reconstruction (*i.e.*, Moslem immigration) here. With a personnel which has no choice but to live on the public and with a district which cannot recover until general conditions afford some guarantee for capital invested, he cannot hope for great success as Vali.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[**E 6851/32/44**] No. 37.

Mr. Henderson **to** ***Mr. MacDonald.***—(***Received*** *August* 11.)

(No. 601.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 6, 1924.

IN my despatch No. 572 of the 23rd July I underrated the capacity of the "clandestine returns" scandal for creating further storms in the teacup of Turkish internal politics. I mentioned that various reports of the commission appointed to enquire into the circumstances attending the return many months ago of various non-Moslems to Constantinople were being given to a jaded public. Among them was a report published in Angora on the 22nd July which tended to incriminate not major and minor officials like its predecessors, but various Deputies, representatives of the sovereign people. It referred to a very jovial policemen's banquet—the police have naturally been much to the fore in the scandal—followed two months later by another, at which the guests included "Kilij" Ali Bey, Deputy for Aintab, and Yunus Nadi, Deputy for Smyrna, the former a distinguished swashbuckler, the latter an even more notorious bully in the journalistic world. The commission had also heard of a proposal to form a "business committee" under the auspices of these two and a third, who had sought to enlist in their enterprise the late Director-General of Police, Saaduddin Bey. It had collected other information implicating certain other Deputies besides Ferid Bey, the former Minister of the Interior. The whole report seems to have been a farrago of hearsay evidence, all suggesting rather than stating that the persons named in it were mixed up in the "clandestine returns." The summary telegraphed to Constantinople ended :—

> "The incriminated persons being Deputies, the commission did not consider itself entitled to pursue the enquiry further."

2. The publication of the report had been discounted by partial disclosures in Opposition newspapers in Constantinople, and the Government had been taunted with sheltering important personages whilst taking drastic action against officials. These disclosures precipitated the publication, though it is not clear whether Rejeb Bey, the new Minister of the Interior, merely suffered himself to be drawn or acted from obscure political motives. Anyhow, he loosed a swarm of hornets by making the report public. The press rained *démentis* and accusations. The incriminated Deputies vowed that they could not rest tamely under a cloud, and that their parliamentary immunity was never intended to leave them in that position, once the commission had been allowed to place them in it by embodying in its report a mass of irresponsible gossip, and the Minister had made the report public. Controversy raged as to the real effect of parliamentary immunity in such a case.

3. After this had gone on for several days a new incident occurred. Kilij Ali Bey, accompanied by a fellow-Deputy, went to the office of the "Ileri" newspaper on the 30th July and there assailed the editor, Jelal Nouri, some say with his own inkpot and other office accessories, some with a revolver. Jelal Nouri, who had for some time been attacking the Government with all the zeal of a pervert, and who stinks in the nostrils of their supporters, was wounded about the head. The police hurried to the scene, but fell back finding that the assailants were representatives of the people. Next day there was a council meeting in Angora, as a result of which the Minister of

the Interior himself came to Constantinople on the 2nd August. He is still dealing with the situation.

4. These incidents have raised a variety of issues They have raised the question of parliamentary immunity in a two-fold form. It is now not merely a question whether the enquiry, which should naturally follow on the report of the commission, can be pursued without the consent of the Assembly, but whether the two Deputies who invaded the "Ileri" office can be treated as ordinary criminals. What is more important, from the point of view of the Government, is that the new Minister of the Interior has embroiled himself with some of its strongest supporters, and that in some quarters there is a clamour for the immediate convocation of the Assembly. Minor political issues arise regarding the position of the members of the commission of enquiry and the circumstances in which partial publicity was prematurely given to the sense of their report. Finally, it has become obvious that on certain of the points raised Fethi Bey, the President of the Assembly, does not see eye to eye with the Government. It is not worth while to sift the various views which are being ventilated regarding all these issues in the highest and the lowest quarters. The essential fact is that the supporters of the Government have been thrown into disarray and in a fashion all the more embarrassing because of the violent personal animosities which have been aroused.

5. The Government will probably, however, master the situation for the time being, stave off any convocation of the Assembly until October, when it must meet anyhow in the normal course, and prepare during the interval for the new crises which will then inevitably threaten its existence. Discontent is not being allayed, and new projects are being elaborated which will add to the future bones of contention, notably one for the complete revision of the tithe system.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

No. 38.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 141.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, August* 13, 1924.

TURKISH Government desires to appoint Zekiai Bey as their representative in London and have requested me to ask for *agrément* for him. Turkish delegate here said that he would have official rank of Minister, pending definite arrangement as to status of our respective missions, but personal rank of Ambassador, thereby following precedent of Italian and German representatives now here.

Turkish delegate added that he understood that Zekiai Bey would be instructed to discuss personally with you question of Irak frontier.

I observed that unless concrete proposals on that subject were forthcoming from Turkish Government before 14th August, I presumed that relative British documents would be transmitted to Geneva on that day.

Zekiai Bey is Minister of Agriculture in present Cabinet. He was economic expert at the Lausanne Conference and in close touch with Mr. Payne of Board of Trade.

Turkish Government beg for early reply.

No. 39.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 13.)

(No. 142.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August* 12, 1924.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

There would seem no ground for refusing *agrément*. Mr. Ryan, who was acquainted with him at Lausanne, describes him as intelligent, difficult in negotiation and probably untrustworthy, but he had nothing definite against him. He was little known in European circles before the Lausanne Conference and has had little other diplomatic experience as far as I know, but he appears to carry some weight in this country.

No. 40.

Mr. Kennard to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, August* 20, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 138.

Italian Government have ascertained from Paris that French Government propose to appoint an Ambassador at Constantinople unless Turkish Government insist on Allied representatives residing at Angora. Italian Government appear to be more or less committed to appointment of Ambassador, but are delaying reply pending further consideration. I have urged them to take into serious consideration points in your telegram under reference.

No. 41.

Mr. Kennard to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 21.)

(No 212.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, August* 20, 1924.

ITALIAN Government point out that on 6th August ratifications of Treaty of Lausanne were deposited by Great Britain, Italy and Japan in Paris. According to article 143 the first *procès-verbaux* should be drawn up as soon as Turkey on the one hand and any three other Powers on the other have deposited ratifications, and treaty should now enter into force as regards them.

Italian Government are anxious to know whether His Majesty's Government consider any steps should be taken to make this ratification, and entry into force of treaty as regards those who have ratified, generally known.

No. 42.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 534.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 21, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 218 of 14th August

M. de Peretti informs me that he asked the President of the Council what his intentions were in regard to the rank of the French representative in Turkey. M. Herriot replied that as France had not yet ratified the Treaty of Lausanne he could take no decision in the matter at present. I urged that no step should be taken in the matter by the French Government without affording us an opportunity for a further exchange of views, and to this M. de Peretti entirely agreed.

No. 43.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 538.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 21, 1924.

FOREIGN Affairs Commission of the Chamber have, on the advice of their chairman, M. Franklin-Bouillon, requested the Government not to adjourn Parliament before discussing and ratifying the Treaty of Lausanne

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No. 44.

Mr. Palairet to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 22.)

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Tokyo, August* 22, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 146.

Japanese Government agree to maintain only Legation at Constantinople on condition that all Powers do likewise.

No. 45.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 23.)

(No. 540.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 22, 1924.

MY telegram No. 538 of yesterday.

The President of the Council suggested in the Chamber this morning that to-morrow morning should be set aside for discussion of the Treaty of Lausanne. M. Loucheur, however, pointed out that the discussion of the London Conference was too important to break into in this manner. It was therefore finally agreed that the Treaty of Lausanne would be discussed by Parliament directly after the conclusion of the debate on the London Conference.

No. 46.

Mr. Kennard to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 213.)
(Telegraphic.) D. *Rome, August* 23, 1924.

MY telegram No. 211.

Italian Government understand that neither French nor United States Government can come to any definite decision regarding representation in Turkey until their Parliaments have ratified the treaty. Under these circumstances, while Italian Government still favour appointment of Ambassador, they propose to delay coming to any definite decision until attitude of the other Powers concerned is clearer. They have promised me, however, to take no definite step without consulting His Majesty's Government.

[E 7310/3918/44] No. 47.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 25.)

(No. 623.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August* 19, 1924.

THE Turco-Bulgarian negotiations, which have been proceeding at Angora for the past few months, were interrupted last week and M. Radeff has returned to Constantinople. They will probably be resumed in the latter half of October.

2. I saw M. Radeff yesterday. He told me that the original intention of his Government had been to conclude a simple treaty of friendship similar to those concluded with other countries, but that the Turkish Government had insisted on the simultaneous settlement of outstanding questions. He denied that the difficulties with which his negotiations had met had arisen, as apprehended in the Turkish press, in connection with the return of Bulgarian refugees to Thrace. Thousands of Bulgarians had, it was true, evacuated Eastern Thrace after the Balkan war, but his Government had no wish to see them emigrate back again. There had been ever since a question as to the disposal of their properties, but in this matter he had succeeded at long last in coming to an arrangement with the Turks.

3. The real stumbling-block had been the position of the Bulgarian Exarchate and of the Bulgarian schools in Eastern Thrace. The Turks had insisted on the observance in this respect by Bulgaria of the obligations imposed on her after the Balkan war by the Treaty of Constantinople, while declining to be themselves bound by the similar obligations imposed on Turkey. The deadlock had arisen out of the question of reciprocity. Turkey, M. Radeff said, wished Bulgaria to continue to give entire liberty to and to meet out of State funds the expenses for the upkeep of over 600 Moslem schools and over 1,000 mosques with their Moslem teachers and muftis, while the Turkish authorities were to exercise complete control over Bulgarian religious and scholastic institutions in Thrace, and even to have the right to nominate to the Bulgarian schools Turkish teachers whose salaries Bulgaria was to pay.

4. The Turkish Government had been entirely obdurate on this point. They had insisted on the new laic character of the republic and the impossibility, on the grounds of public order, of making any exception in favour of Bulgarian schools. M. Radeff had pointed out that if the Turkish State was as laic as all that, then it need not concern

itself with Moslem religious affairs in Bulgaria, and that the obligations under the Treaty of Constantinople might mutually be waived. He had offered to settle the matter either in that way or by agreeing to the reciprocal observance of those obligations, or, if the Turks preferred, by dropping the Constantinople Treaty altogether and by declaring both parties bound simply by the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty. The Turkish Government had agreed to none of these alternatives. They had in particular objected to reference to the Lausanne Treaty. They had, M. Radeff said, merely tried to wear out his patience, but they had not succeeded. His Government were glad, rather than otherwise, to see his residence in Angora prolonged, since it was there only that the new Turkish Government could properly be studied. M. Radeff did, however, complain of the Turkish obstinacy and wrong-headedness, and in particular of the defects in this respect of Munir Bey who had been the principal negotiator. As an example, he mentioned that Munir Bey had used as an argument in Turkey's favour that there were only some 7,000 to 8,000 Bulgarians in Eastern Thrace and over half-a-million Turks in Bulgaria. M. Radeff professed considerable scorn at such reasoning, but, in point of fact, it seems to me to have a certain force as the Bulgarian Government has considerable interest in conciliating their large Moslem population and cannot afford to antagonise it.

5. In the end M. Radeff had left Angora rather than yield, and expressed the hope that by October the Turkish Government would show themselves more reasonable.

6. M. Radeff confirmed to me the impressions which the Polish Minister had given me of the general situation at Angora. Mustafa Kemal was head and shoulders, he used the German expression "himmelweit," above any of the other Turks in Angora. No political question was settled without consulting him. We could, he said, in an hour's conversation with him dispose of questions which it would take months to arrange by less direct methods. His health was good and the stories of his ever being fuddled with drink an absolute myth. The present régime was very firmly established and the army loyal and sufficiently well paid. The Grand National Assembly would obey any order that the President of the Republic gave it. It was absurd to think that an Opposition led by people such as Reouf or Refet would succeed in overthrowing the Government. If Ismet Pasha had to go, he would be followed by Redjeb Bey, or if Mustafa Kemal wished to have a still stronger Government, by Fethi Bey. It was true that the Turks were suspicious of all foreign Powers (Russia alone, he said, had a certain influence at Angora) and distrustful of each other, of the remnants of the Committee of Union and Progress party, of Califatists and Sultanites; but he himself was convinced that if trouble arose, it would be successfully and ruthlessly crushed. As for liberty of elections, of course such a thing was impossible. Even Bulgaria had not succeeded in obtaining that after over forty years of constitutional government!

7. M. Radeff's opinions are valuable. He was educated entirely in Turkey, in Turkish schools and universities. He speaks the language like a native and has many personal friends among the present Turkish leaders. He is, in addition, an extremely intelligent and well-informed individual.

8. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sofia.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON

No. 48.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 25.)

(No. 543.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 24, 1924.

MY telegram No. 534.

Note now received from Quai d'Orsay states that French Government intend to reserve the question of the rank of their diplomatic representative at Constantinople until Chambers have ratified Treaty of Lausanne, when normal diplomatic relations with Turkey can be established. The solution of this question, upon which the French Government shall decide, will be brought to the knowledge of this Embassy at the proper time.

Copy of note by bag.

Chamber will to-morrow morning begin discussion of the Treaty of Lausanne.

No. 49.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 25.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Yenikeuy, August* 25, 1924.

TURKISH delegate here has given me to understand that Turkish Government are preparing to accept invitation of League of Nations to submit to council dispute respecting Irak frontier.

He tells me his Government are perturbed at having received no official communication as to entry into force of Treaty of Lausanne. Should not French Government have communicated *procès-verbal* to them?

No. 50.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Kennard (*Rome*).

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 26, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 212 of 20th August: Public notification of entry into force of Treaty of Lausanne.

A public announcement of the ratifications and entry into force of the peace settlement with Turkey, together with the Treaty of Peace (Turkey) Order, 1924, were published in the "Board of Trade Journal" of 14th August, 1914.

The press were advised on 7th August.

No. 51.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 27.)

(No. 546.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 26, 1924.

CHAMBER last night voted ratification of Treaty of Lausanne by 395 votes to 156. In his speech M. Herriot stated that it was wrong to complain that the rôle of France in the East was henceforth limited; the treaty reserved for France great scope and left her a large share of disinterested influence. As regards Syria, M. Herriot stated that the Government intended to follow very closely the provisions of the League of Nations mandate and in no sense to endeavour to make Syria into a colony. His references to the Turkish Republic were distinctly friendly, and he took credit to France for having been instrumental in securing the retention of Constantinople by Turkey.

Text by bag to-morrow.

Senate will probably vote ratification to-morrow.

No. 52.

Mr. Phipps to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 552.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, August* 27, 1924.

MY telegram No. 546 of yesterday.

Senate this morning agreed to ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne by 270 votes to 20.

No. 53.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (*Constantinople*).

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1924.

REPORT in British press states that Turkish Government desire Zekiai personally to enjoy ambassadorial rank. It would perhaps be well that you should tactfully point out to them that his *agrément* was granted as Minister and that his personal rank does not concern His Majesty's Government.

No. 54.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 147, paragraph 2.

Paris reports slight delay in printing copies of *procès-verbaux*. Proof already sent to Turkish Legation, to whom note was addressed on 27th instant stating that His Majesty's Government and Italian and Japanese Governments have ratified Lausanne Treaty, that deposit of ratifications has been made, and that documents will be forwarded as soon as they are ready.

(Addressed to Constantinople, No. 130. Repeated to Geneva, No. 42.)

[E 7606/463/44] No. 55.

Notes by Mr. Ryan on Judicial Reorganisation in Turkey.

NUSRET BEY confirmed to me on the 27th August that Tahir Bey had gone to Europe on a mission connected with the legal counsellors to be engaged under the Lausanne judicial declaration. He was also to study certain other questions, and would visit Brussels and Paris as well as The Hague. As regards the legal counsellors, he would not have power to take any final decision.

This Tahir Bey is a professor in the Law Faculty of the Constantinople University. He was formerly U.S.S. for Justice at Angora, and held that office when he was appointed a member of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne.

The Turks have not shown themselves in a hurry to secure the services of foreign legal counsellors. How little voice they mean to give them in the actual reorganisation of the judicial system may be inferred from the fact that a very drastic remodelling of the existing system was effected with feverish haste shortly after the suppression of the Caliphate at the beginning of March. The commission appointed to draft the necessary laws held its first sitting on the 12th March. The laws passed quickly through all stages and were promulgated within a few weeks. It is remarkable how little attention they seem to have attracted among the general public.

The four principal laws—there is a fifth dealing with notaries public, which I have not studied—are the following :—

(*a.*) Law No. 469 of the 8th April, on the suppression of Religious (Sheri) Courts and the organisation of tribunals.
(*b.*) Law No. 492 of the 22nd April, modifying various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code of Penal Procedure, the Law on Peace Courts and the Law on Execution of Judgments, also spoken of as the Law for the Expediting of Trials.
(*c.*) Law No. 460 of the 3rd April on advocates.
(*d.*) Law No. 461 of the 3rd April on the official costume of judges, &c.

The first two of these came into force as from the 1st May, the other two on the date of promulgation.

Apart from the complete disappearance of the religious (Sheri) jurisdiction, the most notable feature of the new organisation is the abolition of all Courts of Appeal, the only recourse to a higher court being now that to the Court of Cassation Commercial courts as such also cease to exist. On the positive side, the new arrangements embody the result of certain experiments which have been made since 1908. The "Peace Courts," *i.e.*, courts exercising summary jurisdiction in small cases, both civil and penal, are maintained with a somewhat readjusted competency. The single-judge-court system, which had been tried experimentally at Adrianople, and possibly elsewhere, receives a considerable extension for the time being, at any rate. The new organisation as a whole comprises the following courts :—

(*a.*) A Court of Cassation at Eskishehr, now divided into five (or possibly six) sections.
(*b.*) Criminal courts, consisting of five members, to try cases of serious offences of the degree of gravity covered by "crime" in the technical sense.
(*c.*) "Fundamental" (Asli) courts, consisting of three members, to hear all cases, civil and penal, other than crimes, except those subject to the summary

jurisdiction of the peace courts. In important centres the fundamental court can be divided up into as many sections as the Ministry of Justice thinks necessary, each section having its own three members and having special kinds of cases assigned to it. Thus, in Constantinople there are seventeen or eighteen sections, in Smyrna four, and in some other places two each.
(*d.*) Composite criminal courts in places where the volume of business does not justify a separate criminal court. These are made up by the addition of two supernumerary members to the appropriate "fundamental" court.
(*e.*) Single-judge courts, which may be substituted for the ordinary fundamental court, at the discretion of the Minister of Justice, in places where it is necessary to have a court, but where the institution of a regular fundamental court is not thought to be justified. This is represented as a transitory measure.
(*f.*) Peace courts, consisting of a single judge, who may be the same as that of a single-judge court, as under (*e*), to deal summarily with small cases, both civil and penal.,

The organisation includes the necessary machinery of supernumerary judges, juges d'instruction and public prosecutors, the public prosecutors attached to the criminal courts having apparently a general supervision over those of the fundamental courts.

The Law for the Expediting of Trials deals in great detail with numerous points of procedure, &c. To appreciate its effects fully it would be necessary to study it in conjunction with the existing laws which it modifies. The general effect is to simplify procedure and to curtail the opportunities hitherto afforded for abusive, vexatious and frivolous protraction of legal proceedings. In at least one respect it modernises away an old survival, *i.e.*, it does away with the system of formal investigation into the credibility of witnesses in civil cases (Tezkié), and provides that all witnesses shall be examined on oath.

The law on advocates does not bear directly on judicial reorganisation, but is closely connected with it. It lays down stringent conditions to be fulfilled by advocates practising in law courts (*inter alia*, they must be Turkish subjects), it develops the bar system in important centres, and it provides in a transitory article for a purge in places where bars are already constituted. Commissions to effect this purge, subject to certain rights of appeal, have been set up in a number of cities, including Constantinople, Angora and Smyrna. The Constantinople commission, which excited great attention, finished its labours towards the end of August, and published a list of over 300 lawyers who were not to be allowed to practise in the courts. Politics and anti-Christian feeling enter a good deal into the matter, but the commission seems to have been drastic in all directions, *e.g.*, the list includes a certain Ahmed Saki Bey, a Deputy who was actually a member of the commission which drew up the Government proposals for the new judicial organisation, and the well-known Nejmuddin Mollah, also a Deputy, one of the best-known lawyers and politicians in Constantinople, and at one time Minister of Justice.

The law on the official costume of judges has more importance than might be supposed, for it will not merely provide lay judges with republican raiment, but it will, as and when applied, impose the same "laic" dress on such judges, &c., as are taken over from the old organisation of ulema for the administration of religious law in the suppressed Sheri courts. It is thus a new challenge to religious feeling, as the ulema have hitherto preserved their own garb, turban and robe. It is noteworthy that, while the Government proposal was to make the official costume compulsory three months after the passing of the law, the law as passed by the Grand National Assembly gave the Minister of Justice discretion to determine the courts in which, and the date from which, the new costume should be introduced.

The laws mentioned above and various others were recently published in a special number of the "Judicial Gazette." It is illustrated by a very interesting map showing the new distribution of courts. It is specially significant that, while in the western half of Asia Minor regular "fundamental" courts have been set up nearly everywhere, single-judge courts predominate very largely in the eastern half, except in the most important centres. This can be very plausibly explained by sparseness of population and the smaller number of important cases likely to arise in remote places, but the authorities may also have been influenced by the consideration that in parts of the country unamenable to "laic" ideas single-judge courts, in which it may still be possible to wear the turban, will present in externals a less revolutionary

appearance than if the fundamental courts, absorbing, *inter alia*, all jurisdiction hitherto exercised by the Sheri courts, were set up at once, and all connected with them were compelled to wear a new-fangled costume.

The new system can only be tested by experience. Though evolved in too great a hurry, it is the work of people with a good deal of practical knowledge of the defects of what preceded it. In many respects they seem, so far as I can judge, to have worked on sound lines, and to have produced something which should diminish the law's delays and cost the country less. The most obvious defect, a serious one, is that the suppression of all appeal, except by way of cassation, and the extension of single-judge courts imply a confidence in the ordinary run of judges greater than their capacity, their moral character and the rate at which they are paid seem at present to justify.

August 31, 1924.

No. 56.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Henderson (Constantinople).

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1924.

MY telegram No. 130 of 28th August: Turkey–Irak frontier and coming into force of Lausanne Treaty.

Council of League telegraphed to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30th August in reply to the latter's telegram of 25th August, as follows:—

> "In inviting Turkish Government to be represented on footing of equality at its discussions on this question council has noted consideration mentioned by your Excellency as being likely to delay arrival of Turkish representatives at Geneva. Council has accordingly decided to postpone consideration of question until arrival of such representatives. Council would welcome any arrangements which Turkish Government might be able to make with a view to hastening moment at which study of question can be begun. Present session of council will probably last until end of September."

I now learn that official copies of *procès-verbal*, recording deposit of ratifications on 6th August, were sent by French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Turkish representative in Paris on 29th August.

[E 7687/7687/44] No. 57.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received September* 8.)

(No. 653.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 2, 1924.

TURKEY has followed the example of other nations in erecting a memorial to the unknown Turkish soldier. The 30th August, the second anniversary of the battle Doumlou Punar, the decisive engagement of the offensive which began on the 26th August, 1922, and which resulted in the capture of General Tricoupis and the complete and final rout of the Greek army, was selected as the appropriate occasion for the laying of the first stone of the monument to be erected for this purpose. The site chosen was the hill whence Mustafa Kemal himself witnessed and directed the battle, sometimes called the "Battle of the Commander-in-Chief," owing to the fact that it was fought under Kemal's personal supervision and as the result of orders inspired and issued by himself.

2. The widest publicity was given to and the greatest interest taken in the preparations for the ceremony which was attended by the President of the Republic, the Council of Ministers, the President of the Assembly and a large proportion of the Deputies, by all the principal Turkish military commanders as well as by representatives of the universities and schools and of the leading institutions and professions in Turkey.

3. Numerous speeches were delivered beginning with that of Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff during the Greek campaign, and closing with an oration by Kemal himself. Though I believe that he is talkative in private conversation, the

public speeches of the latter are few and far between. He is sometimes described in this respect as the "silent President." When, however, he does deliver one, it is worthy of attention and reflection. His public utterances are conceived with thoughtful intention and their infrequency adds to their significance. I have been struck on re-reading them in the light of what happened afterwards by the evidences of this intention. Subsequent events have shown that remarks therein which appeared to be objectless at the time were carefully pointed, with an objective which, it must be admitted, the Ghazi Pasha has generally succeeded in reaching.

4. His oration last Saturday was consequently awaited with expectancy. The occasion was more suited to military panegyrics than to political thought. Nevertheless, though I need scarcely trouble you with the full text of the speech, it shows certain tendencies which are worth recording.

5. It commences with an account of Kemal's personal share, which he is at no pains to conceal, in this momentous victory. He takes the opportunity for a certain glorification of self rather than of the common Mehmedjik (*Anglicè* "Tommy") to whom the monument is dedicated. It is true that preceding speakers paid full justice to the rank and file. But the "I's" in Kemal's speech are noticeably frequent. He also refers to the Turkish nation as "my nation," and the impression derived is that he intentionally asserted himself and his position and wished to live for posterity as the victor of one of the decisive battles of the Turkish world. Nevertheless, his pride in his achievements is legitimate, and excessive modesty would scarcely have been human or natural.

6. He underlines the immensity of the Greek catastrophe both militarily and morally, and declares the sublime result of the great victory from the Turkish point of view to be "the assumption without any restriction of national sovereignty by the Turkish people." He does not miss the chance thus afforded him of blackening the face of Sultans and Caliphs. He speaks contemptuously and abusively of "a person wearing the title of Sultan and Caliph and an institution called the Sultanate and Caliphate." "After the victory, the Turkish people abolished for ever this apocryphal institution, which was merely a source of misfortune for the fatherland, and meted out to the Sultan-Caliph the fate that he deserved."

7. He then reverts to national sovereignty "before which no throne can stand," and urges the necessity, if the Turk wishes to reconstitute his country and live freely and independently therein, of preserving national sovereignty at all price, and of rallying round the republican flag.

8. His references in this respect would imply his wish to confute the allegations of those who attribute to the Ghazi Pasha the desire to assume, at a later stage, the mantle of a Sovereign or even of a Caliph. They do not necessarily, however, mean, in spite of the stress which he lays on the vital importance of national sovereignty that eventually he does not intend to take the substance, even if he foregoes the shadow, and to concentrate power, as far as possible, into his own hands. At present the Grand National Assembly, as a whole, represents the sovereignty of the people. It is significant that he does not once in the course of his speech refer to that Assembly or to the chosen of the people. He could thus, without risk of going back on his own words, ultimately denounce an assembly as being too cumbersome an institution, and assert for himself the claim to be the sole representative of that sovereignty.

9. The latter part of Kemal's speech is the more impressive, and reveals an intense and probably honest patriotism. It defines in general but statesmanlike terms the broad basis on which the new Turkey must be built up if it is to exist. Her needs, he says, are science and knowledge, a high state of civilisation, a free mentality and independence. The Turks must set to work seriously, thinking only of their country and of nothing but their country. He reminds his hearers that selfish aims were the characteristic of their former rulers and the bane of the country itself. The objective of all Turks must, he states, be the national ideal. The aim of the nation must be to occupy in the world the rank of a civilised State. Peoples without the capacity to produce the works of civilisation are bound to lose their liberty and their independence. The history of humanity is a proof of this axiom In order to live it is indispensable to tread the road of civilisation. Those who look back are condemned to be overwhelmed beneath the advancing flood of universal civilisation.

10. Kemal proclaims in these words his fixed determination to Westernise the new Turkey. There is to be no survival of orientalism in his ideal of a future Turkish State. Turkey must become civilised, and for this purpose must seek regeneration, "since that alone can lead to success in economic and social life and in the domain of science and art." There is, he points out, a greater victory than Doumlou Punar yet

to be won. A nation that is weak economically cannot attain to civilisation or to happiness and prosperity. Every civilised State thinks first of improving its economic situation before considering its army and its fleet. The defence of a country can only be assured by economic development and extension. All obstacles in the way of such development must be removed. All superstitions and misconceptions must be for ever banned, and he concludes with an appeal to the Turkish youth, endowed by education and instruction with the new ideas which he formulates, to maintain and to elevate the republic which he and his contemporaries have founded.

11. The reference to superstitions and misconceptions is undoubtedly propaganda in favour of the new lay régime and directed against the religious influences which, rightly or wrongly, the youngest Turks hold to have been such a bar to progress in the old Ottoman Empire. The remark concerning the necessity for the nation to give priority to the development of its economic rather than its naval and military resources is, if seriously intended, as I believe it to be, somewhat striking. Turkey is thoroughly war weary. A period of repose after the revolutions and wars of the past sixteen years is absolutely indispensable for a multitude of vital reasons. One of these is certainly the stability of the republic and of the régime which Kemal has created. If the attitude of his neighbours permit of it, Kemal is, I think, sincere not only in his ideal of Turkey as a civilised Western State, but also in his desire to devote, if possible, the slender revenues of his country to economic development and the internal needs of Turkey rather than to budgeting for naval construction and an increase in her military forces.

12. After the ceremony the President left with his wife for a villa on the outskirts of Broussa, where he hopes to enjoy nearly a month of complete repose before the opening of the autumn session of the Grand National Assembly.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

No. 58.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received September* 12.)

(No. 572.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September* 11, 1924.

MR. PHIPPS'S telegram No. 543 of 24th August.

Mr. Phipps enquired to-day of M. de Peretti whether the French Government had come to any decision in the matter of the status of their representative at Constantinople. M. de Peretti replied in the negative, but said that in all probability a French Ambassador would shortly be appointed Mr. Phipps used all possible arguments in favour of the status of the Allied representatives at Constantinople being that of Minister, but M. de Peretti was evidently not convinced. He declared that it would be very difficult for the French Government to avoid appointing an Ambassador, firstly because of M. Herriot's declaration in Parliament in the debate on the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne (see Mr. Phipps's despatch No. 1883 of the 28th August), when he laid stress on the necessity of maintaining the most friendly relations with Turkey, and secondly because of parliamentary pressure, led by M. Franklin-Bouillon, with a view to the appointment of a French Ambassador.

Mr. Phipps pointed out that most friendly relations could be maintained by a Minister as well as by an Ambassador, and that the policy of seeking to curry favour with Turkey had been none too successful in the past. This M. de Peretti readily admitted, and promised to place all the arguments in favour of the lower status before M. Herriot. There seems, however, to be little likelihood of their prevailing.

No. 59.

Mr. MacDonald to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

[By Bag.]

(No. 227.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 12, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 572 of 11th September; Status of French representative at Constantinople.

You should remind French Government what His Majesty's Government asked of them (see last sentence of my telegram No. 218 of 14th August) was not to make any change—*i.e.*, not to take a final decision—without affording an opportunity for a further exchange of views. His Majesty's Government trust that they can rely on the French Government to do this.

[E 7886/109/44] No. 60.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received September* 15.)

(No. 673.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 10, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 8th instant the proceedings of the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, for the formation of which provision was made in the relative convention attached to the Treaty of Lausanne, reached a deadlock, which, for the moment at least, threatens the whole future of the commission's work.

2. Members of the Sub-commission for Exchange have for some time been occupied in preparing the ground for the exchange of the Constantinople Greeks in accordance with articles 1 and 2 of the Exchange Convention. The leading Greek and Turkish delegates, together with the neutral members of the commission themselves, arrived here some six weeks ago, and decided that the departure of the Constantinople Greeks should commence as from the 1st October. It was immediately after this decision was taken that more became heard of a matter which had previously attracted but little serious attention, namely, the interpretation to be placed on the word "établis" which is employed in article 2 of the French text of the convention. The Turkish delegation, on instructions from Angora and with the support of the local press, chose to interpret "établis" in its narrowest possible sense, namely, that the only Greeks to be excepted from exchange were those whose names had been inscribed on the Constantinople Civil Registers before the 30th October, 1918, an interpretation which, if accepted, would result in the expulsion of practically all Ottoman Greeks who were not natives of Constantinople. The Greek delegation, on the other hand, pointed out that such an interpretation was entirely at variance with the spirit of the convention, and, relying on the declarations of M. Barrère and Ismet Pasha at the twentieth meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission of the Lausanne Conference and on the terms of M. Montagna's report to the president of that commission which is annexed to the *procès-verbal* of the meeting (Lausanne Blue Book, No. 1, pp. 313–337), firmly maintained that only Greeks who had arrived in Constantinople after the 30th October, 1918, should be subjected to exchange, and that the draftsmen of the convention, in employing the term "établis," had intended that it should be interpreted in this sense only.

3. The issue raised is of the utmost importance, involving, as it necessarily must, the fate of many thousands of Greeks. No Greeks ever registered before the war, and approximately 100,000 is the figure which has been quoted to me. As neither delegation, after reference to Angora and Athens, was prepared to abate its claims in the slightest degree, it was decided that the matter should be considered at a plenary sitting of the commission to be held on the 4th instant. In the meantime both delegations prepared lengthy statements of their respective cases, and these, which merely developed the arguments already employed during the more informal discussions, were read to the meeting. The neutral delegates, in their turn, also presented a statement, which, I understand, constituted, with some slight concessions, practically a complete acceptance of the Greek point of view A prolonged general discussion ensued, but, as both the Turkish and Greek delegations adopted an uncompromising attitude, no progress could be made, and it was decided to hold a further sitting on the 8th instant, when it was hoped to dispose of the matter finally.

4. The resumed sitting was, however, even less successful than that which had preceded it, for Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the chief Turkish delegate, who opened the discussion, stated quite categorically that his Government were adamant in their standpoint, and that all Greeks not registered on the 30th October, 1918, must be expelled on the 1st October. Nevertheless, the Turkish delegation was prepared, if the Greek delegation so desired, to agree that the question should be referred back to the judicial experts for examination. In this proposal M. Pappas, the chief Greek delegate, affected to detect an endeavour to shelve the whole matter, so that on the 1st October the commission should be faced with a *fait accompli*, but intimated his

readiness to accept Tewfik Rushdi Bey's proposal on condition that a time limit should be fixed for the decision of the jurists or that the idea of commencing the exchange operations on the 1st October should be abandoned. To both these suggestions, however, the Turkish delegate returned a categorical negative, whereupon a personal incident arose between him and M. Pappas, and Tewfik Rushdi Bey left the room in protest, without any arrangements having been made for a further meeting.

5. Such is the position at the moment of writing this despatch. On the eve of the meeting on the 8th instant I received a visit from Count Frederik Moltke, the Danish member of the Mixed Commission. He enquired anxiously what would be the attitude of the Allied Powers in the event of the Turkish Government declining to be bound by a majority decision of the commission and proceeding to the immediate expulsion of the Ottoman Greek population regardless of that decision. He also expressed the wish to be informed of the view of His Majesty's Government as to the interpretation of the word "established" in the text of the convention, as well as my opinion as to the best course for the commission to follow.

6. I told Count Moltke that I could only speak unofficially. I had no doubt whatsoever personally as to the sense which the negotiators had intended to give to the word "established," and that was the sense in which the Greeks interpreted it. M. Montagna, who was president of the sub-committee at Lausanne responsible for this convention and who could not be accused of having any pro-Greek proclivities, held this view also. I had personally no doubt either that it would be shared by His Majesty's Government. The Allied Governments, at whose instigation the convention had been drawn up, could not remain indifferent to its violation by the Turks. At the same time, however, it was the League of Nations, under whose auspices the Mixed Commission had been set up, which was primarily interested. The Council of the League was at present in session, and in the event of a rupture the first duty of the neutral commissioners was to appeal to it for instructions as to the course to pursue. It was for this reason that I had so far refrained from raising the question with the Turkish authorities, since I did not wish to give the impression that the Allied representatives here were exercising pressure on either party or desirous of influencing a neutral commission.

7. I also told Count Moltke that I trusted that the neutral commissioners would not yield to Turkish pressure and go back on the decision to which they had, so I understood, already committed themselves in writing after careful consideration. The question was one of right or wrong and not a matter for compromise. The Turks would incur a heavy responsibility, from the results of which they might well shrink, if they, at this early stage of the execution of the Lausanne Treaty, flouted the arbitral decision of a commission set up under the good offices of the League of Nations. They would by such action put themselves *hors la loi* in the eyes of the world. Moreover, they were about to submit to the League the dispute respecting the Irak-Turkey frontier, and would certainly hesitate to indispose that body on the eve of such an important negotiation.

8. My personal advice to him was, therefore, to adopt a firm attitude on the principle of right and wrong. The crucial point would be the taking of a vote in the commission. This could not be much longer delayed, lest the Turks should regard hesitation as weakness and count unduly on further concessions. Nevertheless, I did not think it should be precipitated. I advised Count Moltke, therefore, to see the Turkish delegates before the meeting on the 8th September and to explain to them frankly the views of the neutral members, and to warn them seriously of the consequences of any act of folly on their part. The expulsion of 100,000 Greeks would put the final nail in the coffin of Constantinople. But this was really a side issue, since it concerned the interests of Turkey only and did not affect the principle of justice. I recommended him, therefore, to lay stress on the condemnation which would be expressed and the disgust which would be felt by the civilised world at a flagrant violation by Turkey not only of the spirit of a convention which it had signed, but of all ideas of humanity. I would, if I were he, let the Turks know the exact line which the commission proposed to follow, and give them a last chance to save their face by offering to refer back once more to expert opinion, before actually voting at a meeting to be fixed at most two or three days later.

9. I do not know whether Count Moltke followed this advice. He was on his way, after seeing me, to discuss the question with M. Exstrand, the Swedish president of the commission, who had been confined for some days past by illness to his room. It is, however, significant that the Turkish delegates at the meeting on the 8th did in fact ask for a final reference back to the juridical experts. That the proposal was not

actually accepted and no decision reached was due to the refusal of the Turks to agree to a time limit and to the personal altercation which ensued between M. Pappas and Tewfik Rushdi Bey. In so far as the latter point is concerned, I learn that M. Pappas has written to the latter a letter apologising for the expressions used by him at the meeting.

10. The outcome of the dispute is thus in suspense. Whatever the Government may think or Ismet Pasha realise to be the true meaning of the convention which he personally signed, public opinion, such as it is in this country, feels very strongly on the point. The Turks appreciate very clearly the fact that they are commercially no match for the Greeks. The idea is that the Turks, who have so long been excluded, must alone profit from the prosperity which the new Turkey is going to create. The "good work" of expelling the non-Moslem from Anatolia must be completed in Constantinople. Moreover, the windfall produced by the Armenian abandoned properties is nearly exhausted and they are seeking a new source of ill-gotten gains.

11. The Turkish Government, constitutionally prone to procrastination, shrinks from antagonising these sentiments, and, even if it feels that it will in the end have to yield, would like to postpone the evil day as long as possible. At the present moment, therefore, Tewfik Rushdi talks of resignation and of proceeding to Angora, and in the meantime no day has been fixed for a further meeting of the commission. But the 1st October is now only a little way off, and the Greek population has a right to know its fate without further delay. If, therefore, though I cannot take the initiative, I see again any neutral member of the commission, I shall express my personal opinion that the commission must stick to its guns and must insist on an early decision. Incidentally, Count Moltke informed me that the Spanish member, though he signed the unanimous report of the neutral members, had fallen under the influence of the Turks and had in a general meeting gone back on the views expressed therein. Whether he has recanted altogether I do not know; but his vacillation is at any rate an unfortunate feature of the complication.

12. I have the honour to transmit to you, for your fuller information, herewith copies, which have been communicated to me privately and confidentially, of the three reports: (*a*) of the neutral members, (*b*) of the Greek, and (*c*) of the Turkish delegates. I have had no time to have them typed, and I should be grateful if I might in due course be furnished with copies of them.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch, without its enclosures, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

No. 61.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald—(*Received September* 15.)

(No. 574.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September* 13, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 227 of 12th September.

Mr. Phipps has already urged the French Government not to take a final decision in regard to the status of the French representative at Constantinople without giving an opportunity for a further exchange of views on the subject, but he made a further appeal in the matter this morning to the Acting Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay (see, however, last paragraph of French Government's note enclosed in Mr. Phipps's despatch No. 1846 of 24th August).

M. Laroche confirmed what M. de Peretti had already said, viz., that the French Government had virtually made up its mind to appoint an Ambassador to Constantinople, but he promised that the appointment should not actually be made without giving His Majesty's Government time to express any further views which they might have in the matter.

M. Laroche observed that the Italian Government were also determined to appoint an Ambassador, but Mr. Phipps urged that if France and Great Britain agreed to the appointment of Ministers the Italians would doubtless consent to do the same.

I fear there is no chance of the French giving way in this matter, as they are so desperately anxious to please the Turks.

No. 62.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 575.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, September* 14, 1924.

MY telegram No. 574 of yesterday.

It is reported in the press to-day that General Mougin left yesterday for Angora on an official mission, the object of which is stated to be to prepare the way for the complete re-establishment of friendly relations between France and Turkey, both in the political and economic spheres.

General Mougin's mission is said to be expected to last several months.

M. de Peretti last year described General (then Colonel) Mougin to Mr. Phipps as a "perfect imbecile," with no views of his own. His exaggerated pro-Turk sympathies are perhaps sufficient, however, to account for his new mission to Angora.

[E 8121/32/44]

No. 63.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 685.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 16, 1924.

I HAVE reported earlier in separate despatches on Mustafa Kemal's speech at the ceremony held at Doumlou Punar in honour of the unknown Turkish warrior, and on the Turco-Greek deadlock in respect of the interpretation of the word "established" as used in article 2 of the convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. These are two of the main features of the six weeks which have elapsed since I last addressed to you, in my despatch No. 601 of the 6th August, a general summary of events in this country. The Grand National Assembly is not due to meet again till November, and the past few months have been in the nature of the calm before the storms which are likely to arise when the Assembly is once more in full swing and asking the Government to give an account of its stewardship.

2. There have, nevertheless, been developments, not without interest, in the situation since the above-mentioned despatch was written. In the first place, the Treaty of Lausanne has come into force as from the 6th August for Great Britain, Italy and Japan, and about a month later for France. The final ratifications had been so long delayed that its actual entry into force provoked little comment. There was undoubtedly relief at seeing peace with the Western Powers at last finally and juridically consummated, but also resentment at a delay which seemed to indicate no feverish anxiety on the part of those Powers to resume normal peaceful relations with Turkey. I think that it was principally on this account that the Turkish Government showed a somewhat sulky temper in refusing to regard the treaty as being legally in force until the receipt by them of the official notification from the French Government to that effect. There is nothing to imply such a necessity in article 143 of the treaty, which merely states that the date of the *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications is the date on which the treaty shall be regarded as coming into force The fact, however, remains that for some reason or other the official communication was not made to the Turkish representative at Paris until the 29th August. A serious attempt on the part of the Turkish Government to uphold its thesis in this respect would therefore give rise to considerable complications in various respects, such as, to quote but one example, the date of the application of the tariffs under the provisions of the Commercial Convention.

3. The Turkish Government at Angora have, however, by now received the actual copies of the various *procès-verbaux*, and thus have no further excuse either for delay in proceeding with the different acts consequent on the entry into force of the treaty or for violations of its stipulations. I regret to have to state that I have not yet observed any alacrity to abide, where it does not suit them, either by the spirit or the letter of the treaty, notably, in so far as the minority clauses are concerned. I have agreed with my Allied colleagues that it would be expedient, now that the treaty is at last in force, to draw the attention of the Turkish Government, lest they mistake silence for indifferent acquiescence, to this tendency, and to the various evasions which we have observed. A note on the subject will accordingly be drafted by the Allied

Juridical Commission for submission in the first instance to the Allied Governments, and will in due course form the subject of another despatch.

4. One satisfactory result of the ratification of the treaty by Great Britain has been the tacit, so far as I am concerned, consent of the Turkish Government to submit the question of the Irak–Turkey frontier to the Council of the League of Nations. Several days after the announcement of Fethi Bey's appointment as Turkish delegate to Geneva for this purpose had appeared in the press, the Turkish representative here repeated to me that, though he believed the news to be correct, he was without any official confirmation. I presume that the Turkish Government notified the League direct, but it would seem as if they wished to lay stress on the fact that their submission was voluntary and not due to pressure by this mission or by His Majesty's Government. I consequently carefully refrained from any contact whatsoever with Fethi Bey or his mission during their stay in Constantinople. It might be noted in passing, firstly, that the future attitude of Turkey towards the League is bound to be largely influenced by the latter's decision in respect of the Irak frontier dispute; and, secondly, that, though I have made to the Turkish Government during the past few months various official communications on this subject, I have received nothing but purely verbal communications in reply. The dislike of the Turk for the written word is traditional and ingrained, but in this matter it has been curiously emphasised. The net result is, however, satisfactory, though it is possible that Fethi Bey may suggest at Geneva a plebiscite as the most suitable means of settling the difficulty.

5. In this connection very special interest attaches to the Turco-Kurkish Congress, which opened at Diarbekir on the 1st August. The proceedings have been kept secret and there has been no mention of them whatsoever in the press. But one of the main aims of Turkish policy is to assert the brotherhood and inseparability of Turks and Kurds, including those in Persia, and Kurdish influence has an important bearing on the Turkish reluctance to make any concessions in respect of the Mosul vilayet. The congress was intended to promote this brotherhood by removing as far as possible all causes of Kurdish disaffection.

6. Though I cannot vouch absolutely for the accuracy of the information at my disposal, it appears that the Kurdish delegates, when asked to state their grievances and suggest the remedies therefor, demanded, *inter alia*, a special form of administration for Kurdistan, amounting practically to autonomy, a loan for the alleviation of distress, a general amnesty, no taxation or conscription in Kurdistan for a period of five years, the restitution of the religious Sheri courts and of all arms confiscated in the country, as well as the removal of certain obnoxious Turkish military officers and officials. In return the Kurds would loyally support the Government and lend them their full assistance in the Mosul and all other questions and in the repression of any agitation among their compatriots in favour of a Sultan or Caliph.

7. These demands may well be authentic. They would certainly commend themselves to many Kurds, who, while regarding Turkey and Kurdistan as inseparable, do not hold that they should be indistinguishable. On the other hand, they would scarcely commend themselves to the Turkish Government and it is not surprising to learn that they were received with no little consternation by the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, the Kurdish desiderata seem to have been accepted in principle, though the admission of the demands in respect of the Sheri courts, taxation and conscription have perforce been subjected to future approval by the Grand National Assembly. A general amnesty was in any case granted on the occasion of the Doumlou Punar celebrations to all Kurds condemned for political or criminal offences. In the meantime, however, there are reports that large sections of the population are dissatisfied with the decisions of the congress and that an anti-Kemalist rising has actually occurred in the Kotch-Kiri district of the Sivas vilayet, and has induced the Turkish Government to give dictatorial powers for its suppression to Djevad Pasha, the inspector-general of the Sivas army. The Kurdish question thus remains one of those which is giving and will give the new Republic the most anxiety.

8. The Turkish Government has hitherto shown little disposition to expedite the nomination of their representatives to the different commissions to be set up under the treaty. Possibly they have been waiting for the communication of the *procès-verbaux*. I am continually urging Nusret Bey to stir up his Government in this respect, but so far I have met with nothing but evasion on some ground or other. For instance, as regards the Thracian Frontier Commission, he has told me that the Turkish member cannot be appointed until an agreement has been reached with the Bulgarian Government about certain small frontier rectifications. I insisted upon the impropriety of delay, the comparative unimportance, so far as a demilitarised zone was concerned, of a

minor frontier rectification and on the fact that Bulgaria, though equally affected, had not hesitated to appoint her representative and to facilitate on her side of the frontier the work of demarcation, which is actually in progress, of that zone. Nusret Bey merely adopted an attitude of passive resistance, accompanied by the assurance that the rectification would shortly be settled. If there be really an intention to rectify, of which I was unaware, no arrangement to that effect is likely to take place before the Bulgarian representative returns to Angora, probably next month, and continues his interrupted negotiations for the conclusion of a general treaty with Turkey. (Please see my despatch No. 623 of the 19th ultimo.)

9. In the same way I have so far failed to get the Turks to select their representative to the Graves Commission (article 130 of the treaty), to the demilitarised Straits Zone Commission (article 5 of the Straits Convention), or even to express an opinion as to the amount of salary to be paid to the neutral president or to the secretary-general of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal to be set up under article 92 of the treaty. In fact, the only representative whom they have so far nominated is Admiral Vassif Pasha as president of the International Straits Commission.

10. On the other hand, they have appointed, as successor to Yussuf Kemal Bey, who preferred under the recent regulations to remain a Deputy rather than an Ambassador or Minister abroad, a new Turkish representative to London in the person of Zekiai Bey, the Minister for Agriculture, and consequently also a Deputy, but one who presumably does not set equal store on his deputyship. I cannot say that I regard him as an eminently suitable choice. In fact I am at a loss to explain why he was selected; whether it was because the Government preferred to see him abroad, or whether it was simply for lack of a more suitable candidate, or whether it was that they thought him qualified for a particular object, such as, owing to his connection with the representatives of the Board of Trade at Lausanne, the development of economic relations with Great Britain. Whatever be the reason, I do not anticipate that his tenure of the office in London will be long. He has, however, already left for his post and been succeeded as Minister for Agriculture by Shukri Kaya Bey, Deputy for Smyrna.

11. In this latter connection it is worth mentioning that the press reported with insistence that the Government contemplated offering, or had actually offered, that Cabinet post to Rahmi Bey. The latter, equally a Deputy for Smyrna, is well known as one of the most prominent members of the old Committee of Union and Progress, as one of the leaders of the so-called "Opposition" and for his friendship with Reouf Bey. It is at least significant that his possible inclusion in the Government should even have been mooted. There are two possible explanations: Firstly, that it was an attempt on the part of the Government to conciliate and thus weaken the Opposition, or, secondly, that Mustafa Kemal himself put forward Rahmi Bey's name. There are many who believe that the President of the Republic, whose own position is, in my opinion, unassailable, would find no difficulty in working with the Opposition, should the latter develop sufficient strength during the next session to defeat the present Government. In that event Mustafa Kemal would presumably ask Reouf Bey, who is now living very quietly and unostentatiously in Constantinople, to form a Government.

12. To turn to more parochial matters, there have been during the past three weeks several events which have aroused considerable local interest. The most sensational has been the fate of Rachid Bey, the Vali of Constantinople. Some ten days ago the latter, after dining and supping "not wisely, but too well," took it into his head to order at about 2 A.M. a surprise mobilisation of all the armed forces of the republic in the city. All traffic was consequently stopped, and all the gendarmerie and the police, as well as the fire brigades and a portion at least of the military garrison, turned out into the streets under arms. The perturbation of the peaceable civil population, who believed in the possibility of a Communist rising, was considerable, though no real harm was done. As the result of the complaints raised in the press, an official enquiry was instituted and definitely established that Rachid Bey's zeal, though perhaps not in principle unjustifiable, particularly in view of the aforesaid Communist danger, about which there has been some talk recently—arms having been discovered and a secret Communist committee arrested in the town—was due in the case in point solely to the influence of intoxicants. He was consequently summarily dismissed by the Minister of the Interior.

13. His colleague, the prefect, who like most reformers is highly unpopular, has also managed to give the press a fresh handle against him. In referring in public recently to the necessity for rebuilding the burnt-out areas of the city, he seriously

advocated demolishing what he described as the walls of Justinian and using the stones thereof for this utilitarian purpose. His municipal enemies have taken advantage of this fatuous suggestion to cover him with well-deserved ridicule.

14. Of more importance has been the purification of the Turkish bar in Constantinople. A commission instituted for this purpose has been sitting here for some time past and making searching enquiries into the antecedents and morality of the Constantinople barristers. As the result of its investigations, over 530 out of 960 members of the Turkish bar here have been prohibited from further practice in the Turkish courts. Of the 430 who survive, 313 are Turks, 42 Greeks, 39 Armenians and 34 Jews. The victims have been disqualified either on moral grounds (a very wide net) or for not having furnished the necessary documents, or for being engaged in business incompatible with the profession of a barrister, such as commerce and even politics, since apparently a Deputy also is debarred from practising in the Turkish courts. This drastic cleansing of the Augean bar will add to the number of the disaffected in this city, particularly as some of the excluded barristers have been practising here for twenty or even thirty years. The decision of the commission is, however, not final, as those excluded have the right of appeal to the Ministry of Justice in Angora. It should be added that the members of the bar, after purification, held a general meeting and elected as their president Lutfi Fikri Bey, who, it will be recollected, was tried for treason to the republic last December by the special "Tribunal of Independence" and condemned to five years' imprisonment. Though he was subsequently pardoned and the sentence remitted, his re-election to the presidency of the Turkish bar here indicates that, even as purified, it does not intend to be subservient to the Government at Angora.

15. No summary of events would be complete without some mention of the doings of the President of the Republic. Mustafa Kemal went to Broussa after his speech at Doumlou Punar. It was anticipated that he would remain quietly there, at a villa in the vicinity, for several weeks so as to get a complete rest and change before the reopening of the Grand National Assembly. He took part as a matter of course in the celebrations at Broussa itself in honour of its recapture from the Greeks. He made thereat a somewhat similar speech to the oration which he delivered when laying the foundation-stone of the monument to the unknown Turkish warrior. That is to say, he emphasised once more the two main planks of his platform, namely, firstly, the importance of strengthening and supporting the present Republican régime, since the Sultans and Caliphs were solely responsible for all the ills from which Turkey had suffered in the past; and, secondly, the vital necessity for the new Turkey, if she is to prosper, of progress along civilised Western lines.

16. Owing to the proximity of Broussa, rumours were somewhat naturally current here that he would pay a visit to Constantinople, possibly on the occasion of the first anniversary on the 6th October of the re-entry of the Nationalist army into this city. His refusal of an invitation to attend a similar, though second, anniversary of the reoccupation of Smyrna on the 9th September seemed, however, to indicate that he was preparing to avoid also that of Constantinople. Moreover, since a visit here would not be without complications, such as a residence, as well as the somewhat awkward position of the foreign representatives, most of whom have not presented their letters of credence, I was inclined to think that he would keep away from here, though not, as some assert, on grounds of fear of assassination, for some time yet to come.

17. Nevertheless, he has at last shown himself in a sense to his stiff-necked people at Constantinople. Early last Friday morning, the 12th September, I received an agitated telephone message from Nusret Bey himself, informing me that Mustafa Kemal would shortly be passing up the Bosphorus on board the cruiser "Hamidieh" on his way back to the Black Sea and begging me to give instructions to British shipping to decorate in his honour. As a matter of fact, there would have been no time for such preparations, as within an hour of Nusret's message the "Hamidieh," accompanied by a very antique-looking gunboat and numerous motor craft, was already passing the British Embassy at Yenikeuy. As Kemal has too long been deprived of the pleasure of seeing it, I did, however, myself hoist on the building here the largest British flag which we possess.

18. The President was accompanied by his wife and other ladies and has gone to Trebizond, where it is said that he will stop about a fortnight. I am unaware of the object of his visit, which was clearly undertaken most unexpectedly. Its most probable object, however, is to show himself in the eastern provinces and to take stock of the situation there.

19. But it is scarcely flattering to Constantinople to have passed so cavalierly

through the largest city of the republic without stopping at it. If the President were to repeat the manœuvre it could scarcely be regarded except as a studied insult. It is, therefore, just possible that Kemal will break his journey here on the return voyage, more especially as some of the complications above mentioned would be mitigated if he were to remain during his stay on board a battleship.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

P.S.—Since writing the above despatch I have been officially notified, in a communication which I am sending under a separate cover, of the appointment of two Turkish officers to the commission for the demilitarisation of the Straits zone under article 5 of the Straits Convention. It is stated that one of these officers is the delegate for the Dardanelles and the other for the Bosphorus zone. This is in itself a step in the right direction, though it will be necessary to point out to the Turkish Government that the aforesaid article 5 lays down that the commission shall be "composed of four representatives, appointed respectively by the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and Turkey," and that consequently one only of the two officers mentioned can be the Turkish representative and that the other must be his assistant. Nusret Bey also in conversation yesterday gave me to understand that his Government would, after all, shortly proceed with the appointment of a representative on the Thracian Frontier Commission.

N. H.

[E 8123/32/44] No. 64.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received September* 22.)

(No. 688.)

THE acting British representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Britannic Majesty's consul-general, Smyrna reporting on the second anniversary celebrations of the recapture of Smyrna.

Constantinople, September 17, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 64.

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Henderson.

(No. 94.)

Sir, *Smyrna, September* 12, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that the second anniversary of the recapture of Smyrna was celebrated on the 9th instant with a considerable amount of genuine enthusiasm. There was a holiday, all public buildings and most cafés and shops were decorated, there were official receptions in the morning, a procession at midday, which was better organised than any that has been seen here, and in the evening indiscriminate pistol firing and fireworks, which were visible in spite of the moon. On the whole the people enjoyed themselves. There was no ill-feeling shown towards foreigners.

2. The procession was organised, no doubt on the instigation of the Government, by a special committee. It was composed of representatives of the public services and of various political, professional, athletic and philanthropic associations. It was remarkable as revealing the extent to which such bodies have sprung into existence in the last two years.

3. During these festivities Mustafa Kemal Pasha's picture was in evidence and his name was cheered, but this was probably not entirely spontaneous. The celebrations afforded the Government an occasion for working up a little enthusiasm with which to meet latent discontent. The Popular party has lately been extending its organisation throughout this vilayet. This week a congress of representatives from the different branches has met. It is worthy of note that, according to the newspaper report of the proceedings, the resolutions consisted of complaints about the lack of roads, the lack of schools, delays in the distribution of seed and negligence on the part of officials sent to enquire into the damage caused by floods in the Meander Valley.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

[E 8125/210/44] No. 65.

Mr. Henderson to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received September* 22.)

(No. 692.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 17, 1924.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 625 of the 19th ultimo, to inform you that I have received a verbal communication from the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here to the effect that the whole question of sites in Angora for the residences of foreign representatives was actually under consideration and would probably have to be referred to the Grand National Assembly when it meets next November.

2. I asked the German Minister here a short while ago whether the site which I had heard that he had acquired near Tchankaya for the erection of his ready-made wooden house had been offered to him as a free gift or not. M. Nadolny told me that he had indeed been offered an entirely unsuitable plot of land inside the town itself. On his declining to accept it as inappropriate for the purpose in view, it was intimated to him that as the land elsewhere did not belong to the Government he would have to purchase in the ordinary way from the owners. The site which he had chosen was in the neighbourhood of the President's villa. It was about 150 metres long by 100 broad and the price asked was approximately £T. 17,000, or, roughly, £2,000 sterling.

3. Such a price appears to me fantastically absurd. I said so to M. Nadolny and informed him that I had, under your instructions, accepted the free grant of land which Adnan Bey had verbally but formally and spontaneously offered to me on behalf of his Government last year. Whereupon M. Nadolny said that the contract had not been signed and that he would recommend to his Government that they should wait and see what the other Powers did before making any payments. As I learnt from him a few days ago that his wooden house, which reached here last month and which he had hoped to have erected by October, is still lying in storage at Haidar Pasha, I gather that the German Government have taken his advice.

4. M. Nadolny's experiences had, however, led me to anticipate some such reply from Nusret Bey as I have now received. The Turkish Government are beginning to realise that their original offer to the French, Italians, Americans and ourselves was somewhat rash and to appreciate that the question is one which must be treated generally and not individually.

5. Nevertheless, I thought it advisable to let M. Nadolny know that His Majesty's Government did not contemplate purchasing land, lest, if the German Government paid, a precedent would be set and all be obliged to pay. Nor do I imagine that our experience would differ materially from that of the German Minister. We would probably be offered the same plot of land in the town which M. Nadolny refused, and have to pay for anything outside, where the only suitable emplacement is likely to be found. I would add that I do not regard 15,000 square metres, *i.e.*, the area of the plot which M. Nadolny selected, as nearly large enough. Though the temporary residence which it is proposed for the moment to construct may be small, I think that it is most desirable that as large an area as possible should be earmarked against possible eventualities.

6. For the present, however, I am inclined to suggest that the question be left in abeyance until the Turkish Government raise it later themselves. It would scarcely be possible to commence any construction work, except of the most rudimentary kind, before the spring and in the meantime we can well wait upon events and see how they evolve.

7. I have also asked the French representative how the situation stands in respect of the site which I believed Colonel Mougin to have selected at the beginning of this year and of which I understood the plans had actually been sent to Paris. M. Jessé-Curély said that he knew nothing about it and that any arrangements which had been made had been made direct between Colonel Mougin and Paris. In this connection I may mention that I observe from the press that that officer, now promoted to the rank of a general, is being sent back to Angora "with a view to preparing the way for a complete resumption of political and economic relations between France and Turkey." I cannot imagine that such a mission will commend itself either to M. Jessé-Curély or to any French representative unless it be M. Franklin-Bouillon, who, as it is already rumoured, is to be appointed here as French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
NEVILE HENDERSON.

[E 8631/8631/44] No. 66.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 6.)

(No. 713. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 30, 1924.

WITH reference to previous correspondence, and especially to the despatches Nos. 96, 101 and 126 of 1923 from His Majesty's Legation at the Vatican, I have the honour to report that Mgr. Philippi, who for some months acted as Apostolic Visitor at Constantinople, left Turkey a few weeks ago, and that Mgr. Dolci, Nuncio at Bucharest, arrived here at about the same time in an unofficial capacity to take his place. Mgr. Dolci has told me that he accepted the mission only with the utmost reluctance and as a result of strong pressure from the Vatican and that his principal task was to seek some sort of arrangement by which the French and Italian congregational schools in Turkey may again open their doors and resume their task of imparting education.

2. I am reporting separately what the Monsignor told me about the schools; but from another informant I gather that he is also seeking to bring about permanent and official diplomatic relations between Turkey and the Vatican. His principal difficulty in this task, I am told, arises from the attitude of the French Government, who apparently now, even though the Treaty of Lausanne is in force and the Capitulations are abolished *de jure* as well as *de facto*, hanker no less than ever after the maintenance of its right to protect Catholics in the East—a task in which it will brook no rivalry. The French, I understand, have therefore protested with some warmth against the despatch of an official envoy from the Vatican and may even have gone so far as to threaten the withdrawal of their own Ambassador to the Holy See if the latter accredits a representative to Constantinople. Mgr. Dolci's efforts are therefore directed towards inducing the Turkish Government themselves to take the initiative by proposing the establishing of official diplomatic relations, hoping that in this manner his object may be achieved without incurring the risk of a breach with France.

3. As to the Turkish Government, they naturally will have nothing to do with any idea of a French protectorate of Catholics, and it is said that Mgr. Philippi's departure from here was due to the fact that he accorded liturgical honours to the French representative so freely as to compromise his position with the Turks. The latter are therefore in principle not averse to receiving an official envoy from the Holy See, but are unlikely to take any measures towards that consummation until the question of the congregational schools has either been settled or has entered into a less acute phase.

4. I report the above information with some hesitation, as I am not quite sure of its reliability. I should be grateful for any observations on it that may occur to His Majesty's Minister at the Vatican, to whom I am sending a copy of this despatch.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 8636/32/44] No. 67.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 6.)

(No. 720.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 1, 1924.

DURING the past fortnight the local press has devoted much space to chronicling the details of the tour of the President of the Republic, who, as reported in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 685 of the 16th instant, passed through the Bosphorus on the 12th September *en route* for Trebizond. Contrary to expectation, his stay in the latter town, which he reached on the 15th September, only extended to four days, during which he visited the port of Rizé as well as other places in the immediate vicinity. He then proceeded to Ordu, Samsun (where he remained two days), Havza, Amassia, Tokat and Sivas (where the first Nationalist congress was held in 1919). Two days ago he left Sivas on his way to Erzeroum.

2. Although it has been officially announced that the motive underlying the visit of Erzeroum is the President's desire to witness for himself the damage done by a series of recent earthquake shocks in that area, it now seems certain that the real object of the tour, which was doubtless fully, though secretly, planned in advance, is to enable Mustafa Kemal to take stock of the situation actually prevailing in the eastern provinces.

3. It seems scarcely necessary to state that, according to the press reports, the utmost enthusiasm prevailed at every point visited by the President. Moreover, the fact that he was traversing, as head of the Turkish State, practically the same route as that followed by him five years ago, when he left Constantinople alone for Anatolia to found the Nationalist movement, has served as an excellent text for the speeches which it was but natural that he should deliver. Apart from one, all these speeches have been in the usual strain, a comparison between the free and independent Turkey of to-day and the Turkey of 1919 which groaned under the oppression of foreign foes, aided and abetted by a traitor Sultan and his servile Government in Constantinople. At a banquet given in his honour by the People's party organisation at Trebizond, however, the President took the opportunity to answer those of his critics who have for some time been contending that the head of the State should be above party. The People's party was, he said, a sacred association which had created a force by which the foreign invaders had been expelled and the enemies at home crushed, it had laid the foundations of the free republic, had introduced Turkey to the civilised world and was continually striving to elevate her position in that world. Of such a party the President announced himself proud to be the leader, and added that for him there could be no neutrality, as he was an out-and-out partisan of the republic and he felt sure that by remaining at the head of the party he would be best serving the needs of the young republic. It is not without interest that Mustafa Kemal should have chosen to deliver himself of this important pronouncement at the place where, during the elections just over a year ago, the utmost difficulty was encountered in securing the nomination of the Kemalist candidates, a result which, as will be remembered, was only attained after the so-called headquarters of the People's party in Trebizond had been forcibly closed. Moreover, in a speech a few days later at Samsun, he further warned his hearers that the real salvation of the country lay in the realisation of the ideals of the People's party, and that the formation of other groups could only damage the nation's highest interests.

4. Where everything appears to have savoured of adulation and hero-worship, at least one small incident occurred to mar the otherwise general harmony. This was at the port of Rizé, where two muftis submitted to Mustafa Kemal a petition, in which they begged for the reopening of the Moslem religious schools ("medressehs"). This request seems to have roused the anger of the President, for he at once addressed the assemblage and enquired whether they were not aware that the "medressehs" had been the real cause of the Turkish decline, and concluded: "No, the 'medressehs' will not be reopened." The incident is significant as showing that, while the lay republic has been established without active opposition, there remain elements discontented with the Government on religious grounds, though powerless effectively to oppose it.

5. As has already been stated, the President's immediate objective is now Erzeroum, beyond which his itinerary has not yet been made public. It seems probable, however, that he will eventually return to Angora by road, and so escape the necessity of again passing through the Bosphorus. This is all the more probable as the cruiser "Hamidieh" has returned to Constantinople, where it is understood that she will undergo repairs. In this connection it is reported that during the voyage to Trebizond the officers drew the attention of the President to the grievances of the navy, whose interests have hitherto been almost entirely neglected by the Government, and extracted from him a promise that he would devote his personal attention to the much-needed reorganisation of the Turkish navy. He further sought to ingratiate himself with the latter by writing in the visitors' book of the "Hamidieh" a long eulogy of the navy in general and of the "Hamidieh" in particular, in which he expressed the hope that a further goal would soon be reached with Turkey in possession of a large and powerful navy in keeping with her great maritime interests.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 8637/8637/44] No. 68.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 6.)

(No 721.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 1, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Spain was signed on the 27th ultimo at Angora by a representative of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and M. Juan Servert, Spanish Minister in this country.

2. I understand that the contents of this treaty are similar to those of the treaties recently concluded between Turkey and other countries.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 69.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 173.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, October* 9, 1924.

MY despatch No. 575.

Houloussi Fuad Bey, secretary of Constantinople delegation of Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, together with Professor Jemil Bey (see paragraph 7 of my above-mentioned despatch) and another delegate, leaves to-day for London to attend Conference of League of Nations Unions. We understand privately that Fuad has been specially delegated for this mission and is visiting on return Warsaw and Bucharest; Turkish Government have said nothing to me about it, but it may of course be connected with sounding opinion abroad about Turkish entry into League of Nations.

No. 70.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 181.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 11, 1924.

I HEAR on fairly good authority that there is some question of French Government sending a complimentary flight of aeroplanes to Angora. This is one of Colonel Mougin's activities. Of course, it would be most inappropriate at this moment from our point of view, and French have no reason that I know to be grateful to Turks, as settlement of schools question seems to have been an abject surrender on their part.

Could project be discouraged?

[E 8863/32/44] No. 71.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 750. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 8, 1924.

A FEW days ago the press of Constantinople began to publish reports to the effect that the Government was contemplating some sort of action against the Committee of Union and Progress at Smyrna. There seems to be little or no truth in these rumours, but the circumstances which gave rise to them transpired in a confidential conversation between the correspondent of the "Times" here, Mr. Macartney, and Hussein Jahid Bey, editor of the "Tanin" and a prominent member of the Union and Progress party.

2. Hussein Jahid said that it had now been definitely decided to start an Opposition party in Turkey, and that it might be expected to materialise soon, perhaps before, perhaps shortly after the meeting of the Assembly. The general dissatisfaction of educated opinion in and out of the Assembly at the mismanagement of affairs by the Government made such a development necessary. For five months the Government had been free from the annoyances of the elected Chamber, and so far from having utilised this period for reconstruction, they had done nothing. The administration was still in chaos, the hardships suffered by Mahometans exchanged from Greece were making a deep impression, and the abuses of the Abandoned Property Commission were flagrant, the more so as valuable properties, instead of affording shelter for incoming refugees as had been intended, were now to be found in the possession of Ministers and notables (of whom I fear Ismet Pasha is one). The movement towards secession was further stimulated by the close identification of the presidential office with the leadership of the People's party which Mustafa Kemal had recently emphasised in his speech at Trebizond (see my despatch No. 720 of 1st October).

3. Hussein Jahid was of opinion that the popularity of Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly on the wane and still more that of Ismet Pasha and his Government. All accounts to the effect that the President's eastern tour was a quasi-military inspection of the north-east frontier should be discounted; its sole object was to beat up in the east some enthusiasm for the People's party, which had always been conspicuously absent, and especially since the murder of Chukri Bey in March 1923. Nor had the tour succeeded in its object; the reports of cordial receptions in the various towns published in the papers were, he said, exaggerated; the People's party in those regions usually consisted of one or two officials with no following; and the President's reception had been markedly cold.

4. It was not intended, Hussein Jahid said, to reconstitute the old Committee of Union and Progress as the new Opposition party, though undoubtedly many of the old organisation would join it. Nor was it intended to afford cover to any anti-republican or other reactionary elements. The new party was to be an Opposition organised with the definite object of opposing the Government on constitutional and republican lines; and towards the President it would initiate no marked hostility, but would reserve its attitude until the President's attitude towards it was more clearly defined.

5. In all that Hussein Jahid has said above there is some truth, and the fact that the Vali of Trebizond has just been removed from his post confirms the statement that the President has been coldly received in the east. Nevertheless, Hussein Bey is essentially a politician and a critic, and his declaration, taken as a whole, certainly requires to be discounted somewhat. I am certainly of opinion that the President's position in the country at large is not materially shaken. As you know, he stands head and shoulders above any other of the governing personages of Turkey, certainly in ability and probably also in character, and I cannot help thinking that on any point of real importance he would find no difficulty still in having his own way.

6. An interesting feature of Hussein Jahid's statements is the indication it gives of Turkey's political evolution. It is an axiom that healthy political life can only exist where there is organised opposition to, and criticism of, the Government, and though there has been in Turkey much dissatisfaction at the maladministration of the country (especially of Constantinople) and bitter criticism of the acts of Ministers collectively and administratively, the opposition has not hitherto ventured openly to invest itself with a political character and has thus failed so far to fulfil its real function. There now seems to be a movement towards remedying this state of affairs, supported undoubtedly by the most intelligent of Turkish writers and politicians. Whether or not it will succeed, and whether or not Turkish politics really will now enter on a new phase is still doubtful; and it is sad to read in this morning's "Tanin" (Hussein Jahid's paper) a prominent paragraph denying the existence of any such movement. Reouf Bey had heard no more about the formation of an Opposition than what he has read in the papers; Refet has never discussed it with him at all; and Ismail Jamboulat regards the whole thing as a mere *ballon d'essai*. It is hard to imagine that those who faint so soon by the wayside will struggle through to the end of the race.

7. The true difficulty is the attitude the President has adopted in taking on himself the leadership of the People's party and the arrogance with which at Trebizond he claimed for it a monopoly of public virtue. There may have been good reasons to impel him when he founded the party also to become its head. The republican régime had to be consolidated and the serious work of laicisation was about to begin, culminating in the expulsion of the Caliph. Mustafa Kemal may well have thought a year ago that to carry through these tasks opposition must somehow be silenced, and that the best way would be to identify himself closely with the organisation which was to undertake the work. The disadvantages of his action are obvious and do not require to be laboured, and last spring, when affairs in the Assembly appeared to be rather critical, Mustafa Kemal seemed to appreciate them and to be seeking to extricate himself from a false position by holding himself aloof from the turmoil of the Assembly and above the difficulties of his Cabinet. His Trebizond speech puts things back where they were and condemns politics to a continuation of principles that are essentially false. It is not easy to discern the motives of his action.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 8864/109/44] No. 72.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 751.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 8, 1924.

DURING the past month little apparent progress has been made towards a settlement of the difference which, as reported in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 673 of the 10th ultimo, had arisen within the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations over the interpretation of the word "établis," as employed in article 2 of the French text of the relevant convention signed at Lausanne.

2. As will be remembered, the plenary sitting of the commission on the 8th September closed with a personal altercation between the principal Greek and Turkish delegates, as a result of which Tewfik Rushdi Bey left the conference chamber. He thereupon tendered his resignation to his Government, and, although M. Pappas offered his apologies for the incident, followed up his letter of resignation by proceeding in person to Angora on the 10th September, where he was reported to have given explanations to, and to have received instructions from, Ismet Pasha. His resignation not having been accepted by the latter, Tewfik Rushdi Bey returned to Constantinople after an absence of ten days.

3. In the meantime, thanks to the efforts of the neutral delegates to secure a resumption of the commission's activities, a further meeting had been held on the 15th September at which, after M. Pappas had again expressed his regrets, it was decided to refer the disputed point back to the juridical section of the commission, with the request that its report should be submitted at the earliest possible moment. It soon became evident, however, that the distance between the Greek and the Turkish standpoints was too great to be bridged, and further delay resulted from the retirement of the chief Greek delegate, whose successor, M. Exinderis, stated by the Turkish press to be a pronounced Turcophobe, only arrived in Constantinople on the 27th September. Up till the 1st October, on which date the exchange of the Constantinople Greeks should have commenced, no further plenary meeting of the commission had been held. All the chief delegates had, however, attended the meetings of the legal experts, and on the 2nd instant the latter completed their report. This report proved in the event to be merely a majority one, signed by the neutral and Greek delegates alone, the Turkish delegates having refused to append their signatures.

4. According to the press this majority report recommended that the following categories of Greeks should be regarded as "établis":—

(*a.*) Those who, being resident in a locality excepted by the convention from the exchange operations, had had their names regularly inscribed in the civil registers of the locality.

(*b.*) All those with fixed habitations obtained with the intention of residing in the locality in a regular manner. As regards this category, it was made clear that the intention would be shown if the person concerned was engaged in a regular manner in commerce or industry, or had concluded a contract of long duration, or followed a trade which showed that he intended to reside regularly in the locality in question. Married women and children were to be dealt with in the same way as their husbands or fathers, and widows as their husbands if the latter had been alive, the Mixed Commission alone being competent to give a decision in disputed cases.

5. Following the plenary meeting of the commission at which the above report was presented on the 2nd instant, the resignation of Tewfik Rushdi Bey was once again announced, and at the same time he stated to the press that in this instance it would not be withdrawn, adding that, if his Government refused to accept it, he would be compelled to request leave for reasons of health. The result of this action of the Turkish delegate has been to bring the work of the commission again to a standstill. So far as is known at the moment, the resignation has neither been refused nor accepted, nor has the Government given any indication as to who, if it is accepted, will be the new delegate. For this post, the local press has, nevertheless, insistently been pressing the candidature of Dr. Riza Nour Bey, the Turkish negotiator of the convention, who, it is expected, would be in a position to press the Turkish case with greater vigour. As the neutral delegates have, however, so

definitely identified themselves with the Greek interpretation of "établis" it is difficult to imagine his having any greater success in upholding the Turkish Government's standpoint than attended the efforts of Tewfik Rushdi Bey.

6. As regards the latter, it is somewhat difficult to account for his attitude. During the operations of the commission in Greece he was accused locally of having surrendered too much to the Greek point of view, and it will be remembered that, on the Turkish side, he was chiefly responsible for the drafting of the much criticised and hitherto unsigned Turco-Greek Convention, the text of which was enclosed in Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 622 of the 19th August. These activities lent colour to the theory that Tewfik Rushdi Bey was preparing the ground for his appointment as Turkish Minister at Athens, in which direction his ambition was supposed to lie. He is represented to me as an ambitious intriguer, and it may well be that, having foreseen that a Turkish climb down on this important issue is well-nigh inevitable, he hopes by his present final resignation to escape that political unpopularity which would undoubtedly be associated with such a surrender.

7. I understand that the Greek Government are now addressing to the principal Allied Governments a formal protest against the Turkish attitude regarding article 2 of the convention, and asking for Allied support.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 73.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 13.)

(No. 183.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 13, 1924.

NEWS this morning is that President is returning at once to Angora. Press is scrupulously restrained and, while adopting patriotic attitude, shows no indication of warlike spirit.

Assembly can hardly meet before 18th October at the earliest and its convocation introduces new element of uncertainty. From the point of view of domestic politics, Government is doubtless glad to call Deputies up on a patriotic issue and thus weaken Opposition on internal questions. So far as frontier affair is concerned, convocation certainly increases Turkish powers of passive resistance in both diplomatic and military field and tends to facilitate delay and confusion. Probably Turkish Government could bring Deputies to vote as it wished, but responsibilities are now divided and clear decisions will be more difficult to obtain.

While drawing attention to the above considerations, I cannot emphasise too strongly the importance from British point of view of the maintenance by His Majesty's Government of the firm attitude they have taken up. Affair has assumed first-rate proportions, and if it is not carried through, everyday life here, already difficult, will become impossible, not only for Englishmen, but for all Europeans.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 52.)

No. 74.

Mr. MacDonald to the Marquess of Crewe (*Paris*).

(No. 244.) [By Bag.]

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 13, 1924.

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 181 of 11th October: French aeroplane flight to Angora.

I leave the manner of bringing this matter to the notice of the French Government entirely to your discretion.

No. 75.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1924.

MY despatch No. 1072 of 13th October: Proposed action in view of Turkish violations of minorities provisions of Lausanne Treaty.

Please reply by telegraph.

[E 9116/210/44] No. 76.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 20.)

(No. 770.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 15, 1924.

WITH reference to previous correspondence concerning sites for foreign mission buildings at Angora, I learn from the German Minister that he has now bought a site and paid for it. It will therefore be seen that Herr Nadolny has changed his mind since the date of Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 692. He told me that he was having to spend a large sum for storage of his wooden house at Haidar Pasha, and that he has made a formal reserve to the Turkish Government that he will expect them to repay him the purchase money if they grant sites gratis to any other mission. It is, however, obvious that by his action he has compromised the chances of all other foreign Governments of obtaining the grant of free sites.

2. The plot of land acquired by Herr Nadolny is 28,000 square metres in area, and is situated on the road from Angora to Chankaya, the residence of the President of the Republic. It is 5 kilom. from the town and 3 from Chankaya. Herr Nadolny says there is a good spring of water on the site, but not a single tree. The price he paid is £T. 16,000, and this works out to about 1*s.* 5*d.* per square metre, a rate for a bare hillside, in the remote and undeveloped suburb of a place like Angora, which I should regard as outrageous. I am, however, told by my Polish colleague that the President of the Republic pressed him and presses other foreign representatives also to settle on the Angora–Chankaya road, and that various persons of influence have therefore gone in for a speculation in this region and are holding all possible sites for high prices. There is thus no telling how mixed Herr Nadolny's motives may have been in agreeing to buy a site for his Government in this area.

3. The Polish Minister himself lives at a place 8 kilom. out of Angora in the opposite direction from Chankaya in a house he has on lease till this time next year. He is far from enthusiastic about his residence, but he says it is well removed from the malarial swamps. He has no spring, but he has a stream of running water and a few trees.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No 77.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October* 21, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 165.

I am inclined at present to concur in view given in last sentence of your despatch [? No. 10]72.

At next Allied meeting I will suggest re-examination of draft note enclosed in my despatch No. 711 with a view to ascertaining whether we have evidence of specific breach of amnesty declaration as distinct from minority clauses of treaty sufficient to justify protest. Question is complicated by explicit attitude adopted by Turkish delegation at Lausanne as regards return of fugitives before Adnan's declaration was signed (see pp. 11–14 of Lausanne Conference hand-book).

[E 9226/109/44] No. 78.

M. Caclamanos to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 2969.)
Sir, *Greek Legation, London, October* 22, 1924.

WITH reference to your note of the 21st October, I have the honour to inform you that the Greek Government is addressing to-day to the secretary-general of the Council of the League of Nations an appeal concerning the execution of the Greco-Turkish Convention for the exchange of populations, asking him to inscribe this question on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the Council of the League of Nations, to be held in Brussels on the 27th October, in order to deal with the Irak frontier dispute.

I have, &c.
D. CACLAMANOS.

Enclosure in No. 78.

Note to the Secretary-General of the Council of the League of Nations.

AS soon as the Mixed Commission dealing with the application of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey was invited to determine the term "établis" (established) inscribed in article 2, paragraph 2, of this convention (Annex IV of the Treaty of Lausanne), the Turkish delegation virtually opposed an obstruction to it which resulted in the resignation of the Turkish delegates to the commission.

The sittings of the commission were thereupon interrupted and their work stopped. Later on the resignations were withdrawn, but instead of allowing the Mixed Commission to proceed with their work, the Turks tried to put forth different terms, which, in fact, constituted a modification of the convention—the Turks tending to bring back the date of 1918 mentioned in the convention to some years previous to this date.

Upon the refusal of Greece to accept such modifications in the treaty, the Turkish Government, acting on their own initiative, proceeded, without any justification whatever, to the arrest of a great number of Greeks at Constantinople under the pretext that these Greeks were established there subsequent to 1918. The Turkish Government thus substituted themselves to the Mixed Commission—the only competent body who, after interpreting the word "établis," is entitled to designate those Greeks who must leave Constantinople and those who would have the right to remain there.

These arrests were carried out with characteristic brutality. Women were even forbidden to take their children away from the schools where they were at the moment of the arrest. The prisoners arrested are confined in camps, and the Mixed Commission has proved impotent to stop the action of the Turkish authorities.

The Treaty of Lausanne having been violated in an evident way following these arbitrary Turkish measures, the Hellenic Government, making use of the right conferred upon them by article 11 of the pact, appeal to the League of Nations and request that this question should be inscribed on the agenda of the session of the Council of the League of Nations to be held on the 27th October.

As a matter of fact the situation created by the violation of the Treaty of Lausanne on the part of Turkey affects international relations and "threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

1. The Turkish Government has expressly violated the Convention of the Exchange of Populations by substituting themselves to the Mixed Commission and executing through their own agents and on their exclusive initiative the expulsion of Greeks whom they claim to be exchangeable.
2. By giving to the term "établis" a significance contrary to the meaning determined by the treaty and the minutes of the proceedings of the negotiations for its elaboration, without waiting for the decision of the Mixed Commission on this point and endeavouring to force this commission to adopt their point of view by dilatory means and by intimidation as well as by the creation of an accomplished fact.

3. Not only has the Turkish delegation rendered it impossible for the Mixed Commission to continue its sittings, but the Turkish Government, on the pretence that they are expelling only Greeks established in Constantinople after the year 1918, are arresting indiscriminately through their agents people falling under this category as they interpret it, and even Christians provided with "nofouz" (*i.e.*, having a legal domicile in Constantinople).

On the other hand the said agents, instead of stopping their action on the representations of the Mixed Commission, are only promising to refer to their superior authorities, continuing in the meantime their wholesale arrests in order to create an accomplished fact.

Finally the Turkish representatives, unable to make their interpretation prevail as far as the term "établis" is concerned, have just raised a fresh interpretation of article 3 of the Convention of the Exchange absolutely inadmissible.

The Greek Government is also of the opinion that article 11 of the Pact of the League of Nations could invoke additionally, because there is in a general way a formal violation of the rights of the minorities following an arbitrary generalisation of the measures of exchange which could only be applied in a strict sense and limited to the special stipulations of the treaty, the exchange being an exception to the minorities rights.

October 22, 1924.

No. 79.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received October* 25.)

(No. 239.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October* 24, 1924.

I HAVE received following information from Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs:—

Greek consul-general at Constantinople learns from good source that Turkish Government have enquired of Soviet Government whether they intend to carry out agreement for mutual assistance, in case of hostilities, which was concluded on the resumption of relations between the two countries.

Secretary-General believes that understanding exists, but only extends to facilities for propaganda, provision of war material, &c. He cites as instance of latter that Turks have already received artillery from Russia sent to inland Black Sea port and forwarded east by train.

He asserts also that Turks have purchased guns from France, and that transport animals are being mobilised in Smyrna district.

I have no means of checking above information, but collection of transport is apparently common knowledge.

No. 80.

Mr. MacDonald to Mr. Lindsay (*Constantinople*).

(No. 172.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October* 30, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 191 of 21st October: Turkish violations of minorities provisions of treaty, and my despatch No. 1092 of 20th October.

We propose to reply to French Government, and to Italian Government, who are understood to be about to raise question also, that His Majesty's Government are in favour of bringing question jointly before Council of the League of Nations at its next meeting in December. Do you see any objection? We presume there is sufficient evidence to justify this course? Full statement of facts will be required. Please arrange to have one prepared for our information and guidance.

No. 81.

Sir G. Grahame to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received November* 1.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Brussels, October* 31, 1924.

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cadogan:—

"Council met this afternoon and discussed the question of arrest of Greeks in Constantinople.

"Spanish president of Mixed Commission and Greek and Turkish members were present.

"Both sides admitted that questions in dispute were within competence of Mixed Commission. Council accordingly requested president of Mixed Commission to summon a meeting immediately on his return to take decisions on disputed points. Council expressed hope that both Governments would see to it that they were represented properly at the meetings of commission. If commission found itself unable to give decision, Permanent Court of International Justice might be appealed to. Council further requested commission to furnish periodical reports on its progress.

"These proposals were accepted by all concerned, and it was resolved to bring them officially to notice of both Governments and of Mixed Commission.

"President announced that Czechoslovak Government had ratified Protocol for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

"He also announced formation of Irak Frontier Commission, to consist of Count Teleki, M. Paulis and M. de Wirsen.

"It is hoped that commission may meet in Geneva about 10th November.

"British delegation leaves to-morrow morning."

[E 9537/32/44]

No. 82.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 805.)
Sir, *Constantinople, October* 28, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Grand National Assembly, which held its first meeting on the 18th instant, has continued its sittings on the regular days throughout the past week. The Mosul question, which caused its hurried convocation, has not again been mentioned, and interest has centred round matters of purely domestic concern, there being a good deal of discussion of the interpellations with which the various Ministers are threatened. The principal attack is at present directed against Refet Bey, Minister of Reconstruction, on account of the scandalous neglect of Mussulmans exchanged into Turkey from Greece, and the press of Constantinople is anticipating that this Ministry will be abolished altogether and its duties transferred to some other Department. It is quite certain that, faced with a task that might well tax the abilities of a far more highly organised Administration, Refet Bey's Ministry has lamentably failed to do any serious work; but it is far more doubtful whether Ismet Pasha, who is loyal to his colleagues and reasserts at intervals the principle of Cabinet solidarity, is yet prepared to let him go.

2. On the 25th instant a meeting took place of the People's party, which still comprises—nominally, at any rate—all the Deputies. Ismet Pasha made a long statement as to the activities of the Government during the parliamentary recess, which, according to the press reports, was of a somewhat colourless nature; there was little discussion and little enthusiasm, and the proceedings are to be continued at another party meeting to be held later on this week.

3. So far the Opposition to the Government have either not yet consolidated themselves into a party, or they prefer not to unmask their batteries at once; indeed, one Constantinople adherent told an Englishman a few days ago that they intended to go ahead presently, provided that England did not send any more ultimatums. To-day, while there is every likelihood that the Government will be freely sniped, there is no indication of the formation and organisation of a regular parliamentary Opposition, and nothing resembling a constructive political programme has yet been put forward. All that has been accomplished so far is that the press has talked so much about opposition that the idea must have become familiar to the newspaper-reading public. It is usually said that some forty or fifty Deputies belong to the

new group, and the leaders of it are mentioned almost every day as being Reouf, Refet, Ismail Jambolat and Dr. Adnan Beys. Yesterday a fifth is said to have been added. Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, Commander of the Eastern Army Corps, walked into the Assembly and said that, the country being no longer in danger, and because the army was perfect, he himself, having to choose between his military command and his post as Deputy, now definitely preferred to take up the latter. The event caused some sensation in the Assembly, but the general has so often in the last two or three years been talked about as a politician, and so little has come of it, that judgment as to the importance of his action had better wait awhile.

4. Though the surface of the parliamentary sea is thus at present fairly smooth, a good deal is probably going on under the surface, and I frequently hear rumours, always very indefinite, of sensational developments preparing for the near future. I find it impossible to say what importance should be attached to these rumours There is certainly a widespread recognition of the fact that Ismet Pasha's Ministry has failed to accomplish any serious work of reconstruction. The Government is therefore unpopular, and a movement is taking place towards the formation of an Opposition. But it is equally certain that 80 per cent. of the Deputies are either military men or carpet-baggers, with the mentality of pure placemen, and that the army will obey any orders that its commanders give it. Mustafa Kemal has probably lost some of his prestige, for some of the discredit attaching to the Government is reflected on himself, but he still keeps enough authority to hold the game in his own hands. To an observer in Constantinople the situation is as interesting as it is obscure.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 9538/109/44]

No. 83.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received November* 3.)

(No. 806.)

Constantinople, October 28, 1924.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 751 of the 8th instant, I had the honour to inform you that a deadlock had been reached in the Mixed Commission for the Exchange of Populations over the interpretation of the word "établis" as applied to the Turkish-Greek population of Constantinople, and that, owing to the resignation of the chief Turkish delegate, the commission had been compelled to suspend its sittings. At the same time, I reported the categorical statement of Tewfik Rushdi Bey that in no circumstances would he be induced to withdraw his resignation. This insistence proved, however, to be merely a bluff, which doubtless served its purpose, for on the 14th October he was reported as having stated that he was not one to shirk responsibilities, and that, if his resignation were not accepted, he would bow to the will of Ismet Pasha. No surprise was therefore caused when, at a meeting of the commission two days later, it was officially announced that Tewfik Rushdi Bey had resumed his duties as head of the Turkish exchange delegation. Even so, however, and in spite of repeated Greek applications for an early solution of the "établis" difficulty, this question has not yet been the subject of further discussion at any plenary meeting of the commission, the time of which during the past ten days has been fully occupied with a development which has attracted considerable attention and which has been the subject of much misrepresentation.

2. The genesis of this development was contained in a communiqué issued by one of the sub-commissions for exchange under date of the 10th October and published in all the local newspapers of that date. It stated that all persons to whom the Exchange Commission had already issued passports must leave Constantinople within a period of seven days, that exchangeable persons who had arrived in Constantinople after the 30th October, 1918, must immediately apply for passports and leave for Greece not later than ten days after the dates stated thereon, and that, failing departure within the periods stated above, the persons in question ran the risk of being forcibly expelled by the police. Among such of the affected Greeks as read or were informed of the contents of the above communiqué, it caused a certain nervousness and resulted in an increased number of applications for passports. It did not, however, prepare them for the next step, which was taken on the 18th instant, when the Turkish police summarily arrested large numbers of Greeks and forthwith marched them in batches to Balukli, just outside the land walls of Stamboul

3. This action of the Turkish police not unnaturally caused lively panic among the Greek population of Constantinople, more particularly as the police acted with energy and without much discrimination, so that a number of those arrested did not come within any of the terms of the communiqué issued eight days before. M. Exindaris, the chief Greek exchange delegate, therefore lost no time in lodging an official protest. General de Lara, the president of the commission, in his turn, took up the matter with the Turkish delegates, and an agreement was ultimately reached whereby no further arrests would take place after the 21st October, by which time, I am reliably informed, 4,452 Greeks had been concentrated at Balukli.

4. Although the Mixed Commission has so far been silent on the point, there can, I think, be little doubt that its neutral and Greek members at least were ignorant of the action which the Turkish police were about to take. That action was, moreover, at variance with the terms of the communiqué, according to which only Greeks to whom passports had already been issued should have been arrested as early as the 18th October, and even this only on the presumption that a notice in the press is considered sufficient warning to some hundreds of persons, the majority of whom, if they can read at all, rarely see a newspaper. The activities of the police were, however, not confined to this category, which numbered only 669 out of the total given above, nor even to those who, having come to Constantinople after October 1918, were still without passports when the arrests were effected It is, however, true that in cases where the persons arrested, on being taken to the police stations, were able to prove that they had arrived in Constantinople prior to October 1918, they were allowed to return to their homes with a warning that their turn would come later. This preliminary examination of papers at the various police stations resulted in the number of "non-exchangeable" (according to the Greek standpoint) Greeks at Balukli being kept as low as 765, but did not prevent the premature and illegal arrest of the 3,018 Greeks who had not provided themselves with passports.

5. Apart from the Turkish police having acted without the knowledge of the Mixed Commission and from their violation of the terms of the latter's communiqué, the manner in which the arrests were carried out gave ground for much criticism. Many, even without headgear, were marched off as they stood, and even others more fortunate were unable to do more than make up bundles containing the smallest necessities and lock the doors of the houses or shops which contained all their possessions. In this state they were collected at the police stations and then marched off under armed escort through the streets. These pitiable processions created a deep impression in the minds of all those who saw them. On arrival at Balukli they found that no provision had been made for them, with the result that many spent the cold autumn night in the open, though others were able to get shelter, but nothing more, in the concrete-floored infectious wards of a Greek hospital which was put at their disposal. The Greek Red Cross, on its part, did what it could to provide food for those who were unable to purchase it for themselves.

6. Thanks to the energy shown by the neutral members of the Exchange Commission, this terrible state of affairs was of short duration. A commission of enquiry was at once sent to Balukli, passports were issued to those who had not previously obtained them, and arrangements were made whereby all concerned could return to their homes for a very limited period to settle their affairs. This they quickly did, and on the 25th October over 3,000 Greeks left on board a vessel for Cavalla and Salonica under conditions infinitely better than had seemed probable a week before.

7. It may be that, in acting as they did, the Turkish authorities sought to bring about the *fait accompli* which Mr. Henderson contemplated in his despatch No. 673 of the 10th September, and that they were only prevented from doing so through the intervention of the Neutral Exchange Commission. Whether this be so or not, however, the development of ten days ago proves the danger which must attend any further postponement of a solution of the "établis" question. It is certain that many Turkish Greeks with their oriental mentality will only take steps to leave when they are compelled to do so, and it seems equally clear that, unless outside pressure is applied, the Turkish Government will not yield in its interpretation of the term "établis." Reference to the League of Nations would therefore appear to be the only way out of the present *impasse*, and though the Greek Government alone has appealed for the question to be considered by the present meeting at Brussels of the Council of the League, there is, I think, little doubt that a definite pronouncement by that body would have a considerable, if not a decisive, influence on the ultimate solution of this difficult question. Indeed, I think it quite possible

that had the Neutral Commission acted with more energy (see advice given to Count Moltke by Mr. Henderson as reported in his despatch No. 673 of the 10th September), had they refused to allow themselves to be put off by Rushdi Bey's countless tergiversations, and taken up a more definite stand on their real opinion as to the "établis" question, the whole affair of exchanges might have by now been far further advanced on the way to solution.

8. The report, which came originally from Greek sources, that the Council of the League had been invited to deal with the question of the Constantinople Greeks, received an extremely cold reception from the Turkish press, which at once proceeded to contest the right of the League to consider a question in which the Commission for Exchange was alone competent. The favourable treatment of the Constantinople Greeks was contrasted with the persecutions which the Moslems of Western Thrace were alleged to be suffering at the hands of their Greek oppressors, and which, as the latter was alone within the competence of the Exchange Commission, the Turkish Government had not referred to the League. The League would, therefore, the argument continued, be well advised to leave the "établis" question alone, as otherwise there would be grave danger of its causing the withdrawal of the whole Turkish delegation and thereby the dissolution of the commission.

9. Whether the press in taking this line was voicing the views held in official circles is not known, as the entire position was changed yesterday by the announcement in the press that, at the direct invitation of the secretary-general of the League of Nations, General de Lara, the president of the Exchange Commission, had left the previous evening for Brussels, and that M. Exindaris, who had proceeded a few days earlier to Athens ostensibly to consult his Government, was also on his way to the Belgian capital. In face of these developments, the Government was compelled to take up a definite attitude the nature of which was evidenced in an official communiqué published in this morning's press, to the effect that, though the Mixed Commission in the course of its work had encountered no obstacles which necessitated reference to an outside authority, the fact of the Greek Government having appealed to the Council of the League of Nations rendered it desirable, in the opinion of the Turkish Government, that Tewfik Rushdi Bey should accompany General de Lara to Brussels in order to enlighten the council regarding the real facts of the situation. Tewfik Rushdi Bey accordingly left for Brussels last evening. The news of his departure apparently only became known at a late hour and is not the subject of much comment in to-day's press, the "Vakt" alone stating that it has learnt from a reliable source that one of the main objects of Tewfik Rushdi's mission would be to draw the attention of the Council of the League to the manner in which the Greek Government has violated its engagements in regard to the treatment of the Moslems in Western Thrace.

10. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY

No. 84.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received November* 5.)

(No. 196.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November* 4, 1924.

YOUR telegram No. 172.

I still think most important object from point of view of protecting minorities, as well as from other points of view, is to secure Turkey's early application for admission to League, and that some risk may be run of postponement of such application if Allied Governments press prematurely for League interference in this matter.

On the other hand, entry into force of treaty carries with it Turkey's obligation to permit League supervision of minority clauses, and last meeting of council at Brussels appears to have resulted in some sort of agreement by Greece and Turkey to license intervention at [? group omitted] between Greeks and [? groups omitted]s in Western Thrace and Constantinople respectively. Objection to Allied intervention at the next meeting of council is to this extent weakened.

I would suggest that French and Italian Governments be informed as you propose, but subject to proviso that your consideration of evidence to be prepared here by Allied Juridical Commission brings out sufficiently serious facts other than those

to be covered by enquiry already under consideration by present League meeting to warrant suggestion of intervention at December meeting.

Meanwhile I will propose to my colleagues immediate preparation of evidence by Juridical Commission.

[E 9675/210/44]

No. 85.

Note by Sir Eyre Crowe.

IN the course of a friendly conversation which I had with the French Chargé d'Affaires to-day, I referred to the unpleasant impression created upon us here by the appointment of M. Franklin-Bouillon and M. Jean Herbette to the posts of French Ambassadors at Angora and Moscow respectively.

As regards the Angora appointment, I reminded M. de Montille that there had been an understanding between our two Governments that the question of creating Embassies and of fixing their seat at Angora should be left to be settled by common agreement between them. But the mere fact that we now understood France to have acted without further consultation with us was less important than the choice of the new French Ambassador. I said I need not remind M. de Montille of M. Franklin-Bouillon's proceedings in Turkey, which culminated in the conclusion of the Franco-Turkish Agreement signed at Angora and the resultant rift between our two Governments at a critical moment in the affairs of Turkey. I found it impossible to believe that the French Government could have overlooked the significance which must attach to this appointment at the present moment. To English eyes M. Franklin-Bouillon was the avowed champion of a distinctly anti-British policy, and, speaking quite frankly, I said I despaired of that Anglo-French co-operation in the East which I had believed was the policy hitherto favoured, so long as M. Franklin-Bouillon was the French representative in Turkey. Meanwhile, the announcement of his appointment was already producing a crop of rumours at Constantinople of an extraordinary and not very reassuring nature. It was being said that the French Government were making overtures to Mustafa Kemal for a fresh separate treaty, in which, among other things, France offered to support the Turkish claim to Mosul when it came before the League of Nations. It was unfortunate that M. Franklin-Bouillon's previous record was of a nature to encourage a belief in such rumours among the Turkish Nationalists.

M. de Montille said that, of course, such rumours were quite absurd. He did not believe that any negotiations for a fresh Franco-Turkish treaty were on foot.

I then reverted to the case of M. Herbette. Although his versatility was well known to me, I could only say that his blatant advocacy of everything anti-British in the columns of the "Temps" for years had marked him indelibly as an element of definite hostility towards Britain, and his advent in Moscow at the present moment forbode no good from the point of view of Anglo-French relations.

M. de Montille said that he quite understood my feelings on the subject and was not surprised at anything that I had said. He begged me, however, to believe —and he himself felt quite sure of this point—that it had been entirely foreign to the mind of M. Herriot, when making these appointments, that they had an anti-British element in them. There could be no doubt that the appointments were not made in order to give effect to a particular policy favoured by the Quai d'Orsay, but that they were due entirely to parliamentary and internal political considerations. These gentlemen had certain influence, to which M. Herriot had to give way. At the same time, M. de Montille thought it would be a good thing if we could convey to M. Herriot, through Lord Crewe, the bad impression created by these appointments, because he felt sure that M. Herriot would appreciate it if we spoke our minds quite frankly, and that he would then do all he could, by the issue of proper instructions, to ensure that none of the evil consequences which we might apprehend would, in fact, follow from the appointment of these particular men.

I begged M. de Montille to understand that I had spoken in my own name, in confidence to him as a friend; I was making no official representations, nor could I say whether the new Secretary of State would wish, at the very beginning of his taking office, to make a communication of such a kind to the French Government. I would, however, bear his advice in mind, and speak to the Secretary of State as soon as I had an opportunity to do so.

(Initialled) E. A. C.

Foreign Office, November 5, 1924.

[E 9733/8151/44] No. 86.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 812.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Consul-General Edmonds at Smyrna regarding economic and general conditions at that district.

Constantinople, November 5, 1924.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Consul-General Edmonds to Mr. Lindsay.

(No. 114.) *Smyrna, October* 31, 1924.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report upon economic and general conditions in this district.

2. The country is essentially agricultural, but the cereal crop has gradually declined since the war began, until to-day it is only a tenth of what it was. Far from exporting grain, Smyrna imports it. Until this state of things is remedied there is not much hope of a real revival of trade. Bread, which is far more the staple food here than it is in Europe, is at a fabulous price (25–30 piastres an oke), and, in its turn, keeps up the price of labour. The Government is alive enough to the seriousness of the position. Valis and kaimakams are full of it and have evidently plenty of instructions. But the measures which the Government has been able to take are only a drop in the ocean. A few tractors have been sent to certain vilayets, but these soon get out of order. Small grants have been made for the distribution of seed, and here and there hand ploughs are sold cheap, but the whole area is short of animals, implements and seed. The peasants are in a chronic state of debt. They have no savings and have no choice but to mortgage their crops months ahead and to pay such rates as 50 per cent. interest for advances. Announcements appear from time to time about the help which the Agricultural Bank will shortly afford, but, in fact, the Agricultural Bank seems to be useless. The peasants are indolent and improvident. Were the Agricultural Bank made a live thing it could stimulate their activity by advances by providing a form of investment, introduce the entirely unfamiliar but valuable idea of thrift. At present the peasant spends his money as soon as he makes it and this seems to be common to all classes here.

3. As is to be expected after the wastage of war, almost all the other local crops are considerably smaller than they were before 1914. Fig orchards having been cultivated principally by Turks, and needing little attention at that, have suffered only a little. The crop this year is of good quality, and in quantity about equal to the pre-war average—20,000 tons. But the raisin crop is only about half the pre-war average and its quality is poor. Vine-dressing needs skill and was done almost entirely by Greeks, who are no longer here. The Moslem immigrants who know anything about vines are too few to look after all the vineyards. Many, therefore, have already gone out of cultivation, and others are steadily deteriorating. It is a form of cultivation which involves too much trouble to appeal to the Turks, and it seems not unlikely that in ten years' time the vineyards will have disappeared and the whole of the Smyrna raisin trade will be lost.

4. The authorities have been encouraging the villagers to go in for cotton and tobacco, and the results have been fairly good. After a great decline in recent years the cotton crop this year is estimated at 30,000 bales—only two-thirds of the pre-war average. Similarly, the tobacco (15 million okes) is better than in recent years, but yet less than before the war. It is a hard crop to grow, and, under the exchange of populations, more skilled growers have left the district than have come into it. The opium crop, though worth half a million sterling, is only a quarter of what it used to be, and now most of it goes to Constantinople rather than Smyrna.

5. The valonia crop is only about half what it used to be before the war. This is largely due to the destruction of oak trees. Deforestation is admitted by all to have gone on apace since the war began. Firstly, being short of coal, railways and factories burnt wood during the war. Secondly, there is a continual drain on the forests for logs and charcoal. Thirdly, goatherds have the habit of hacking trees down, not only to get the timber, but also in order that their goats may eat the sapplings which shoot up. Fourthly, forest fires—sometimes started by charcoal

burners—are frequent. No replanting was ever done. Here again the Government has realised that something should be done. Although this is more than the Turkish Government has ever done before, the law which it has passed (the 24th April, 1924) seems quite inadequate. Only the strictest gendarmerie measures will arrest the present ruthless deforestation. Although the timber grown here, say, in the highlands east of Denizli, is not of a very good quality, it is good enough for most local building, as well as for fuel. The space available is enormous—perhaps a third of the whole district—for the mountains between the valleys and the low-lying coastal areas are too steep for cultivation. In a morning's walk one may only meet a boy or a few goats. Were these barren mountains shaded by foliage the temperature of the whole district would be much more bearable in summer and perhaps rainfall would be improved. But, although trees grow up in fifteen or twenty years, there seems little likelihood of systematic afforestation.

6. One of the few local products which is increasing is liquorice root. The export this year is 20,000 tons, as against 15,000 before the war. But this is almost an indication of impoverishment rather than of prosperity. The root is always in the ground. The peasants have lately been so hard up in the winter (when it is dug) that they have been readier than usual to collect it.

7. The state of agriculture, the primary business of the country, indicates that the district has suffered a very serious decline since the war began. Its industries were less important, but their position is much worse. They may, in fact, be said scarcely to exist. Carpet weaving alone is fairly prosperous, but, as the skilled workers who made the better carpets were Greeks and Armenians, this has declined by at any rate 25 per cent. Almost all factories were destroyed during the hostilities. Cotton-ginning and olive-pressing, two common industries, are, therefore, in abeyance. The loss of the skilled Christian workman has meant the end of all the industries—*e.g.*, furniture-making and engineering—which went on in a small way in the towns. Anyone whose business depends on skilled labour is severely handicapped. The Aidin and Cassaba railway companies have great difficulties of this kind, but, as general prosperity has somewhat improved, they manage to hold their own.

8. So far as I can see, the greatest problem which the Government has to face here—and in the rest of Turkey it is probably worse—is the depopulation which is partly indicated by diminished agriculture and industry. Wherever one goes there is depopulation—particularly on the coast, where the Greeks used to predominate, and in the Meander and Hermus valleys, which were ravaged by war. Round Sokia one may ride for hours and meet no one. In the Karaburnu Peninsula, where the finest grapes were grown, vineyards are running wild. Aïdin town is three-quarters destroyed. Aïdin Vilayet (former sanjak) has 92,000 inhabitants, merely the number by which its Moslem population is believed to have decreased in the last thirty years. Ushak, Alashehr and Cassaba have been five-sixths destroyed. Very little rebuilding has been done in any of these towns. It is not unusual to see a Turkish cemetery in the middle of the country with no sign of the village to which it belonged. Official statistics do not exist. The authorities are evidently keenly interested in the subject, but the figures they quote are always exaggerated. The pre-war population of the Smyrna district (*i.e.*, present vilayets of Smyrna, Aïdin, Sarunan or Magnesia, Denizli, Buldur, Sparta and Mentesha) may be taken roughly to have been 2½ millions. Of these, about 1½ millions were Moslems. With the exception of a few thousand Jews the non-Moslems have all gone. The Turkish population has been reduced by service on many fronts and by hostilities on the spot. Not more than 50,000 Moslems have come from Greece. The present population of the richest part of Turkey cannot, therefore, be much more than 1¼ millions—viz., half what it was in 1914. Not only is the population alarmingly reduced, but it is likely to go on diminishing because it is scourged by disease. There is malaria in all directions except Smyrna itself—not only in the valleys, but even in places like Denizli and Dineir, which are well up in the highlands. Venereal disease is rife both in the towns and in the villages. If it was bad before the war, it is probably worse now. Tuberculosis is frequent in the towns. Enteric diseases of various kinds inflict heavy mortality every summer, especially on children. The Government knows these dangers well enough, but the little it can do is inappreciable. What is wanted is a Health Act with cash behind it. But there is no money and there are very few doctors. What doctors there are mostly stay in Smyrna, where they have more prospect of making a living. There are supposed to be official doctors in the smaller towns, but the salaries are too small to attract anyone. Only in the bigger towns

are there chemists' shops, and even there the drugs are often stale or adulterated. There is a local committee of the Anti-Tuberculosis League, but it can do little beyond publicity work. Dispensaries have been set up in one or two malarial places, but they will not do what only systematic drainage of swamps can effect. Against venereal and enteric diseases practically no public measures are taken. People were dying like flies from the latter at Alashehr this summer. This epidemic, as, indeed, all the diseases rife here, was greatly favoured by the impoverishment and under-nourishment of the population, bread being very dear and times bad. Against all this, it may be said that the Anatolian Turk is by nature extraordinarily hardy. He is, but there is a continual drift—especially under the influence of education—to the towns, and the townsman is not robust. It seems scarcely too much to say that the next few years will show whether, by some miracle, the authorities can arrest the decline of population which, as viewed, even from so favourable a point as this, seems to threaten Turkey's political existence.

9. It may have been indispensable for the supremacy of the Turkish element that the Greeks and Armenians should be expelled, but it may be doubted whether the measure will not prove suicidal. This district now seems to live on the lowest and most primitive economic basis. It has a sadly reduced population, which obtains from a soil of renowned fertility only a fraction of its former produce. The labour which remains is indifferent and unskilled. The growers lack the initiative and financial and managing ability which the Greeks used to lend to the harvesting and marketing of crops. Industry, such as it was, has almost disappeared. Neither agriculture nor industry can be improved without foreign money to pay for labour, animals, implements, stock, transport, renovation, &c. But Turkish policy has destroyed confidence and no one will invest money until confidence returns. It is true that credit has so far improved that several banks and foreign firms have reopened their premises, but having no confidence in the law courts, everyone is chary of advancing to growers up-country the money which alone can make extensive cultivation possible. The attitude of the authorities to invested capital being still to fleece it rather than to protect it, there is no encouragement for the foreigner to sink his money in agricultural land, in mines, in mills, in irrigation and drainage, or in any other of the many things where it is needed for the country's due development. It is admitted that in the last twelve months the official attitude towards foreign business has become appreciably better. But if the district is to be saved from the consequences of the departure of the Greeks and Armenians, a great deal more than this is wanted. There must be such a change of policy as will warrant investment here. Failing this, it seems likely that the district will plod along on the same low economic level until perhaps it suffers pacific vegetation or a military invasion by some Power whose surplus population has urgent need of the wonderful opportunities lying neglected here.

I have, &c.
W. S. EDMONDS.

E 9738/32/44

No. 87.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. MacDonald.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 818.)

Constantinople, November 4, 1924.

Sir,

THOUGH the Grand National Assembly met a fortnight ago in connection with the difficulties on the Irak frontier, it was only on the 1st instant, the day originally fixed for its reopening, that Mustafa Kemal Pasha formally opened the session with a presidential speech. Considering how widespread is the dissatisfaction against the inefficiency of the Government, the tone of the address on internal affairs—one of calm optimism—was rather striking. He did, indeed, admit the existence of difficulties, and even of defects, but he always praised what had been accomplished, and expressed confidence in the success which would follow on renewed and continuous efforts. This fairly covers his remarks on the state of the army, finances, public health, instruction and justice. As regards the settlement of Moslems exchanged from Greece, he said that the immigrants had not received the satisfaction that they deserved, and that the Assembly would have to take urgent measures of relief. The navy, he said, would have to be seriously reformed, but within the limits of what was practically possible. Railways should be built, but out of Turkey's own resources only. The Assembly should provide a grant to help in the construction of Angora. In general, the path of civilisation and progress must be strenuously followed.

2. It may be thought that the President's language was rather far removed from the material realities of the situation in the country, but it is doubtless calculated to suit the political exigencies of the moment.

3. In the field of foreign affairs, besides the mention of the Irak frontier question (reported in my despatch No. 815 of to-day), he referred to the friendly relations with France, "the frontier incidents having been rapidly settled," with Italy, and with "our old friend" Russia, while a special mention is made of the favourable evolution of relations with Poland. As regards the public debt, he said: "It is natural that we shall respect our engagements." Another passage worth quoting is that referring to the League of Nations, as follows: "As soon as the Treaty of Lausanne entered into force, Turkey began official relations with and reposed confidence in the League of Nations. We hope that this confidence will be justified by the justice of the decisions which will be rendered. It is certain that a sincere League will be regarded as a guarantee of security for nations."

4. The Assembly proceeded then to the election of its officers. Fethi Bey was re-elected President with substantial unanimity—a result not surprising, for in the session of last spring he got into a position of unavowed semi-opposition to the Government, and thus now meets with no opposition from anyone. For the three Vice-Presidencies, the Government candidates were all elected, but the rival list received the support of about sixty-five Deputies. This is of some interest, as showing what the voting strength of the Opposition at present amounts to. It is also interesting that one of the Vice-Presidents elected is Refet Bey, Minister of Reconstruction, against whom (as reported in my despatch No. 805 of the 28th October) the Opposition were directing their main attack in connection with the resettlement of Moslems exchanged from Greece. It thus appears that Ismet Pasha had been willing, after all, to part with his subordinate, though giving him an ostensible promotion. Refet is in the next few days to answer the interpellations on the management of his Department now about to be addressed to the Government. When the debate is over, his Ministry is to be abolished and its affairs conducted as a branch of the Ministry of the Interior.

5. I mentioned in my above-quoted despatch that the resignation of Kiazim Karabekir Pasha of his military command and his assumption of his position as Deputy had created some sensation. This has been followed by quite a little series of similar events. Ali Fuad, Jevad and Jaafer Tayar Pashas have all followed Kiazim Karabekir's example, while it was announced at the same time that Generals Fevzi, Fahreddin, Izzeddine, Ali Hikmet and Shukri Naili Pashas had decided to retain their military commands and to resign their Deputyships. In the elections to places on the Parliamentary Commissions party feeling has been strong enough to exclude Kiazim Karabekir and Refet Pashas from that of National Defence, in spite of their undoubted technical qualifications.

6. This development might at first sight be thought to indicate a split in the higher command of the army on political lines, but I should not care yet to draw so wide an inference, and it is possible that each commander may be actuated by a different motive. Kiazim Karabekir is, I am told, a man of some ambition, jealous of Ismet Pasha, who has passed over him in seniority, and discontented because he has had no chance of gathering laurels against the Greeks. He is a great personality in the Turkish army, and his appearance on the political stage, especially in the Opposition, is therefore of some importance. It will certainly give the President of the Republic food for thought.

7. In a leading article in to-day's "Tanin," Hussein Jahid rather implies that these decisions by generals as to military or civilian and political service have been brought about by the Government requiring the officers to choose definitely which path they would wish to follow in the future. In a clever piece of journalism, the writer congratulates Turkey on the complete severance of the army from politics that has now been effected. How unfortunate it would have been if Turkey had come to resemble those South American States where the Republican form of Government serves merely as a cloak to a military dictatorship. There follows a long description of conditions prevailing in South America, every word of which is precisely applicable to the Turkey of to-day, and with scarcely concealed irony the article ends by exclaiming how the Turkish heart will beat with joy at the decisions now taken, and how Europe will respect the young republic whom she has hitherto regarded as pure comedy.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 88.

The Marquess of Crewe to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November* 13.)

(No. 619. Confidential.) [By Bag.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November* 12, 1924.

A MEMBER of the Quai d'Orsay to-day told the "Times" correspondent here that he had heard that M. Franklin-Bouillon had been induced to abandon the idea of going to Turkey. This was ascribed by member of Quai d'Orsay to a wish to give evidence of friendship for Great Britain. I do not vouch for the truth of this rumour, but it is very possibly correct.

On the other hand, I hear from another good source that he has spontaneously refused the post.

[E 9955/43/44] No. 89.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November* 17.)

(No. 823.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 12, 1924.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 199 of the 10th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith, in original, three letters addressed to you by the President of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration regarding the shares of the annual charges of the debt, which should be borne by the Governments of Irak, Palestine and Transjordania respectively, two copies of a printed volume of data on which these decisions are based,* and a printed résumé of its decisions issued by the council to the press are also enclosed.

2. One copy of the relevant letter and of the volume has been forwarded to the High Commissioner for Irak by bag leaving here to-day, and a copy of the relevant letter has been given to Ibrahim Effendi-el-Khabir, the Irak financial delegate, who arrived here on the 8th November. Mr. Davis, the Palestine financial delegate, is leaving Constantinople to-day and is taking back to Jerusalem with him copies of the letter relating to Palestine and Transjordania and two copies of the volume.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 89.

President of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le 6 novembre* 1924.

LE Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ayant procédé, conformément aux dispositions de la Partie II, section 1, Dette publique ottomane, du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923, mis en vigueur le 6 août 1924, à la répartition des charges annuelles de ladite dette, telle qu'elle est définie au tableau annexé à ladite section, j'ai l'honneur de notifier à votre Excellence, par la présente, les montants incombant à l'Irak (Mésopotamie) au titre de ces charges annuelles et ressortant des données et des calculs exposés dans le recueil ci-joint :

1. Ces montants sont les suivants :

(*a.*) £T. 410,446·19, à titre d'intérêt, d'amortissement et de commission afférents aux emprunts et bons du Trésor indiqués dans la Partie (A) du tableau précité, et £T. 174·14 à titre de frais afférents au service desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Ces deux montants de £T. 410,446·19 et £T. 174·14 sont payables annuellement, à partir du 1er septembre 1925, en deux échéances, exigibles les 1er septembre et 1er mars de chaque année, jusqu'aux dates respectives d'amortissement total desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Pour la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925, la charge incombant à l'Irak est de £T. 185,820·02 pour l'intérêt, l'amortissement et la commission afférents aux emprunts et aux bons du Trésor, et de £T. 98·28 pour les frais. Ces deux montants sont exigibles le 1er mars 1925.

* Not printed.

(*b.*) £T.8,853·13 payables pendant cinq ans, le 6 août de chaque année, en règlement de la part contributive de l'Irak dans les avances indiquées à la Partie (B) du tableau susmentionné.

La première de ces annuités est exigible le 6 août 1925.

(*c.*) £T. 61,818·10 payables pendant vingt ans, le 6 août de chaque année, en règlement de la part contributive de l'Irak qui, devenue exigible depuis le 1er mars 1920, est restée en souffrance.

La première de ces annuités est également payable le 6 août 1925.

(*d.*) Les montants, indiqués aux litt. (*a*), (*b*) et (*c*) ci-dessus, ne comprennent pas les frais d'encaissement, de recouvrement et d'application des parts contributives, la charge en découlant pour l'Irak ayant à être déterminée ultérieurement.

En outre, les frais et commissions, compris dans les montants énoncés aux litt. (*a*) et (*c*), étant établis sur la base du régime normal institué par les contrats d'emprunts et de bons du Trésor, ces frais et commissions devront être accrus ultérieurement dans la mesure nécessitée par le règlement en vingt années des annuités restées en souffrance.

(*e.*) Les parts contributives incombant au Vilayet de Mossoul ne sont pas comprises dans les montants énoncés aux litt. (*a*), (*b*) et (*c*) ci-dessus.

Ces parts contributives seront mises à la charge de la Turquie ou de l'Irak, selon la décision que rendra le Conseil de la Société des Nations pour l'attribution dudit vilayet.

Toutefois, pour la période comprise entre le 1er mars 1920 et la date de cette décision, lesdites parts contributives doivent être imputées à l'Irak, qui occupe de fait le même vilayet.

Les parts contributives incombant au Vilayet de Mossoul sont :

£T. 120,510·78 à titre d'intérêt, d'amortissement et de commission afférents aux emprunts et bons du Trésor indiqués dans la Partie (A) du tableau de la Dette publique ottomane annexé au Traité de Lausanne, et £T. 51·14 à titre de frais afférents au service desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Pour la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925, la charge incombant à l'Irak est de £T. 54,558·45 à titre d'intérêt, d'amortissement et de commission des mêmes emprunts et bons du Trésor et de £T. 28·86 à titre de frais.

£T. 2,599·36 payables pendant cinq ans, en règlement de la part contributive du Vilayet de Mossoul dans les avances indiquées à la Partie (B) du tableau susmentionné.

£T. 18,150·35 payables pendant vingt ans, en règlement de la part contributive du Vilayet de Mossoul restée en souffrance depuis le 1er mars 1920.

Les parts contributives incombant au Vilayet de Mossoul sont payables dans les mêmes conditions et aux mêmes époques que celles de l'Irak.

2. Les montants énoncés au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus, bien qu'exprimés en livres turques, doivent être payés dans les monnaies stipulées aux contrats d'emprunts, de bons du Trésor et d'avances, c'est-à-dire en or pour certains emprunts, bons du Trésor et avances, et, pour les autres, dans la plus appréciée desdites monnaies.

En conséquence et sous réserve des modifications pouvant se produire ultérieurement dans les cours respectifs des monnaies, les parts contributives, définies au même paragraphe 1, doivent être payées de la manière suivante :

(*a.*) En livres turques or, soit, dans leur équivalent en dollars des États-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord, représentant actuellement la parité de l'or, pour les parts contributives afférentes à l'ensemble des frais du service des emprunts et bons du Trésor en général et aux annuités des emprunts et bons du Trésor ci-après :

Dette unifiée et Lots turcs, Hodéïda–Sanaa (1911), Soma–Panderma (1910), première tranche des bons du Trésor de 1913, émise directement par le Ministère des Finances, Avances de l'Administration des Phares (1904, 1907 et 1913) ;

(*b.*) En Reichsmarks (marks-or), pour les emprunts ci-après :

Osmanié (1890), Priorité Tombac (1893), Emprunt de 40 millions de francs des Chemins de Fer orientaux (1894), 5 pour cent (1896), Douanes (1902), 4 pour cent (1903) Pêcheries, Bagdad Série I (1903), Bagdad

Séries II et III (1908), Tedjhizat-i-Askérié (1905), 4 pour cent (1901–1905), 4 pour cent (1908), 4 pour cent (1909), Douanes (1911) :

(*c.*) En francs suisses, pour les emprunt et avance ci-après :
Emprunt Irrigation de la Plaine de Konia (1913), Avance de la Société du Câble de Constanza (1904) ;

(*d.*) En livres sterling, pour les emprunts et bons du Trésor ci-après :
4 pour cent (1904), 5 pour cent (1914), Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales (1913), bons du Trésor (1911), bons du Trésor (1912), deuxième tranche des bons du Trésor de 1913, émise par la Banque Périer et Cie ;

(*e.*) En francs français, pour l'avance ci-après :
Avance de la Régie des Tabacs (1913).

3. Sur les bases et sous la réserve qui précèdent, les montants en différentes monnaies, incombant à l'Irak au titre desdites charges, s'établissent comme suit :

Monnaies.	Emprunts et Bons du Trésor.		Avances.	Arriérés.
	Charges afférentes à la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925.	Charges annuelles, normales.	Annuité payable pendant 5 ans.	Annuité payable pendant 20 ans.
1.	2.*	3.*	4.	5.*
Dollars	260,297·72	413,448·30	38,480·18	88,040·34
Reichsmarks (Marks-or) ..	1,170,134·65	2,073,296·82	..	421,214·71
Francs suisses	31,127·27	55,152·50	2,285·91	12,220·91
Livres sterling ..	51,119*l.* 10*s.*	174,271*l.* 5*s.* 6*d.*	..	8,959*l.* 6*s.*
Francs français	68,457·50	121,296·14	..	171,887·95
Livres turques ..	..	..	..	..

Les mêmes montants, incombant au Vilayet de Mossoul et devant être acquittés dans les conditions définies à la litt. (*c*) du paragraphe 1 ci-dessus, sont les suivants :

Monnaies.	Emprunts et Bons du Trésor.		Avances.	Arriérés.
	Charges afférentes à la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925.	Charges annuelles normales.	Annuité payable pendant 5 ans.	Annuité payable pendant 20 ans.
1.	2.*	3.*	4.	5.*
Dollars	76,425·70	121,392·23	11,298·14	25,849·47
Reichsmarks (Marks-or) ..	343,562·75	608,739·21	..	123,672·14
Francs suisses	9,139·09	16,193·18	671·14	3,588·18
Livres sterling ..	15,009*l.* 3*s.*	51,167*l.* 13*s.*	..	2,630*l.* 11
Francs français	20,099·77	35,613·64	..	50,467·95
Livres turques	..	..	..	..

* Les montants indiqués aux colonnes 2, 3 et 5 ne comprennent pas les charges afférentes à l'Emprunt Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales, la détermination définitive et le paiement de ces charges étant subordonnés à l'exécution des dispositions de l'article 2 du paragraphe 1 du Protocole XII annexé au Traité de Lausanne.

Aux termes de l'article 48 du Traité de Lausanne, les États cessionnaires de territoires turcs ayant à donner à notre conseil, dans le délai de trois mois à compter de la date de la présente notification, des gages suffisants pour garantir le paiement des parts contributives qui leur incombent, notre conseil a l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui faire connaître les gages que le Gouvernement de l'Irak entend assigner à cet effet.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien m'accuser réception de la présente notification.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
Le Président du Conseil d'Administration de
la Dette publique ottomane,
DES CLOSIÈRES.

Enclosure 2 in No. 89.

M. des Closières to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le 6 novembre* 1924.

LE Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ayant procédé, conformément aux dispositions de la Partie II, section 1, Dette publique ottomane, du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923, mis en vigueur le 6 août 1924, à la répartition des charges annuelles de ladite dette, telle qu'elle est définie au tableau annexé à ladite section, j'ai l'honneur de notifier à votre Excellence, par la présente, les montants incombant à la Palestine au titre de ces charges annuelles et ressortant des données et des calculs exposés dans le recueil ci-joint :

1. Ces montants sont les suivants :

(*a.*) £T. 255,643·74 à titre d'intérêt, d'amortissement et de commission afférents aux emprunts et bons du Trésor indiqués dans la Partie (A) du tableau précité, et £T. 108·47 à titre de frais afférents au service desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Ces deux montants de £T. 255,643·74 et £T. 108·47 sont payables annuellement, à partir du 1er septembre 1925, en deux échéances exigibles les 1er septembre et 1er mars de chaque année, jusqu'aux dates respectives d'amortissement total desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Pour la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925, la charge incombant à la Palestine est de £T. 115,736·79 pour l'intérêt, l'amortissement et la commission afférents aux emprunts et aux bons du Trésor et de £T. 61·22 pour les frais. Ces deux montants sont exigibles le 1er mars 1925.

(*b.*) £T. 5,514,11 payables pendant cinq ans, le 6 août de chaque année, en règlement de la part contributive de la Palestine dans les avances indiquées à la Partie (B) du tableau susmentionnée.

La première de ces annuités est exigible le 6 août 1925.

(*c.*) £T. 38,502·99 payables pendant vingt ans, le 6 août de chaque année, en règlement de la part contributive de la Palestine, qui, devenue exigible depuis le 1er mars 1920, est restée en souffrance.

La première de ces annuités est également payable le 6 août 1925.

(*d.*) Les montants indiqués aux litt. (*a*), (*b*) et (*c*) ci-dessus, ne comprennent pas les frais d'encaissement, de recouvrement et d'application des parts contributives, la charge en découlant pour la Palestine ayant à être déterminée ultérieurement.

En outre, les frais et commissions, compris dans les montants énoncés aux litt. (*a*) et (*c*), étant établis sur la base du régime normal institué par les contrats d'emprunts et de bons du Trésor, ces frais et commissions devront être accrus ultérieurement dans la mesure nécessitée par le règlement en vingt années des annuités restées en souffrance.

2. Les montants énoncés au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus, bien qu'exprimés en livres turques, doivent être payés dans les monnaies stipulées aux contrats d'emprunts, des bons du Trésor et d'avances, c'est-à-dire en or pour certains emprunts, bons du Trésor et avances et, pour les autres, dans la plus appréciée desdites monnaies.

En conséquence et sous réserve des modifications pouvant se produire ultérieurement dans les cours respectifs des monnaies, les parts contributives, définies au même paragraphe 1, doivent être payées de la manière suivante :

(*a.*) En livres turques or, soit, dans leur équivalent en dollars des États-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord, représentant actuellement la parité de l'or, pour les parts contributives afférentes à l'ensemble des frais du service des emprunts et bons du Trésor en général et aux annuités des emprunts et bons du Trésor ci-après :

Dette unifiée et Lots turcs, Hodéïda–Sanaa (1911), Soma–Panderma (1910), première tranche des bons du Trésor (1913), émise directement par le Ministère des Finances, Avances de l'Administration des Phares (1904, 1907 et 1913) ;

(*b.*) En Reichsmarks (marks-or), pour les emprunts ci-après :

Osmanié (1890), Priorité Tombac (1893), Emprunt de 40 millions de francs des Chemins de Fer orientaux (1894), 5 pour cent (1896), Douanes

(1902), 4 pour cent (1903) Pêcheries, Bagdad Série I (1903), Bagdad Séries II et III (1908), Tedjhizat-i-Askérié (1905), 4 pour cent (1901–1905), 4 pour cent (1908), 4 pour cent (1909), Douanes (1911);

(*c.*) En francs suisses pour les emprunt et avance ci-après :

Emprunt Irrigation de la Plaine de Konia (1913), Avance de la Société du Câble de Constanza (1904);

(*d.*) En livres sterling, pour les emprunts et bons du Trésor ci-après :

4 pour cent (1904), 5 pour cent (1914), Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales (1913), bons du Trésor (1911), bons du Trésor (1912), deuxième tranche des bons du Trésor de 1913, émise par la Banque Périer et Cie;

(*e.*) En francs français, pour l'avance ci-après :

Avance de la Régie des Tabacs (1913).

3. Sur les bases et sous la réserve qui précèdent, les montants en différentes monnaies, incombant à la Palestine au titre desdites charges, s'établissent comme suit :

Monnaies.	Emprunts et Bons du Trésor.		Avances.	Arriérés.
	Charges afférentes à la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925.	Charges annuelles normales.	Annuité payable pendant 5 ans.	Annuité payable pendant 20 ans.
1.	2.*	3.*	4.	5.*
Dollars	162,124·84	257,513·63	23,967·13	54,835·38
Reichsmarks (Marks-or) ..	728,810·36	1,291,338·94		262,350·53
Francs suisses	19,387·27	34,351·14	1,423·64	7,611·82
Livres sterling	31,839*l.* 9*s.*	108,543*l.* 15*s.* 2*d.*		5,580*l.* 5*s.*
Francs français	42,638·41	75,548·64		107,059·09
Livres turques ..	..	..	..	..

* Les montants indiqués aux colonnes 2, 3 et 5 ne comprennent pas les charges afférentes à l'Emprunt Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales, la détermination définitive et le paiement de ces charges étant subordonnés à l'exécution des dispositions de l'article 2 du paragraphe 1 du Protocole XII annexé au Traité de Lausanne.

Aux termes de l'article 48 du Traité de Lausanne, les États cessionnaires de territoires turcs ayant à donner à notre conseil, dans le délai de trois mois à compter de la date de la présente notification, des gages suffisants pour garantir le paiement des parts contributives qui leur incombent, notre conseil a l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui faire connaître les gages que le Gouvernement de la Palestine entend assigner à cet effet.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien m'accuser réception de la présente notification.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
Le Président du Conseil d'Administration de
la Dette publique ottomane,
DES CLOSIÈRES.

Enclosure 3 in No. 89.

M. des Closières to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.

Constantinople, le 6 novembre 1924.

M. le Ministre,

LE Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane ayant procédé, conformément aux dispositions de la Partie II, section 1, Dette publique ottomane, du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923, mis en vigueur le 6 août 1924, à la répartition des charges annuelles de ladite dette, telle qu'elle est définie au tableau annexé à ladite section, j'ai l'honneur de notifier à votre Excellence, par la présente, les montan

incombant à la Transjordanie, au titre de ces charges annuelles et ressortant des données et des calculs exposés dans le recueil ci-joint :

1. Ces montants sont les suivants :

(*a.*) £ T. 67,139·32, à titre d'intérêt, d'amortissement et de commission afférents aux emprunts et bons du Trésor indiqués dans la Partie (A) du tableau précité, et £ T. 28·47 à titre de frais afférents au service desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Ces deux montants de £ T. 67,139·32 et £ T. 28·47 sont payables annuellement, à partir du 1er septembre 1925, en deux échéances exigibles les 1er septembre et 1er mars de chaque année, jusqu'aux dates respectives d'amortissement total desdits emprunts et bons du Trésor.

Pour la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925, la charge incombant à la Transjordanie est de £ T. 30,395·76 pour l'intérêt, l'amortissement, et la commission afférents aux emprunts et aux bons du Trésor, et de £ T. 16·07 pour les frais. Ces deux montants sont exigibles le 1er mars 1925.

(*b.*) £ T. 1,448·17 payables pendant cinq ans, le 6 août de chaque année, en règlement de la part contributive de la Transjordanie, dans les avances indiquées à la Partie (B) du tableau susmentionné.

La première de ces annuités est exigible le 6 août 1925.

(*c.*) £ T. 10,111·99 payables pendant vingt ans, le 6 août de chaque année, en règlement de la part contributive de la Transjordanie, qui, devenue exigible depuis le 1er mars 1920, est restée en souffrance.

La première de ces annuités est également payable le 6 août 1925.

(*d.*) Les montants, indiqués aux litt. (*a*), (*b*) et (*c*) ci-dessus, ne comprennent pas les frais d'encaissement, de recouvrement et d'application des parts contributives, la charge en découlant pour la Transjordanie ayant à être déterminée ultérieurement.

En outre, les frais et commissions, compris dans les montants énoncés aux litt. (*a*) et (*c*), étant établis sur la base du régime normal institué par les contrats d'emprunts et de bons du Trésor, ces frais et commissions devront être accrus ultérieurement dans la mesure nécessitée par le règlement en vingt années des annuités restées en souffrance.

2. Les montants énoncés au paragraphe 1 ci-dessus, bien qu'exprimés en livres turques, doivent être payés dans les monnaies stipulées aux contrats d'emprunts, de bons du Trésor et d'avances, c'est-à-dire en or pour certains emprunts, bons du Trésor et avances, et, pour les autres, dans la plus appréciée desdites monnaies.

En conséquence, et sous réserve des modifications pouvant se produire ultérieurement dans les cours respectifs des monnaies, les parts contributives, définies au même paragraphe 1, doivent être payées de la manière suivante :

(*a.*) En livres turques or, soit, dans leur équivalent en dollars des États-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord, représentant actuellement la parité de l'or, pour les parts contributives afférentes à l'ensemble des frais du service des emprunts et bons du Trésor en général et aux annuités des emprunts et bons du Trésor ci-après :

Dette unifiée et Lots turcs, Hodéïda–Sanaa (1911), Soma–Panderma (1910), première tranche des bons du Trésor (1913), émise directement par le Ministère des Finances, Avances de l'Administration des Phares (1904, 1907 et 1913);

(*b.*) En Reichsmarks (marks-or), pour les emprunts ci-après :

Osmanié (1890), Priorité Tombac (1893), Emprunt de 40 millions de francs des Chemins de Fer orientaux (1894), 5 pour cent (1896), Douanes (1902), 4 pour cent (1903) Pêcheries, Bagdad Série I (1903), Bagdad Séries II et III (1908), Tedjhizat-i-Askérié (1905), 4 pour cent (1901–1905), 4 pour cent (1908), 4 pour cent (1909), Douanes (1911);

(*c.*) En francs suisses, pour les emprunt et avance ci-après :

Emprunt Irrigation de la Plaine de Konia (1913), Avance de la Société du Câble de Constanza (1904);

(*d.*) En livres sterling, pour les emprunts et bons du Trésor ci-après :

4 pour cent (1904), 5 pour cent (1914), Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales (1913), bons du Trésor (1911), bons du Trésor (1912), deuxième tranche des bons du Trésor de 1913, émise par la Banque Périer et Cie ;

(*e.*) En francs français, pour l'avance ci-après :

Avance de la Régie des Tabacs (1913).

3. Sur les bases et sous la réserve qui précèdent, les montants en différentes monnaies, incombant à la Transjordanie au titre desdites charges, s'établissent comme suit :

Monnaies.	Emprunts et Bons du Trésor.		Avances.	Arriérés.
	Charges afférentes à la période comprise entre le 6 août 1924 et le 28 février 1925.	Charges annuelles normales.	Annuité payable pendant 5 ans.	Annuité payable pendant 20 ans.
1.	2.*	3.*	4.	5.*
Dollars	42,758·55	67,630·33	6,294·49	14,401·33
Reichsmarks (Marks-or) ..	191,406·35	339,142·15	.	68,900·62
Francs suisses	5,091·82	9,021·82	373·86	1,999·05
Livres sterling	8,361*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.*	28,605*l.* 13*s.* 6*d.*	..	1,465*l.* 10*s.* 6*d.*
Francs français	11,197·95	19,841·14	..	28,117·05
Livres turques	..	..	..	..

* Les montants indiqués aux colonnes 2, 3 et 5 ne comprennent pas les charges afférentes à l'Emprunt Docks, Arsenaux et Constructions navales, la détermination définitive et le paiement de ces charges étant subordonnés à l'exécution des dispositions de l'article 2 du paragraphe 1 du Protocole XII annexé au Traité de Lausanne.

Aux termes de l'Article 48 du Traité de Lausanne, les États cessionnaires de territoires turcs ayant à donner à notre conseil, dans le délai de trois mois à compter de la date de la présente notification, des gages suffisants pour garantir le paiement des parts contributives qui leur incombent, notre conseil a l'honneur de demander à votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui faire connaître les gages que le Gouvernement de la Transjordanie entend assigner à cet effet.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir bien m'accuser réception de la présente notification.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
Le Président du Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane,
DES CLOSIÈRES.

Enclosure 4 in No. 89.

La Répartition des Charges annuelles de la Dette publique ottomane.

LE Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923, mis en vigueur le 6 août 1924, porte, dans ses articles 46 et suivants, que la dette publique ottomane, antérieure au 1er novembre 1914, devra être répartie, tant en annuités qu'en capital, entre la Turquie et les États bénéficiaires des territoires détachés de la Turquie à la suite des guerres balkaniques et de la guerre générale.

La répartition des annuités est confiée, aux termes de l'article 47, au Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, la répartition du capital ayant à être faite par une commission spéciale qui devra se réunir à Paris dans le délai fixé par le traité.

(*a.*) Le traité a posé les règles d'après lesquelles le conseil doit exécuter le travail dont il a été chargé.

Ces règles ont principalement pour objet de déterminer, pour chacun des États annexants, les annuités auxquelles il doit participer, d'établir les bases des pourcentages de la répartition et de préciser les dates à compter desquelles les parts contributives sont exigibles.

Quant au premier point, le traité dispose que les charges, afférentes aux emprunts, bons du trésor et avances antérieurs au 17 octobre 1912, seront réparties entre l'Empire ottoman, tel qu'il existait à la suite des guerres balkaniques, les États balkaniques et les États auxquels les îles turques de la mer Égée ont été attribuées.

Sur le même point, le traité déclare que le solde demeurant après cette première répartition, augmenté des charges annuelles, afférentes aux emprunts, bons du Trésor et avances émis entre le 17 octobre 1912 et le 1er novembre 1914, sera réparti entre la Turquie et les États qui ont acquis des territoires turcs à la suite de la guerre générale.

Quant au deuxième point, le traité porte que la part, incombant aux États annexants, sera, en principe, calculée sur la base de la proportion existant, pendant les années 1910–11 et 1911–12 (1326 et 1327), entre le revenu total moyen de l'Empire ottoman et le revenu total moyen des territoires turcs détachés au profit desdits États.

Quant au troisième point, les solutions adoptées par le traité varient selon qu'il s'agit de tels ou tels territoires détachés.

Ainsi, pour les îles de la mer Égée, cédées à l'Italie, la date, à partir de laquelle les parts contributives sont dues, est le 17 octobre 1912.

Pour diverses autres îles de la mer Égée, cédées à la Grèce, cette date est le 1er/14 novembre 1913.

Pour les territoires de la Turquie d'Europe cédés à la suite des guerres balkaniques, c'est la date de la mise en vigueur des traités qui ont consacré la cession de ces territoires.

Pour les territoires détachés de la Turquie à la suite de la guerre générale, c'est le 1er mars 1920.

À l'article 46, il est expressément stipulé qu'à compter de ces dates, la Turquie ne pourra en aucune façon être rendue responsable des parts contributives mises à la charge des autres États.

En outre, le traité a défini les conditions dans lesquelles devront être acquittés les arriérés dus tant par la Turquie que par les États annexants du chef des charges annuelles de la dette publique ottomane, afférentes aux emprunts et aux avances.

Enfin, le traité a prorogé de dix ans les dates respectives d'exigibilité des bons du Trésor.

(*b.*) Sur ces bases, le Conseil de la Dette a fait la répartition des charges annuelles de la dette publique ottomane.

Conformément à l'article 47, il a adressé, au Gouvernement turc et aux autres États responsables du service de la dette publique ottomane, des notifications indiquant les montants qu'ils auront à payer au titre des charges annuelles.

A ces notifications, il a joint un recueil de documents et de tableaux, contenant les données et calculs qui ont servi à la détermination des parts contributives respectives.

Dans les chapitres I à V de ce recueil, sont reproduites les clauses du Traité de Lausanne et des autres traités et actes internationaux, se rapportant à la répartition des charges annuelles de la dette publique ottomane.

Aux chapitres VI, VII et VIII sont exposés, à l'aide de tableaux et de cartes, les partages territoriaux effectués après les guerres balkaniques et après la guerre générale.

Les chapitres IX, X et XI montrent, respectivement, le revenu total de la Turquie pendant les années susmentionnées, le revenu total de chacun des territoires cédés, perçu durant ces mêmes années, et les pourcentages de répartition applicables à ces territoires.

Le chapitre XII indique les charges annuelles devant être réparties.

Les chapitres XIII, XIV et XV déterminent la répartition *objective* de ces charges, c'est-à-dire leur répartition par emprunt, bons du Trésor et avance et le chapitre XVI, la répartition *subjective* de ces mêmes charges, c'est-à-dire leur répartition par État.

Le chapitre XVII est consacré à la répartition par État des parts contributives arriérées.

Enfin, au chapitre XVIII est faite la récapitulation générale des parts contributives.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

(*c.*) Des calculs faits, ressortent les constatations suivantes, quant aux pourcentages de la répartition :

Désignation des États débiteurs.	Charges annuelles— Afférentes à la Dette antérieure au 17 octobre 1912.	Afférentes à la Dette contractée entre le 17 octobre 1912 et le 1er novembre 1914.
	Pour cent.	Pour cent.
Italie	0·2338.6769	..
Albanie	1·5661.1273	..
Bulgarie	1·6776.3679	0·1575.7619
Grèce	10·4911.0632	0·5467.8289
État serbe-croate-slovène	5·2350.5409	..
Syrie et Grand Liban	8·3272.2007	10·2338.5289
Palestine	2·4589.3382	3·0219.4090
Transjordanie	0·6457.8609	0·7936.4780
Irak (Mésopotamie)	3·9479.1584	4·8518.4606
Hedjaz	1·1229.5582	1·3800.7217
Assyr	0·0195.7356	0·0240.5520
Yémen	0·8852.4391	1·0879.3281
Nedjd	0·0967.1901	0·1188.6417
Vilayet de Mossoul	1·1591.4412	1·4245.4629
Turquie	62·1327.3014	76·3588.8263
Total	100·—	100·—

D'après les pourcentages qui viennent d'être énoncés, les montants incombant à chacun des États débiteurs s'établissent comme il est indiqué dans le tableau ci-dessous :

Désignation des États.	Parts contributives annuelles.	Parts contributives dans les Avances.	Parts contributives arriérées.
	£ T.	£ T.	£ T.
Italie	14,011·10	302·90	7,505·62
Albanie	93,826·21	1,908·54	48,467·82
Bulgarie	106,156·27	3,229·42	72,711·76
Grèce	648,125·55	11,170·77	272,716·01
État serbe-croate-slovène ..	313,633·44	5,321·18	140,382·13
Syrie et Grand Liban	865,741·74	18,673·63	21,883·49
Palestine	255,643·74	5,514·11	38,502·99
Transjordanie	67,139·32	1,448·17	10,111·99
Irak (Mésopotamie)	410,446·19	8,853·13	61,818·10
Nedjd	10,055·44	216·90	1,514·45
Hedjaz	116,748·46	2,518·21	17,583·70
Assyr	2,034·96	43·89	306·48
Yémen	92,034·69	1,985·13	13,861·51
Total	2,995,597·11	61,185·98	707,366·05
Vilayet de Mossoul	120,510·78	2,599·36	18,150·35
Total	3,116,107·89	63,785·34	725,516·40
Turquie	6,459,646·70	†	1,401,555·66
Total général ..	*9,575,754·59	63,785·34	2,127,072·06

* Dans ces chiffres, sont compris les bons du Trésor pour £ T. 2,859,647·73.
† La part contributive de la Turquie devra être réglée dans les conditions prévues aux contrats des avances.

Les monnaies dans lesquelles ces montants sont payables, ont été indiquées dans le recueil en regard de chaque emprunt, bons du Trésor et avance, de même que dans les notifications.

Les montants incombant au Vilayet de Mossoul ont été établis séparément, leur mise en charge devant être faite selon la décision que rendra le Conseil de la Société des Nations sur le différend surgi entre la Turquie et l'Angleterre.

Toutefois, jusqu'à la date de cette décision, ces mêmes montants doivent être imputés à l'Irak, qui occupe, de fait, provisoirement, le Vilayet de Mossoul.

(*d.*) Le traité a prévu que les différends, pouvant résulter des notifications faites par le Conseil de la Dette publique, seront déférés, dans le délai d'un mois, à un arbitre que la Société des Nations sera priée de désigner. Mais il dispose, en même temps, que le renvoi de ces différends audit arbitre n'aura pas pour effet de suspendre le paiement des annuités notifiées par le Conseil de la Dette. Le traité ajoute que la sentence arbitrale devra être rendue dans un délai de trois mois et qu'elle sera souveraine.

Constantinople, le 7 novembre 1924

[E 9966/32/44] No. 90.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November* 17.)

(No. 834.)

Constantinople, November 11, 1924.

Sir,

SINCE the 4th November, the date of my despatch No. 818, the time of the Grand National Assembly has been entirely taken up with the interpellations of the Government of which there has been so much talk. Two preliminary manœuvres, aimed at embarrassing the Opposition, were brought into play by the Government. In the first place, they announced that the generals who have resigned their military positions must personally hand over their commands to their successors before they could take their seats as Deputies. In vain Kiazim Karabekir protested that he was no longer a soldier and that he had already been allowed to sit in the Assembly; he was answered that the law was formal, and back to Erzerum he must travel to conform with its prescriptions. As a result of this, neither he nor Ali Fuad could take any part in the debate.

2. The second step by the Government was to refuse any interpellation of single Ministers and to require that the indictment must be of the whole Government: in other words, they put the question of confidence. This was strongly but vainly resisted by the Opposition, and the decision reached had considerable influence on the Deputies. It immediately became clear that many who were ready to snipe a Minister—especially one who had already been transferred to a higher and more serene atmosphere—were not prepared to vote out a whole Cabinet; and any hopes that the Opposition may have had of making a brave show in the final division disappeared from this moment.

3. The actual debates took place in the presence of the President of the Republic and Latife Hanum, who occupied the presidential box. They were opened by Rejeb Bey, the Minister of the Interior, who, contrary to what had been announced, answered for Refet Bey, the ex-Minister of Reconstruction, on questions relating to exchange of populations. I hear Rejeb well spoken of as an intelligent, enlightened and energetic man, and he is far the best of Ismet Pasha's lieutenants. He certainly made a good fighting speech on the exchange question, full of facts and figures; whether they were accurate, or whether they partook of the nature of most Turkish statistics was comparatively immaterial for the purposes of the debate, for the Opposition do not seem to have got up their case with any care and were entirely unable to formulate precise charges of maladministration well supported by facts. Perhaps because of this parliamentary incompetence, perhaps because Reouf Bey, their most competent leader of the Opposition, was away ill for the last two days of the proceedings, and perhaps owing to the generalised nature of the debate, the discussions speedily dissipated themselves over a very wide field, thereby losing coherence and force. At one moment Deputies were soaring into the higher atmosphere of abstruse political theory, at the next they were indulging in acrimonious personalities; and Refet Pasha (the ex-general, not the ex-Minister) half-a-dozen times proclaimed the purity of his republicanism in a loud voice. The debate was wound up by speeches from all the Ministers in turn, each dealing with the activities of his own Department, and on the 8th November the proceedings terminated when the vote of confidence in the Government was passed by 147 votes to 19.

4. On the 10th instant the centre of interest was transferred from the Chamber to the People's party, which was called together for an extraordinary meeting. The existence of a definite opposition to the Government has for some time been clear, but its formation into an organised party, though drawing near, has not yet been actually

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accomplished. According to the papers, it was proposing to call itself the Republican party. The first business of the People's party yesterday was, therefore, to accept the formal resignation of eighteen of its members. This is, of course, the nucleus of the new organisation. The next business was, on the motion of Rejeb Bey, the Minister of the Interior, to change the name of the People's party to the "Republican People's party"—a move obviously intended to preserve the monopoly of republican virtue to those who at present claim it. After that the party proceeded to vote some new rules for its internal organisation. Put briefly, these ordain that interpellations of the Government must first be discussed within the party itself; that no interpellation can be put in the Grand Assembly, and no parliamentary question converted into an interpellation without the approval of the party; and that the declarations and writings of members must conform to the policy of the party. Surely it must be difficult to find more potent weapons of party discipline than these; and if the Opposition leaders have hitherto lacked a programme with which to attract adherents, surely this tyranny of a mere caucus over the individual legislator must achieve the object for them. This evening's papers say that some thirty to forty further resignations from the People's party are to be expected.

5. One further element in the political situation of the moment is worth mentioning—that is Ismet Pasha's health. I have no information beyond what I gather from the press, but again and again during the last couple of months he has been kept to his house by attacks of malaria, which is prevalent in Angora in a peculiarly virulent form. He has been absent from the Assembly throughout the past week and is said to be in a state of great debility, so that it is quite likely that he may have to give up work and leave the capital for a time. His disappearance would be a very serious loss both to the President and to the Government, and nature would thus achieve more at one stroke than all the efforts of the young Opposition.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 10204/145/44] No. 91.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November* 24.)

(No. 850.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 19, 1924.

ON Monday, the 17th November, the "Sonn Telegraph" published a telegram from its Angora correspondent saying that Mustafa Kemal Pasha had accepted an official invitation to visit France. He was to be accompanied by Ismet Pasha, would travel in the French warship "Edgar Quinet"; would stay some time in the south of France, and would witness military reviews. The journey was to take place as soon as Latife Hanum had recovered from an attack of malaria from which, in common with most people in Angora, she is now suffering. Other journals also had telegrams from Angora confirming this intelligence.

2. The "Aksham" of the same evening denied the truth of this news. The President's chief aide-de-camp was quoted as saying that there was no such project forward, and the report was "incredible." According to the correspondent the President had once said to some French statesman that if he undertook a journey to Europe he would begin with France; and a French journalist had done the rest. Since then the various papers have published contradictory news on the subject; but the "Tanin" to-day says that General Mougin has officially invited the President, who has promised to make the journey, but without fixing any date at all. "Stamboul" the French official organ, received the news on Monday with a paean of triumph, but has not printed a word about it to-day or yesterday.

3. It is one of the President's favourite gambits, when he is about to take some important step, to allow an indiscretion to appear in the press which can be immediately denied. It is also well known that General Mougin and the French Government are heavily courting Turkey at this moment. Very likely General Mougin has transmitted an invitation from his Government to Mustafa Kemal, but though perhaps it may not have been refused, I very much doubt that any definite engagement has yet been contracted. I do not think the President or his Government are yet prepared to descend from their aloofness from the international field and commit themselves to a definite gesture of friendliness towards any foreign Government.

4. I shall not fail to report without delay any definite news I may gather on this subject.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 10610/32/44] No. 92.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 858. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 22, 1924.

I HAD an interesting conversation this morning with M. Knoll, the Polish Minister at Angora, who is on a short visit to Constantinople. As the newspapers had just reported the resignation of Ismet Pasha and his succession by Fethi Bey, the subject of our talk was naturally political and other conditions in the capital.

2. M. Knoll was heartily glad of the change of Government, and thought that any new Ministry under a man like Fethi Bey must constitute an improvement. Ismet had become so deaf that it was hardly possible to do business with him; in addition, for weeks past he had been so frequently absent, ill, that he had almost ceased to count. The other Ministers were either nullities, or what M. Knoll called men of the revolutionary and Bolshevik stamp. By this term he did not mean that they were working for revolution or Communism, but referred, rather, to their character and manners; they were the kind of men whom a revolution would be likely to throw up to the surface. Of these, Rejeb, the Minister of the Interior, was one (this surprised me, as I had gathered the impression from others that Rejeb was a sensible and level-headed man). Vassif, Minister of Public Instruction, and Nejati, of Justice, were the pure braggadocios, rough, coarse fellows of the sort who cried out the other day: "Nous, nous ne sommes pas un Gouvernement, mais un nid de brigands sur la montagne!" punctuating the remark with pistol-shots at the ceiling It had come to be a hard-drinking, hard-swearing lot that set the general tone.

3. As a result, there was no one to talk politics to in Angora. Ismet did not count; his Under-Secretary, Tewfik Kiamil, M. Knoll described as a greater nullity than Nusret Bey at the delegation here; of others, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs there was one, Salih, who has just been transferred elsewhere, and beyond these there was no one he had even heard of. Mustafa Kemal himself was different; with him, M. Knoll had had interviews, and serious discussion was easy, but his staff were nobodies, and his entourage were worse. Kilij Ali is the chief of the President's cronies—this is the man who threw the inkstand at Jelal Nouri (see Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 601 of the 6th August last, paragraph 3). Another is a Deputy named Fatih (probably Fatih Rifki), whose favourite oratorical gesture in the Assembly is to lean forward with his right hand ostentatiously bent round to his hip pocket as if he was about to pull out a revolver. These are the President's boon companions in the deep and almost nightly potations, from which his health is beginning to suffer. (I have also heard of these orgies from other persons, and that Mustafa Kemal is not suffering particularly from them in health; that he is able to see anyone under the table and himself to show no ill-effects the next morning.) With other Ministers and personages M. Knoll had tried to establish relations. In their offices they would receive him and talk rather stiffly about the business in hand, but as for any personal relations, he had come to think they were impossible. He had invited them to meals; sometimes they would accept and then fail to arrive; one of them had once come to dinner two hours late, and then informed M. Knoll that he had dined already and did not want to eat any more. This was not wilful rudeness, but sheer boorishness from men who are only to be approached through the bottle. A fortnight ago M. Knoll had attended the Russian National Day at the Russian Embassy. There he found crowds of Deputies noisily quaffing bumpers of pure douzico; as he entered, he felt himself to be a spoil-sport—a silence fell over the company, and in a minute the room was empty. It was not that those present disliked him personally or politically, but simply that they felt uncomfortable in company with a person of civilised bearing.

4. With Fethi as Prime Minister, M. Knoll hopes there will be some change in all this. He is not particularly intelligent, but he has some sense of humour, is decent and honest. Mme. Fethi is a particularly charming person. (I can personally confirm these impressions of Fethi and his wife.) He (M. Knoll) hardly anticipated any change of policy, except that presently Turkey might evolve some genuine foreign

policy instead of the mere tendency to drift, which is all that he can observe at present. (Doubtless M. Knoll has not been as successful as he could have hoped in consolidating a Turco-Polish friendship against Russia.) Fethi had been supposed to be pro-Russian; he (M. Knoll) did not think that it was anything but a predilection of the past due to incidental circumstances of the moment.

5. The People's party—now the Republican People's party—was, according to M. Knoll, nothing but a vast and empty shell. Mustafa Kemal is still its president and the semi-extinct Ismet its vice-president; everyone else of intelligence and decency has left it, covertly or openly. One man only, by continuing his adherence to the party, threw over it a mantle of respectability—Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of the General Staff. This officer is honest, disinterested, patriotic and without personal ambition. Like Mustafa Kemal, he is a field-marshal, and he wields immense influence over the army. His defection would be far more serious than that of any number of other generals. He is a kind of Elder Statesman, old-fashioned, with his women-folk still veiled, and all the more respected for it. With one exception, he is the only person in sight who could possibly take the Ghazi's position as President of the Republic; the Ghazi knows it, and sedulously consults Fevzi in all matters.

6. Curiously enough, the one exception mentioned above is our old friend, Abbas Hilmy Pasha, ex-Khedive of Egypt. He takes his political ambitions quite seriously and is an earnest candidate for political honours. To further his aims, he has established a bank, which, besides transacting the multifarious sorts of business in which Abbas Hilmy is now as much interested as ever he was, is intended to afford lucrative posts to his political supporters. Chief of these is Yunus Nadi, a prominent Deputy, who is also useful because he edits the "Jumhuriet," the only Constantinople paper which still whole-heartedly supports government of Turkey by the People's party. I gave M. Knoll some information about Abbas Hilmy's character and methods.

7. I have endeavoured above to report faithfully both the substance of M. Knoll's remarks and their tone, but I find it far more difficult to assess their value. He is young, and, though I have only seen him twice, I should call him intelligent, fairly frank and cheerful. A bachelor himself, with a bachelor staff, he does not in the least complain of having to live at Angora; on the contrary, he rather enjoys roughing it on the mountain-side. His point of view is that of a civilised professional European diplomatist who has now spent some months at this remote post, and I daresay there are not many of his class who would recount their impressions with such humour, and good humour. Yet, from other persons who have visited Angora you will receive honest accounts of conditions there far more favourable than M. Knoll's, and I expect you will receive by this bag one such (which has not yet been written) from Colonel Woods, commercial secretary of this mission. There is all the difference in the world between M. Knoll, the professional diplomat, on the one hand, and, on the other, Colonel Woods or the travelling journalist, politician or business man. The former has a dignified, representative character, and, speaking no Turkish, comes in contact with a rough lot, whose motto is: "Où il y a de la gêne, il n'y a pas de plaisir." The traveller goes for a transient visit on definite business to Angora, where he is received with alacrity by authorities sunning themselves in the homage implied in a long journey to see a great man. Colonel Woods has known Turks and Turkish all his life, and goes around among old friends without creating the backwash attendant on the movements of an accredited Minister. It is small wonder to me if M. Knoll fails to bring out the good that undoubtedly exists even in Angora.

8. The immediate importance of these considerations—which I put forward with all the diffidence of a distant observer—is that the French are little likely to do themselves much good by sending M. Franklin-Bouillon or any other anointed Ambassador to reside at Angora. Even General Mougin has become ridiculous, strutting through Fresco's restaurant in full uniform. If we look a little further and suppose (which God forbid) that Angora is to remain indefinitely the capital with the atmosphere of to-day, then one wonders whether the Turk, with all his professed desire for progress and civilisation, is not reverting to the conditions of past centuries, when business could only be transacted through subordinates. For the moment His Majesty's Government are unquestionably right in deciding to keep their mission in Constantinople and to have only a minor delegation in the capital

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 10614/32/44] No. 93.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 862.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 24, 1924.

ON the 22nd November the newspapers informed the Turkish public that Ismet Pasha had handed in his resignation on grounds of ill-health and that the President had entrusted the Premiership to Fethi Bey. Considering how frequently Ismet has of late been incapacitated from work, nobody can have felt surprised. Other forces have, indeed, been working to undermine his position, but whether, without the element of health, he would have succumbed to them so soon is a question now of minor importance. Fethi Bey set to work at once to form his Cabinet, acting in close consultation with the President of the Republic, and his list was ready and published in the course of the day.

2. The new Ministry is composed as follows:—

Ali Fethi Bey: Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
Mehmed Redjeb Bey: Interior.
Mustafa Abdul Halik Bey: Finance.
Feizi Bey: Public Works.
Shukri Kaya Bey: Foreign Affairs.
Mahmud Essad Bey: Justice.
Shukri Bey Sarrajoglu: Public Instruction.
Dr. Mazhar Bey: Public Health.
Ali Jenani Bey: Commerce.
Hassan Fehmi Bey: Agriculture.

3. I enclose herewith short biographies of all the Ministers. Fethi I have met several times, but I expect that those who have dealt with him over the Irak question know him better than I do. My own impression is that he is far from intelligent, but that he has character and determination. He has a sense of humour, his interests extend beyond the things that daily and closely concern him, and he is probably about as decent a man as modern Turkey could produce. His wife is particularly charming. I met Feizi Bey last May when he sat at the Constantinople Conference on Irak, and he made a bad impression on me. He looks like a low-class ward politician, and I fancy he has in fact constituted himself into the leader of a fairly strong group of Deputies who are probably out to look after their own personal interests only. Mr. A. Parker, when he was negotiating here last spring about the Anatolian Railway, worked a good deal with Feizi and thought that if only he could become Minister of Public Works—as he now has—all difficulties would be rapidly overcome. Personally, I do not think Feizi is to be trusted, and if he remains long enough in office I fear that Mr. Parker may find it out. Shukri Kaya Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was known to our delegation at Lausanne. He is a courteous, rather colourless, individual. My impressions of the other Ministers are not definite enough to report. It is noticeable that there is no soldier in the Cabinet, and that Fethi himself takes the Ministry of Defence. Presumably, Fevzi Pasha is too great for a mere Ministry, and other military men in the Assembly and available now for office are too small; but, where the army is so highly esteemed as here, the omission constitutes a weakness and confirms the impression that Fethi's Cabinet is one of transition only. On the whole, it looks like the sort of Cabinet which Mustafa Kemal himself prefers, consisting of one right-hand man and a lot of dummies.

4. No member of the new Progressive party is included in the Government, and the Ministry depends still, nominally at any rate, on the old Republican People's party to a conclave, of which Fethi Bey submitted his list for approval and to which in a couple of days' time he will submit his programme. Yet it is well known that three at least of the new Ministers (Feizi, Mahmud Essad and Shukri Sarrajoglu) were within the last few days at violent loggerheads with the party and on the point of leaving it. It might be thought that their inclusion in the Cabinet is an attempt to weld the party together once more, but I think the other reason suggested above is more likely to be the true one, namely, that the Cabinet of to-day is a transition to something else, and that something like a general reshuffle of parties is about to take place. Fethi Bey himself is not sufficiently enamoured of the People's party to lend himself to any scheme for rehabilitating it. Of the state of the party itself, I think Mr. Knoll's description is probably correct (see my despatch No. 858 of the 22nd November, paragraph 5), that it is a mere empty shell with no intelligence left in it. It is noticeable that Hussein Jahid in the "Tanin" this morning extends

a warm and cordial welcome to the new Government; and especially noticeable that in his detailed praise he confines himself to talking of Fethi Bey and not of his Ministers, commending him for his observance of the decencies of parliamentary life and for a strong stand he made a few days ago in the Assembly against rowdy interruption of Opposition speakers, amounting to a denial of the liberty of debate.

5. Indeed, the new Progressive Republican party of opposition has been making considerable strides in influence if not in actual numbers. Only about thirty Deputies have actually resigned from the old People's party, and not all of these belong to the Progressives (of the others, more hereafter), but the new Opposition certainly comprises the most intelligent men in the Assembly, and it certainly has the sympathy of many who have not yet had the courage to avow it. The other day it produced a Constitution and a programme, and it is now an organised body duly recognised by law. Its programme contains much that would be commonplace in other countries, but it includes a strong denunciation of despotism and oligarchy in all their forms and of the undue predominance in the state of any individual. It is against sectarianism, advocates a broad spirit of toleration and the adaptation of the laws of the country to modern requirements, but without shaking the State. Both Adnan Bey and his wife have spoken to me of "things having gone too far," and the new party, while undoubtedly progressive, advocates progress at a pace and in a manner different from what has been recently practised. Comparatively speaking, the movement is conservative in character ,and it is usually spoken of here as a movement to the Right. Perhaps the expression is specially apt if we talk of Turkish politics in terms of manner rather than of substance, of decency rather than of abstract political opinion.

6. The other Deputies who have resigned from the People's party are in a very different category. They are typified by the Hoja of Erzerum, who in his letter of resignation stated quite frankly that his religious principles would not allow him to remain any longer in the party. This is open Khalifism, and is the most outspoken declaration of it that I have yet seen. The Hoja does not stand alone, but he has not many adherents in the Assembly, and I do not think they amount to much at present, but there seems to be a geographical character in this movement—they all hail from the eastern provinces. Of course, the speakers of the People's party try to confuse these pure reactionaries with the Progressives, and Reouf and Refet are freely accused of wishing to see the Khalif back again. I think the new party can be trusted to keep itself clear from any alliance with this element.

7. There is, or at any rate has been, a third movement in progress. The draft constitution presented to the Assembly last spring contained clauses giving to the President considerable powers of vetoing legislation and of dissolving the Assembly. These provisions were drastically excised in the debates of April, and much surprise was expressed at the silence with which the President accepted the curtailment of his powers. Many Deputies of the People's party have been anxious lately to restore them to him by a revision of the Constitution. The proposal has clearly aroused intense opposition, and has undoubtedly precipitated the formation of the Progressive party. It must have received a severe check in the fall of Ismet Pasha's Cabinet. The movement is, of course, essentially as reactionary as that dealt with in the preceding paragraph, for while the one seeks to restore the religious functions of the old Sultanate and some close connection of Church and State, the other tends almost openly towards the civil absolutism of the past.

8. Mustafa Kemal has had to decide what he is to do, confronted by these three movements, all in a sense towards the Right and yet just as widely different from each other in character as it is possible to be. He may well have played with the idea of a revision of the Constitution in his favour, but he has found out in time that the ground is hollow and has not put his foot to it. Ismet Pasha's illness has enabled him without loss of dignity to turn in another direction, and the formation of Fethi Bey's Government is a first step. What the next will be remains to be seen; but it was interesting to read a few days ago in two newspapers that, now that a new political party has been constituted, it was being felt that the President should be above all parties and that he was thinking of vacating the presidency of the People's party, which he has hitherto occupied. It is hard, however, to see how such a strong personality as he will reconcile himself to working with Progressives who formally denounce the "undue predominance of any individual." Fortunately, the necessary transitions are easier in the east than in the west.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 10619/32/44] No. 94.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 868. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 25, 1924.

WHEN I was drafting my despatch No. 862 of yesterday, about the change of Government and the present political situation here, I could not help bearing in mind the news mentioned a few days ago in the local press, that on Friday, the 21st November, the President had received Mr. Macartney, the "Times" correspondent, and had talked to him for two hours. I thought how much it would help me to write if I knew what the President had said.

2. This morning, Mr. Macartney, back from Angora, called, and gave me a copy of his report of the interview as written for publication in his paper. He had promised to submit this report to the Ghazi before sending it to London; he had done so, and was now awaiting for approval, amendment, or whatever else might be decided. I must therefore beg that the report, which I enclose herewith, be treated as entirely confidential.

3. If I have been wondering what the President will do next, here is an answer for me in this very remarkable document. The Progressives are insincere in their republicanism, their programme is a fraud, and they are mere reactionaries. Everything reported implies that the President will have nothing to do with the new Opposition, and his language to Mr. Macartney, not reported, and the tone of his remarks indicated clearly that he meant war to the knife. The Ghazi worked himself into a perfect frenzy; he turned red in the face as he ticked off each member of the Opposition in turn, characterising them as ungrateful to himself, to whom they owed all, and as traitors to their country. The Deputy who acted at the interview as introducer and half as interpreter interrupted more than once, exclaiming: "Be calm, Ghazi Pasha, do not be so indiscreet," but nothing could check the flood of indignation. Mr. Macartney has come away from Angora thinking that pistols will be going off in earnest in a very short time, and that Vassif and Nejati have left the Government in order to come down to Constantinople at the head of a more businesslike tribunal of independence which will decorate Galata Bridge with hanging corpses.

4. Perhaps this may be so, but, if in the meantime we analyse the President's utterances, we find them to be a peculiarly weak bit of special pleading. The Progressives may well have conservative tendencies, but they cannot fairly be regarded as reactionary Monarchists or Khalifists, and to call them so is the merest party politics. If their programme resembles that of the Republican People's party, it is because the latter in the last three weeks has been busily adopting for itself every new idea the Progressives put forward, even down to the name of Republican. "What despotism are they opposed to?" cries the President, and the answer is, firstly, his own, and, secondly, that of the caucus. When the interpellations were in progress in the Assembly three weeks ago, the President himself sat throughout the debate in his box sending for Deputies, telling each one what to do and what to say, and directing the fight against the new Opposition like a general on the battle-field. As for the caucus, I have previously reported the new stringent rules which have been riveted on to the party to enforce discipline and prevent defections. It is fortunate, perhaps, that the President concludes his remarks by saying in substance that circumstances alter cases.

5. But if Mustafa Kemal is really contemplating a vigorous offensive against the new Opposition, what about Fethi Bey and the newly-appointed Cabinet? If the President was personally directing the uproar in the Assembly during the debate on the interpellations, it was Fethi a very few days later who from the Presidential Chair expressed his strong disapproval of it. Fethi is much nearer to the Progressive party than the President, and I very much doubt his being prepared for war to the knife with them.

6. I thus find myself still wondering what the President will do next. If the interview ever appears in the "Times," I should surmise that he would be seeking to cover a retreat behind a cloud of big words. If, on second thoughts, the President asks Mr. Macartney not to publish his statements, then I should infer that, knowing how well acquainted Mr. Macartney is with Refet, Reouf, Hussein Jahid and other Opposition leaders, the President just wants Mr. Macartney to frighten them a little.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

P.S.—*November* 26.—Mr. Macartney has just called to show me a letter he has received from Hamdullah Subhi, the Deputy who introduced him to the President. The latter is considerably put out at the manner in which he has been reported—both as to omissions of what he did say and as to language about persons and policies of the Opposition which he maintains he never said at all. He has asked Mr. Macartney, therefore, to withhold the interview from publication until it has been considerably modified.

Mr. Macartney tells me he did, indeed, omit a tremendous exordium on the past history and present principles of the Popular party, simply because it would be of no interest to readers of the "Times." He maintains, however, that the President did actually use the language quoted in the report, and informs me that he had a Turkish journalist with him at the interview taking notes of the Ghazi's words. I have no doubt that they have been reproduced with substantial accuracy by Mr. Macartney. He has already been round to Hussein Jahid, urging him in his own interest to moderate the tone of his criticisms, and I have little doubt that the President's purpose in granting the interview has been served. Mustafa Kemal wants to move in the direction of the Opposition, and he wants them to make it easy for him to do so.

R. C. L.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Report by Mr. Macartney.

WE are in for a lively, and perhaps even a tempestuous, time in Turkish politics.

When the other day the new Opposition were beaten on the vote of confidence demanded by Ismet Pasha, they comforted themselves with the reflection that a bare 50 per cent. of the total membership of the Assembly had been present to vote for the Government at the end of the debate, and, after a few days' anxious deliberation among themselves, they announced their formation as the Progressive Republican party, and published to the nation their principles and programme as submitted to the Minister of the Interior. If, however, the Opposition thought that, in thus complying with the technical formalities demanded by Turkish law of every new association on formation, they were now free to pursue their campaign as an accepted political party in the Assembly, in the country and in the press, they were perhaps unduly optimistic. Strong and uncompromising as had been the terms of the Samsun and Trebizond speeches, wherein Mustafa Kemal Pasha had reasserted the principles and ideals of the Popular Republican party, it was thought by many Deputies and others with whom I have spoken here that, when once he was faced by a new party, the Ghazi would quickly modify his attitude and would take an early opportunity of saying that, since the system of a single party sitting now as a party and now as the Assembly had become actually obsolete, he, as President of the Republic, must now relinquish even the titular presidency of the Popular party and put himself once for all above all parties now existing or yet to be formed.

This may yet come about with time, but there are little indications at present that this wish, already the subject of tendencious reports in the press, will immediately be fulfilled. The Ghazi Pasha, who has been kind enough to receive me and to give me some explanations on the political situation, cut at once at the root of these hopes with the statement that he had not yet decided whether he could regard the Progressives as forming a new party in the strict meaning of the term. "Every party," he said, "must be founded on definite principles and ideals. If the new party had come out with a definitely conservative programme, I could have accepted them as a new party and could have believed in their sincerity. But I am not yet convinced of the sincerity of the Progressives. I am not yet satisfied that the programme which they have published expresses their real aims and ambitions. An analysis of the personalities composing the party shows that in their ranks are persons who cannot be true republicans. I cannot forget statements made by Reouf Bey in the Assembly about the Caliphate, or, again, what he said to the Constantinople press after the proclamation of the republic. Kiazim Karabekir Pasha also was at no pains to conceal his dislike of the proclamation of the republic. Sabit Bey, again, who is one of the leaders of the new party, protested in the Assembly against the republic being proclaimed so soon, and asked, in the words of a Turkish proverb: 'Why do you put our two feet in one shoe?'

"But," continued the Ghazi, "let us assume for a moment that their programme is sincere. In what does it then differ in its broad outlines from the fundamental principles of the Popular party? They profess to be republicans. So are we. They wish to safeguard the national sovereignty. That is the essential basis of the Popular party and of the republic. If such is really their faith, why, then, have they left us?

"But let us examine their programme more in detail. There are several points which to my mind are obscure and illogical. One of the points is the demand for direct suffrage. This principle has already been admitted as an ideal, and, as a matter of fact, the question how it may be possible to give effect to this principle has come up before the Popular party during the last few days and is now under discussion. The Progressives again are in favour of the presidential right of veto being abolished. But the unqualified right of veto was rejected by the Assembly last year just as it rejected also the proposal to give the President the right of dissolution. If then the qualified right of veto which was left to the President was accepted by the Assembly and was duly incorporated in the Constitution for which they profess to have such a high regard, how do the Progressives propose to effect its abolition, seeing that they are such a small minority in the Assembly? It would appear from their programme that they propose to achieve this end, not by working in the Assembly, but by making an appeal to the people. And one is forced to the further conclusion that the Opposition would not be content with this, but that they might easily take the opportunity of consulting the people also on the very constitution of the republic in the hope that the people would pronounce against it.

"Yet another point. The Opposition say that they are against personal despotism. Such a statement implies that such a despotism exists. But their programme contains nothing to show how they propose to sweep away this despotism. Personally I disbelieve in the existence of this despotism. But even if this despotism does exist, it exists simply and solely in order to protect the national sovereignty and the principles of the Popular party. In any case," added the Ghazi, with a dry smile, as he relaxed for a moment the seriousness with which he had hitherto spoken and waved a cigarette round the gorgeously furnished room in the Assembly in which we were talking, "why should there be so much outcry against this alleged despotism seeing that only a year ago several members of the Opposition were so much against the republic and were anxious for the preservation of the despotic family of Osman?

"It must not be forgotten," the President went on again in his serious tone, "that the republic is still in its first stages and that though the principles of the Popular party have been applied the system will no doubt undergo many modifications in detail in the course of years.

"There are many different types of republics and it cannot be expected that we in Turkey should achieve at a single bound all the political experience and privileges that you have acquired in England in the course of centuries. The National Pact, for example, which made mention of the Caliphate remaining at Constantinople, was only a political pact adapted to the needs of the moment. If I had then made public my ambition to found the republic, I know well that Reouf and his colleagues, who were supporting me in the struggle for national independence, would have left me at once. It would have been impossible for me to carry on simultaneously a fight with our enemies and also an internal political struggle of this kind."

That these criticisms will irritate the Opposition goes without saying. But the President has no doubt in his own mind that the mass of the people will be on his side. One of the very first questions which he put to me was how long I had been in Turkey, and when I had told him, he replied that in that case I had lived long enough in the country to know that one could not get a true picture of the feelings of the country from the Constantinople press. "The Constantinople press," he said, "is nothing but a relic of the Ottoman Empire. I assure you that the press has no influence whatever on the people, which pays no heed to it and has for it only one feeling, the feeling of disdain. The editors are, in general, men who represent no opinion except their own, and they do not always even do that, because they do not always write in their newspapers what is really at the bottom of their minds."

It is, of course, in no way the part of a foreign journalist to take sides in the important issue which has now been joined, and which, it is quite clear, will be fought out to a finish. Mustafa Kemal Pasha in fact did not conceal his belief that the vigorous debates to which the new Opposition have already given rise will

be followed shortly by others, in the course of which the Progressives will be challenged to come out into the open and to explain more clearly what their real intentions are. From my personal acquaintance with several of these Deputies I do not suppose that they will shink from the challenge. Indeed, matters have already gone too far for there to be any question of a retreat on either side. It may be that the reconstruction of the Cabinet, brought about by the breakdown in health of Ismet Pasha, may help to build a bridge between the two parties and that the Opposition may succeed in convincing the President that they are not the reactionaries and anti-republicans that he fancies them to be. It would be a disaster for the young Turkish Republic if its attention were to be distracted from the vital work of internal reconstruction at this time, when there is still so much to be done, and if there were to be a permanent breach, even of personal relations between comrades who were so closely together in the darkest hours of the country. But if matters were ever to come to such an unfortunate extremity, one can safely prophecy that quarter will neither be asked nor granted by the Ghazi Pasha. One has only to look into those steady grey eyes and to note the authoritativeness of his every action and his every word to realise that in him Turkey has a ruler who, when it comes down to bed rock, will carry out his ideal or succumb in its defence.

November 22, 1924.

[**E 10620/7840/44**] No. 95.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 1.)

(No. 869.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 26, 1924.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 179 of the 11th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum prepared by the Allied Juridical Commission regarding Turkish infractions of the minority clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne.

2. I regret that it has not been possible to forward this document at an earlier date, but it has been necessary to examine rather carefully Turkish legislation affecting the subject. As, I assume, the Council of the League will desire the presence of a Turkish representative and competent officials for a full consideration of the matter by the council, and as some warning will, therefore, have to be given to the Turkish Government, you may consider it sufficient if the council takes note of the documents only at its present session and forwards copies to the Turkish Government. Full examination of the case in the presence of Turkish representatives could then be postponed until the next meeting of the council. I do not myself think that such a delay is of serious importance.

3. Copies of the commission's memorandum have been forwarded to their Governments by my French and Italian colleagues.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 95.

Exposé des Infractions commises par la Turquie aux Clauses concernant la Protection des Minorités.

LES Puissances alliées ont tenu à faire insérer dans le Traité de Lausanne, en les plaçant sous la sauvegarde de la Société des Nations, un certain nombre de dispositions qu'elles considèrent comme essentielles pour la protection des minorités existant en Turquie. La Turquie, de son côté, s'est engagée "à ce que ces stipulations soient reconnues comme lois fondamentales, à ce qu'aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne soient en contradiction ou en opposition avec ces stipulations et à ce qu'aucune loi, aucun règlement, ni aucune action officielle ne prévalent contre elles" (article 37 du traité). Or, non seulement la plupart des garanties que les Puissances alliées ont stipulées en faveur des minorités existant en Turquie sont restées lettre morte jusqu'à ce jour, mais des textes de lois et règlements actuellement en vigueur, dont un est même postérieur à la signature du Traité de Lausanne, s'opposent à leur application.

Ces mêmes lois et règlements sans violer expressément et dans leur lettre les dispositions de l'amnistie générale proclamée par le Gouvernement turc le 29 avril 1923, conformément à l'engagement qu'il avait pris à ce sujet à Lausanne sont aussi en contradiction avec l'esprit de cette mesure de pacification. Mais celle-ci n'ayant pas été placée sous la garantie de la Société des Nations, il convient de la laisser de côté dans le présent exposé, lequel a seulement pour objet de permettre aux Gouvernements alliés d'examiner dans quelles mesures ils jugeraient opportun de requérir l'assistance de la Société des Nations en faveur des minorités existant en Turquie.

Les droits auxquels l'application de l'amnistie, telle qu'elle est comprise par le Gouvernement turc, peut porter atteinte sont d'ailleurs déjà expressément réservés dans les clauses du Traité de Lausanne concernant les minorités. Une action basée sur ces seules clauses doit avoir en fait la même efficacité.

Les garanties que les Puissances alliées se sont préoccupées d'assurer aux minorités non musulmanes de Turquie sont d'ordre général et essentiel. Elles concernent des droits que les législations de tous les pays réservent à tous leurs ressortissants, notamment : protection de leur vie et de leur liberté sans distinction de naissance, de nationalité, de langue, de race ou de religion; liberté de circulation et d'émigration sous réserve des mesures s'appliquant, sur la totalité ou sur une partie du territoire, à tous les ressortissants turcs pour la défense nationale ou pour le maintien de l'ordre public; reconnaissance aux ressortissants turcs appartenant aux minorités non musulmanes des mêmes droits civils et politiques que les musulmans, égalité devant la loi et égalité pour l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs ainsi que pour l'exercice des différentes professions et industries. Ces dispositions sont claires et précises. Elles sont si justifiées et si naturelles que leur application ne devrait soulever aucune difficulté. Cette application s'impose enfin à la Turquie par un engagement solennel. Cet engagement qu'elle méconnait jusqu'à présent, les Puissances alliées vis-à-vis desquelles elle l'a pris, ont le droit et estimeront sans doute qu'elles ont le devoir de le lui rappeler en faisant appel à la garantie de la Société des Nations conformément à l'article 44 du Traité de Lausanne.

La loi du 17 Zilcadé 1333 (26 septembre 1915), dite Loi provisoire relative aux Biens, Dettes et Créances laissés par les Personnes déplacées (Annexe No. 1), loi de circonstance, qui frappait en pleine guerre des populations chrétiennes considérées *à priori et en bloc* comme suspectes et en conséquence déportées à l'intérieur du pays, avait établi concernant les biens des personnes ainsi "déplacées" une série de mesures qui, sous l'apparence d'une liquidation légale, constituaient en fait une véritable dépossession. Ces dispositions, que l'état de guerre pouvait non pas justifier mais jusqu'à un certain point expliquer, et dont l'application aurait dû prendre fin avec les hostilités, ont été cependant maintenues et même aggravées par une loi du 15 avril 1335 (1923) (Annexe No. 2). Celle-ci, par exemple, a étendu de quinze jours à un mois avant le "déplacement" le délai pendant lequel les transferts d'immeubles effectués par les propriétaires peuvent être annulés. Elle a aussi considérablement augmenté le nombre des personnes qui ont été atteintes par ces mesures exceptionnelles en décidant, comme elle l'a fait à son article 6, que ces mesures "sont appliquées aux biens meubles et immeubles, aux dettes et créances de tous ceux qui ont disparu de n'importe quelle façon ou qui se sont enfuis à l'étranger, dans les pays occupés ou à Constantinpole et ses environs." De lourdes sanctions matérielles sont donc infligées après coup, pour le seul fait d'avoir quitté le pays ou même d'avoir abandonné la province pour la capitale ou ses environs, à des personnes que la crainte, le plus souvent, et quelquefois de simples considérations personnelles avaient déterminées à un changement passager de résidence.

Or, ces sanctions, si exceptionnelles en droit, un règlement établi postérieurement à la signature du Traité de Lausanne aura pour effet, s'il n'est pas modifié, de les rendre définitives à l'égard d'un grand nombre de ressortissants d'une communauté appartenant aux minorités non musulmanes de Turquie. Le règlement dont il s'agit et dont la traduction, comme celle d'ailleurs des textes législatifs visés plus haut, se trouve annexée au présent exposé, est le "règlement fixant les conditions de circulation des sujets turcs, élaboré par le Commissariat de l'Intérieur et approuvé par le Conseil des Commissaires dont le texte a été publié par l'Agence d'Anatolie le 24 et le 28 juillet dernier (Annexes Nos. 3 et 4). Ce règlement annule complètement, en fait, pour une importante catégorie d'intéressés les effets de l'amnistie promulguée par le Gouvernement turc le 29 avril 1924 (Annexe No. 5). Mais il n'est pas seulement contraire à la déclaration d'amnistie, dont il n'y a pas

lieu de s'occuper dans l'éventualité d'un recours à la Société des Nations. Il viole aussi comme il a été déjà dit dans l'esprit et dans la lettre, soit par ses seules prescriptions, soit par leurs combinaisons avec les prescriptions de la loi sur les biens abandonnés, les dispositions de la Section III du Traité de Lausanne concernant la protection des minorités.

Il y a lieu de signaler en effet qu'aux termes de ce règlement : (1) les Grecs non soumis à l'échange sont tenus de séjourner dans les régions d'Imbros, Ténédos et Constantinople, ce qui est contraire aux dispositions du troisième alinéa de l'article 38 du traité; (2) le retour des Arméniens n'est permis en Turquie qu'à ceux qui sont partis à l'étranger avec un passeport délivré par le Gouvernement national, ce qui exclut en fait la presque totalité des intéressés. Cette disposition viole à la fois l'article 38 et l'article 39 du Traité de Lausanne : l'article 38, en supprimant ou en limitant pour certaines catégories de ressortissants des minorités non musulmanes la liberté de circulation; l'article 39, en refusant à ces mêmes ressortissants l'égalité des droits civils et politiques avec les musulmans, puisque tous les musulmans qui ont quitté la Turquie même sans passeport régulier peuvent y rentrer, à l'exception seulement de ceux qui figurent sur la liste des 150 personnes exclues de l'amnistie, tandis que ce droit n'est accordé aux Arméniens que s'ils ont quitté la Turquie avec un passeport national. Il y a intérêt à rappeler que dans la discussion qui a eu lieu à Lausanne à propos du régime des Arméniens ayant quitté la Turquie—bien que cette discussion ait eu lieu à l'occasion spécialement de la déclaration d'amnistie—Ismet Pacha tout en écartant une mesure de clémence générale avait promis que le Gouvernement turc examinerait cas par cas la situation des Arméniens en question et qu'il autoriserait le retour de ceux qui ne seraient pas compromis au point de vue politique. Cette promesse est annulée par les dispositions du règlement sur la circulation. De nombreux Arméniens paisibles, qui n'ont quitté la Turquie que par crainte ou pour affaires personnelles, sont ainsi privés du droit de retour chez eux et cette mesure exceptionnelle, prise ainsi contre eux après coup et sans avertissement préalable, en les laissant irrémédiablement sous le coup de l'application de la loi sur les biens abandonnés, aura, si elle est maintenue, cette conséquence inouïe d'entraîner la confiscation des biens mobiliers et immobiliers qu'ils possèdent en Turquie.

A ces violations des clauses concernant les minorités il y a lieu d'ajouter encore la suivante :

Aux termes de l'article 35 du paragraphe 3 du Traité de Lausanne, "la différence de religion, de croyance, ou de confession ne devra nuire à aucun ressortissant turc en ce qui concerne la jouissance des droits civils et politiques, notamment pour l'admission aux emplois publics, fonctions et honneurs ou l'exercice des différentes professions et industries." Or, le Gouvernement turc, contrairement à ces principes si naturels et si expressément proclamés, a licencié tous ses employés non musulmans et a conclu avec les sociétés concessionnaires des conventions dans lesquelles il a imposé à ces sociétés l'obligation de licencier tous leurs employés non musulmans à l'exception de quelques rares spécialistes déterminés et de les remplacer par des employés musulmans, ce qui a eu pour conséquence d'enlever leur gagne-pain à un nombre considérable de ressortissants turcs non musulmans, travailleurs honnêtes et méritants que les sociétés concessionnaires ne demandaient qu'à conserver à leur service.

Enfin, il y a lieu de signaler que le Gouvernement turc, autant que les représentants alliés peuvent le savoir, n'a encore pris aucune disposition pour accorder aux minorités non musulmanes, comme il y est tenu par l'article 41 du Traité de Lausanne, une part équitable dans le bénéfice et l'affectation des sommes qui pourraient être attribuées sur les fonds publics par le budget de l'État, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d'éducation, de religion ou de bienfaisance.

Il appartient aux Gouvernements alliés d'examiner s'il n'y a pas lieu de signaler au Conseil de la Société des Nations les faits ci-dessus exposés comme constituant des violations flagrantes des engagements pris par le Gouvernement turc à la Section III du Traité de Lausanne concernant la protection des minorités, afin que le Conseil de la Société des Nations prenne les mesures qu'il jugera convenables pour amener la Turquie à mettre ses lois, ses règlements et son action officielle d'accord avec les stipulations des articles 38 à 44 du Tratié de Lausanne qu'elle a reconnus dans ce traité comme lois fondamentales.

Constantinople, le 24 *novembre* 1924.

ANNEX 1.

Loi provisoire relative aux Biens, Dettes et Créances laissés par les Personnes déplacées.

Article 1". Les biens, créances et dettes, laissés par les personnes physiques ou morales déplacées, conformément aux dispositions de la loi provisoire du 14 mai 1331, sont liquidés par les tribunaux, sur présentation des "mazbatas" qui seront dressés pour chaque personne séparément, par les commissions *ad hoc* instituées à cet effet.

Art. 2. Les propriétés bâties ou non bâties dites "Idjaré-téinli-Vakoufs" appartenant, au moment de leur déplacement, aux personnes mentionnées à l'article 1", sont inscrites au nom du Ministère de l'Evkaf et les autres biens immeubles au nom du Malié. Le montant, qui reste après la liquidation sur les prix des immeubles des deux catégories que lesdits Ministères auront à verser, sera remis à leurs propriétaires.

Tous procès en revendication et autres qui surgiraient relativement aux propriétés susvisées seront dirigés contre les fonctionnaires de Cadastre (Defter-i-Hakkani). On peut en établir le droit de propriété non seulement par des titres de propriété (Sened Hakkani), mais par d'autres documents aussi, à condition que ceux-ci ne soient pas fictifs (mouvazaa).

Tous transferts faits par les personnes susmentionnées dans les quinze jours précédents seront annulés, si l'on constate, à la suite d'un procès, la fictivité du transfert ou une lésion énorme dans le prix.

Art. 3. L'argent liquide, des biens immeubles, laissés par les personnes précitées, ainsi que leurs dépôts et créances sont réunis, repris, encaissés et réclamés en justice par le président de la commission mentionnée à l'article 1" ou son remplaçant. Les biens délaissés pour lesquels il n'y a pas de contestation sont vendus aux enchères et les sommes produites déposées dans les caisses fiscales au nom de leurs propriétaires.

Art. 4. Ceux qui prétendent avoir des droits sur des biens délaissés ou des créances envers des personnes déplacées, doivent, dans un délai de deux mois, à partir de la date de la mise en vigueur de la présente loi, s'ils se trouvent en territoire ottoman, et de quatre mois, s'ils se trouvent en pays étranger, s'adresser aux commissions, soit en personne, soit par un fondé de pouvoirs, pour faire inscrire et admettre leur créance. Ils doivent également élire un domicile dans les villes où siègent les commissions pour qu'on puisse leur y faire toutes significations.

Pour les procès qui seront intentés à l'expiration du susdit délai, la procédure de droit commun sera suivie et les personnes ayant eu gain de cause ne pourront pas se faire payer sur les biens délaissés liquidés conformément à la présente loi.

Art. 5. Les commissions cherchent les preuves de chaque créance de dette, les vérifient, admettent celles qu'elles jugent fondées et les enregistrent; ensuite elles prennent note de tout procès en revendication concernant les biens délaissés et renvoient les réclamations par devant les tribunaux compétents; après, elles dressent des "mazbatas" contenant le bilan des biens et les comptes de chaque personne et elles signifient les copies légalisées de ces "mazbatas" aux intéressés au moyen de l'affichage dans les endroits voulus. Elles envoient les originaux avec les documents y afférents au Procureur impérial. Le Procureur impérial envoie ces documents au tribunal de première instance dans la circonscription duquel se trouve le domicile légal du débiteur avant son déplacement et demande au tribunal d'enregistrer lesdits "mazbatas." Les créanciers peuvent faire opposition à ces "mazbatas" devant le tribunal compétent dans les quinze jours suivant la date de l'affichage.

A l'expiration de ce délai, le tribunal procède à l'enquête nécessaire en présence du Procureur impérial et, s'il y a eu des oppositions, il convoque d'urgence les opposants ainsi que le président de la commission ou son remplaçant. Après avoir entendu l'opposition et la défense et apporté les modifications qu'il aura jugé nécessaire, le tribunal enregistre le "mazbata" et le rend aux commissions, sous forme de jugement, pour qu'il soit exécuté conformément aux dispositions de l'article suivant. Ces jugements ne sont susceptibles ni d'opposition, ni de requête civile, ni d'appel, ni de cassation.

Art. 6. Il appartient aux commissions de liquidation et, après qu'elles auront cessé de fonctionner, aux bureaux exécutifs d'exécuter les jugements définitifs selon leurs dispositions concernant les dettes privilégiées ou ordinaires des débiteurs intégralement sur les biens. En cas d'insuffisance, les dettes seront réglées au prorata avec droit de préférence sur les dettes privilégiées.

Art. 7. Les saisies conservatoires et les saisies exécutoires, mises sur les biens des personnes déplacées, soit par des tribunaux, soit par les administrateurs de l'État

avant la publication de la présente loi, sont nulles et non avenues et les saisissants sont soumis aux dispositions de la présente loi. Ceux qui ont des procès en cours contre les personnes déplacées sont libres de s'adresser aux commissions ou de laisser l'affaire suivre son cours conformément au droit commun.

Le dernier alinéa de l'article 4 sera appliqué à ceux qui ne s'adressent pas aux commissions.

Les procès en cours en faveur de ces personnes sont poursuivis et terminés par le président de la commission ou par son remplaçant, conformément au droit commun.

Art. 8. Le mode de constitution de commissions ainsi que le mode d'application et d'exécution des autres dispositions de la présente loi seront déterminés par un règlement spécial.

Art. 9. Les propriétés bâties ou non bâties "vakoufs" dites "Idjaré-teinli," ainsi que les autres propriétés immobilières inscrites au nom du Ministère de l'Evkaf et du Malié, pourront être distribuées gratuitement aux immigrés conformément au règlement sur les immigrés.

Art. 10. Les Ministres de l'Evkaf, de l'Intérieur, de la Justice et des Finances sont chargés de l'exécution de la présente loi.

Art. 11. La présente loi entre en vigueur à partir de la date de sa publication.

Le 17 *Zilkadé* 1333 (13/26 *septembre* 1331).

Annex 2.

Loi modifiant certains Articles de la Loi provisoire du 17 *Zilkadé* 1333 (13 *Septembre* 1331), *relative aux Biens, Dettes et Créances des Personnes qui ont été déplacées et la Loi sur les Biens abandonnés du* 20 *Avril* 1338.

Article 1er. L'article 2 de la Loi provisoire du 17 Zilkadé 1333 (13 Septembre 1331) relative aux Biens, Dettes et Créances des Personnes qui ont été déplacées a été modifié comme suit :

Les immeubles vakoufs bâtis et non bâtis de la catégorie dite "Idjaré-teinli" appartenant lors de leur déplacement aux personnes dont il est fait mention à l'article 1er seront inscrits au nom de la Caisse de l'Evkaf et les autres immeubles seront inscrits au nom de la Caisse du Trésor. Après avoir procédé à la liquidation sur la base des prix fixés pour les deux sortes d'immeubles, le surplus restant sera passé au crédit des possesseurs par les caisses susindiquées. Les caisses figureront comme partie dans tous procès pouvant surgir à propos de ces immeubles. Le droit de propriété sur ces immeubles pourra être prouvé par le titre de propriété de même que par toute autre pièce, à condition qu'elle ne soit pas fictive. Dans le cas où il serait judiciairement prouvé qu'il y a un acte simulé ou un prix frauduleusement moindre dans tout acte de vente effectué dans une période maximum de trente jours précédant la date du déplacement ou dans tout acte d'achat effectué une année avant la date du déplacement des personnes susindiquées, lesdits actes de vente ou d'achat sont annulés. Les biens immeubles abandonnés occupés arbitrairement et sans un contrat valable sont évacués par l'entremise du fonctionnaire civil le plus élevé en grade dans un délai de quinze jours et par décision de la commission.

Art. 2. L'article 4 de la susdite loi a été modifié comme suit :

Ceux qui revendiquent les biens abandonnés ainsi que ceux qui déclarent avoir des créances envers les personnes déportées doivent, s'ils sont domiciliés en Turquie, s'adresser aux commissions constituées conformément à l'article 1er, dans un délai de quatre mois à partir de la date de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi, si les commissions sont déjà constituées, et dans un même délai de quatre mois à partir de la constitution des dites commissions dans chaque localité, si elles ne le sont pas encore. Un délai de six mois est accordé pour ceux qui se trouvent à l'étranger. Ils doivent s'adresser, soit en personne, soit par l'entremise d'un fondé de pouvoirs et faire enregistrer et approuver leurs créances. Ils doivent en outre élire domicile dans la ville où siège la commission pour que toutes sortes de communications leur soient faites. Les dispositions générales seront appliquées aux procès intentés après l'expiration de ce délai, mais il est interdit aux juges de donner un jugement exécutif prévoyant le cas où le defendeur, lors de son opposition, refuserait de prêter serment.

Les jugements par défaut obtenus jusqu'à la date de la mise en vigueur de la présente loi, portant qu'ils seront mis en exécution dans le cas où le défendeur lors de son opposition se refuserait de prêter serment, sont considérés comme nuls et non

avenus s'ils n'ont pas encore été totalement exécutés. Les demandeurs sont libres de continuer le procès conformément à la présente loi. Les commissions ne pourront exercer leurs fonctions que pendant une année au maximum à partir de la date où elles ont été constituées dans chaque localité. A l'expiration de ce délai, les affaires dont les formalités n'ont pu être terminées seront transférées aux tribunaux et départements dont elles relèvent.

Art. 3. L'article 7 de la susdite loi est modifiée comme suit :

Les saisies conservatoires pratiquées avant la promulgation de la présente loi par les tribunaux et départements officiels sur les biens abandonnés par les personnes déplacées sont nulles et non avenues. Les demandeurs de la saisie ou ceux qui ont un procès en cours par devant les tribunaux seront soumis aux dispositions de la présente loi. Les saisies exécutoires seront définies d'après les dispositions générales de la loi. Les procès en cours d'instruction intentés par les déplacés eux-mêmes seront poursuivis et terminés par les caisses, toujours en conformité des dispositions générales.

Art. 4. Le mode de constitution des commissions et le mode d'application et d'exécution des autres stipulations de la présente loi seront déterminés par un règlement dans le sens des modifications de la présente loi.

Art. 5. L'article 9 de la susdite loi est supprimé.

Art. 6. Les dispositions de la loi du 13 septembre 1331 ainsi que les présentes modifications sont appliquées aux biens meubles et immeubles, aux dettes et créances de tous ceux qui ont disparu n'importe de quelle façon ou qui se sont enfuis à l'étranger, dans les pays occupés ou à Constantinople et ses environs.

Art. 7. La loi sur les biens abandonnés du 22 Chaban 1340 (20 avril 1338) est supprimée.

Art. 8. La présente loi entre en vigueur à partir de la date de sa publication.

Art. 9. Les Commissaires du Chéri, de l'Evkaf, de la Justice, de l'Intérieur et des Finances sont chargés de l'application de cette loi.

Le 15 *avril* 1339.

(Publié dans le "Journal officiel" du Vilayet de Constantinople en date du 25 avril 1339 (1923), No. 101.)

Annex 3.

Texte du Règlement fixant les Conditions de Circulation des Sujets turcs, élaboré par le Commissariat de l'Intérieur et approuvé par le Conseil des Commissaires. (*Publié par l'Agence "Anatolie" le* 24 *juillet* 1924.)

1. LES musulmans sujets turcs qui redoutent les conséquences de l'opposition qu'ils ont faite au mouvement national ou des actes qu'ils ont commis contre le pays et qui ne sont pas compris dans le nombre de ceux dans la liste noire qui se sont réfugiés dans un pays étranger sans être munis de passeports turcs, pourront rentrer dans le pays, en usant du droit de liberté accordé à tout citoyen turc par la loi d'amnistie et la loi du statut organique.

2. Un passeport ainsi qu'un certificat de nationalité turque peuvent être délivrés à tout sujet turc musulman ayant quitté le pays avec un passeport du Gouvernement national ou de l'ex-Gouvernement ottoman.

3. Les Grecs non échangeables, originaires des îles d'Imbros et de Ténédos ou ayant habité dans la zone délimitée par la loi de 1328/1912 de la Préfecture de Constantinople, peuvent rentrer dans ces mêmes îles ou dans la susdite zone sans égard au fait qu'ils se sont simplement enfuis ou qu'ils sont partis avec un passeport.

4. Les Arméniens qui sont partis pour l'étranger avec un passeport délivré par le Gouvernement national sont libres de rentrer.

5. Peuvent également rentrer ceux qui sont partis dans la période comprise entre le 1er septembre 1338/1922 et la date de l'établissement du Gouvernement national à Constantinople, avec un passeport ottoman en règle.

6. Les femmes arméniennes dont les maris sont en Turquie, ainsi que les enfants arméniens au-dessous de 18 ans et dont les pères se trouvent en Turquie, peuvent rentrer.

7. Les israélites qui ont quitté la Turquie sans être munis d'un passeport sont soumis à la formalité de déclaration.

Les israélites, sujets étrangers, en transit (de passage) à Constantinople, seront expulsés.

8. Un délai d'un an est accordé, à partir de la mise en application de ce décret-loi, aux juifs, Arméniens et Grecs visés par les articles 1", 3, 6 et 7 pour le recours aux autorités. Les recours qui auront lieu après le 1" juillet 1341 ne seront pas pris en considération.

9. Tous les étrangers sont libres d'entrer, de voyager dans le pays et d'en sortir, conformément aux lois et règlements y relatifs.

10. Le Gouvernement sur l'avis du Commissariat des Affaires étrangères adoptera des mesures de représailles contre les sujets de ceux des Gouvernements étrangers qui ont restreint le droit de la libre circulation des sujets turcs dans leurs territoires.

11. Tous les réfugiés politiques seront reçus au port, à la ville ou à la frontière où ils arriveront et expédiés aux localités désignées par le Commissariat de l'Intérieur.

12. Il ne sera pas permis aux originaires de la Russie blanche ainsi qu'aux juifs de la Russie de faire du port de Constantinople un centre de transit.

13. Les originaires de la Russie blanche qui se trouvent à la tête d'établissements économiques et qui, momentanément, feraient un voyage en Europe, pourront être admis si lesdits établissements répondent d'eux.

14. Dorénavant aucun Russe blanc ne sera admis dans le pays, exception faite pour ceux qui se conformeraient aux dispositions concernant les réfugiés musulmans.

15. Il ne sera pas permis que les Russes blancs entreprennent des voyages en Turquie pour leur propre compte. Ils peuvent toutefois voyager pour le compte des Turcs et sous la garantie d'établissements turcs à condition de revenir au point d'où ils sont partis.

16. Pourront séjourner et circuler dans le pays, les Russes blancs convertis à l'islamisme qui acceptent la nationalité turque et qui ont épousé des femmes turques musulmanes, ainsi que les femmes russes blanches réfugiées qui se sont mariées avec des sujets turcs.

17. Le droit prévu à l'article précédent est aussi accordé aux familles des réfugiés russes musulmans qui se trouvent actuellement en Turquie.

18. Le Commissariat de l'Intérieur est autorisé à déterminer, en cas de besoin, des zones d'installation pour les Russes blancs se trouvant à Constantinople et à les expédier aux différentes régions du pays.

19. Ceux des sujets turcs qui ayant quitté le pays avec un passeport délivré par le Gouvernement national, ont dû, pour pouvoir rentrer, se procurer un passeport étranger par suite de la non-existence d'un consulat turc dans le pays où ils séjournaient seront admis dans le territoire turc. Toutefois, à leur retour, ils seront obligés de se conformer aux dispositions de la loi sur le passeport.

Annex 4.

Texte intégral du Règlement fixant les Conditions de Circulation dans le Pays (Publié par l'Agence "Anatolie," le 28 juillet 1924).

Article 1". Tous les musulmans ressortissants turcs qui ne figurent pas dans la liste de 150 personnes et ne sont pas compris dans le nombre de ceux qui ont perdu la nationalité turque et qui, redoutant les conséquences de l'opposition qu'ils ont faite au mouvement national ou des actes qu'ils ont commis contre le pays, se sont réfugiés de quelque manière que ce soit et sans être munis d'un passeport, dans un pays étranger, pourront rentrer dans le pays, en usant du droit de liberté accordé à tout citoyen turc par la loi d'amnistie ainsi que celle du statut organique.

Détails d'application : Pour se munir d'un passeport on est tenu de se conformer aux dispositions suivantes :

(*a*.) Tout musulman qui veut rentrer dans le pays comme citoyen turc doit s'adresser personnellement au consulat de la localité où il séjourne en permanence, répondre par des phrases nettes et exactes aux questions écrites dans l'affidavit qui lui sera délivré en trois exemplaires par ledit consulat, et joindre sa photographie à chacun de ces exemplaires. Le consulat certifie l'authenticité de ces photographies et les légalise avec le sceau officiel. L'un de ces exemplaires sera gardé au consulat tandis que les deux autres seront envoyés respectivement à la direction

de la Sûreté générale et du Commissariat de l'Intérieur. Les consuls qui, pour l'échange de leur correspondance avec la capitale, emploient des courriers, expédieront ces documents au Commissariat de l'Intérieur par l'entremise de l'un de ces courriers et par les soins du Commissariat des Affaires étrangères. Sitôt que ces affidavits arriveront à destination, ils seront envoyés aux fins d'enquête aux pays et aux localités où avait habité en dernier lieu l'intéressé. Avis sera donné aux consuls de délivrer des passeports à celles des personnes dont les affidavits s'accorderont avec les résultats de l'enquête. Dans le cas contraire, c'est-à-dire au cas où les déclarations présentées seraient en contradiction avec les résultats de l'enquête, les consuls aviseront les intéressés qu'il ne leur sera pas délivré de passeport.

(*b*.) Les consuls devront indiquer dans les passeports qu'ils délivreront les documents sur lesquels ils se sont basés pour accomplir les formalités requises.

Art. 2. Un passeport ainsi qu'un certificat de nationalité peuvent être délivrés à tout musulman, sujet turc, ayant quitté le pays soit avec un passeport de l'ancien Empire ottoman déchu, soit avec un passeport du Gouvernement national sans qu'il y ait besoin de présenter à cet effet un affidavit.

Note.—Le même traitement sera appliqué aux personnes qui ont séjourné longtemps en Europe munies d'un certificat de nationalité obtenu sur la base d'un passeport délivré du [?] de l'ex-Empire ottoman à condition que ce fait soit prouvé par les inscriptions sur les registres consulaires.

Quant aux personnes qui ont obtenu un visa ou un certificat de nationalité ou bien encore un nouveau passeport sur la base d'un passeport délivré par l'ex-Gouvernement ottoman, les consuls devront faire savoir de suite et directement à la Sûrete générale ou au fonctionnaire le plus élevé en grade de la localité où ces personnes débarqueront, le numéro et la date du passeport et du certificat de nationalité, le nom et l'identité du propriétaire de ces papiers, ainsi que le nom de la localité turque où ces documents ont été visés. Au cas où la correspondance consulaire serait transmise par courrier spécial, ces renseignements seront communiquer par un courrier et par l'entremise du Commissariat des Affaires étrangères.

Art. 3. Les Grecs non soumis à l'échange, ayant quitté la Turquie avec ou sans passeport et qui sont originaires des îles de Ténédos et d'Imbros ou de la zone délimitée par la loi préfectorale de 1328/1912, peuvent rentrer dans lesdites régions, à condition de s'en tenir aux règlements en vigueur.

Note.—Les personnes visées par cet article devront séjourner, conformément au paragraphe 4 de l'article 16 de la Convention de l'Echange, dans les limites de la zone non soumise à l'échange et y jouiront de toutes les libertés accordées aux ressortissants turcs, telles que le droit de séjour et celui de la libre circulation. Ils peuvent quitter cette zone pour aller à l'étranger ou revenir de l'étranger pour rentrer dans cette zone.

Les limites municipales dont il est question dans cet article et ainsi que l'indiquent les cartes géographiques, suivent un tracé dont le point de départ est à Rouméli-Fener et qui passe devant les villages de Zékéria et de Baghtché, puis derrière la ferme Ayas-agha, les Eaux douces d'Europe, les villages d'Ali Bey, de Kutchuk Bey, Ramiz, Dapud Pacha, les fermes de Hassinedar et de San-Stéphanos, pour aboutir à la Harmara. D'ici la ligne de démarcation passe à la rive asiatique en englobant les îles, commence par le pont de Bostandji Bachi, passe derrière Eren Keui, Kos-yatagui, Cherouban-keuy, Tchacal Doghn et le cours d'eau de Kaik-sou, puis devant Akhaba et Karakey pour terminer à Anadolou-Fener, toutes les localités situées sur cette ligne étant comprises dans la zone municipale.

Ceux des Grecs non soumis à l'échange visés à l'article 3, qui sont partis pour l'étranger avec un passeport et qui sont conséquemment autorisés à rentrer dans le pays, doivent s'adresser aux consulats turcs des localités où ils se trouvent. Il ne leur sera délivré de passeport que pour les îles d'Imbros et de Ténédos ainsi que pour la zone déterminée de Constantinople. Lorsque les personnes ayant obtenu un pareil passeport mettront le pied sur le sol turc, il sera procédé à leur endroit à une enquête, sous la responsabilité et la surveillance du vali, afin d'établir si elles ont été immatriculées à Constantinople avant le 30 novembre 1918. Dans le cas où l'on trouverait leur matricule elles seront autorisées à rester, sinon, elles seront expulsées.

Les Grecs non soumis à l'échange et qui ont quitté le pays sans être munis de passeport doivent, pour rentrer dans le pays, s'adresser d'abord au consulat turc, y exhiber leur certificat de nationalité, remplir l'affidavit en trois exemplaires, en y joignant leurs photographies.

Le consulat certifiera, avec son sceau, la véracité de ces déclarations et en enverra deux exemplaires à la direction de la Sûreté générale. Une enquête sera alors ouverte pour établir si ces Grecs sont soumis ou non à l'échange. Au cas où le contenu de leur affidavit serait reconnu exact, ordre sera donné aux consulats de leur délivrer un passeport.

Les consuls indiqueront sur les passeports la nature des pièces sur la base desquelles ils ont délivré ces passeports.

Art. 4. Les Arméniens qui sont partis pour l'étranger avec un passeport délivré par le Gouvernement national sont libres de rentrer.

Art. 5. Peuvent également rentrer ceux qui sont partis avec un passeport ottoman en règle dans la période comprise entre le 1er septembre 1338/1922 et la date de l'établissement du Gouvernement national à Constantinople.

Art. 6. Les femmes arméniennes dont les maris se trouvent en Turquie ainsi que les enfants arméniens au-dessous de 18 ans et dont les pères sont en Turquie peuvent rentrer.

Note.—Les personnes visées dans cet article doivent présenter aux consulats turcs des localités où elles se trouvent un affidavit en trois exemplaires dans lequel elles établiront la preuve qu'elles se trouvent dans les conditions précitées. On aura soin de joindre une photographie de l'intéressé à cette déclaration qui sera envoyée à la direction de la Sûreté générale. Dans le cas où les explications fournies seront jugées convaincantes, on délivrera un passeport à ceux qui ont présenté et signé ces affidavits.

Art. 7. Les israélites qui ont quitté le pays sans être munis d'un passeport sont tenus de présenter une déclaration.

Les israélites ressortissants étrangers et qui sont de passage à Constantinople seront reconduits à la frontière.

Art. 8. Un délai d'un an, à partir de la date de publication du présent règlement, est accordé à ceux des musulmans, Arméniens, israélites ou Grecs mentionnés au paragraphe D de l'article 3 ainsi qu'aux articles 6 et 7 qui ont quitté le pays sans passeport, pour faire les démarches nécessaires pour leur retour. Les recours qui auront lieu après le 1er juillet 1341 ne seront pas pris en considération.

Art. 9. Tous les étrangers sont libres d'entrer, de séjourner ou de voyager dans le pays conformément aux lois et règlements y relatifs.

Art. 10. Le Commissariat de l'Intérieur, sur avis du Commissariat des Affaires étrangères, adoptera des mesures de représailles contre les ressortissants de ceux des Gouvernements étrangers qui ont restreint le droit de libre circulation des ressortissants turcs dans leur territoire.

Art. 11. Tous les réfugiés politiques seront admis dans la ville, le port ou à la frontière où ils arriveront et dirigés ensuite vers les localités désignées pour leur séjour par le Commissariat de l'Intérieur.

Art. 12. Il ne sera pas permis aux Russes blancs, ainsi qu'aux israélites russes, de faire de Constantinople un centre de transit et de s'y livrer à des opérations de transit.

Art. 13. Les Russes blancs qui se trouvent à la tête d'établissements économiques turcs et qui font présentement un voyage d'études en Europe pourront être admis dans le pays sur la demande et la garantie des susdits établissements.

Art. 14. Dorénavant aucun Russe blanc ne sera admis dans le pays, exception faite pour ceux qui se conformeraient aux dispositions concernant les réfugiés musulmans.

Art. 15. Il ne sera pas permis que des Russes blancs entreprennent des voyages en Turquie, en leur nom et pour leur propre compte. Ils peuvent toutefois voyager au nom et pour le compte de Turcs, sur la demande et sous la garantie d'un établissement turc, à condition de revenir au point d'où ils sont partis.

Art. 16. Seront admis dans le pays des Russes blancs convertis à l'islamisme qui ayant épousé des femmes turques musulmanes ont adopté la nationalité turque ainsi que les Russes blanches réfugiées qui ont épousé des ressortissants turcs.

Art. 17. Le droit prévu à l'article précédent est aussi accordé aux membres des familles de réfugiés russes musulmans qui se trouvent actuellement en Turquie.

Art. 18. Le Commissariat de l'Intérieur est autorisé à fixer, en cas de besoin, des zones d'installation pour les Russes blancs se trouvant à Constantinople et à les diriger sur les différents points du pays.

Art. 19. Seront admis dans le pays ceux des ressortissants turcs qui pourront prouver avoir quitté la Turquie avec un passeport délivré par le Gouvernement national et qui ont dû, pour rentrer, se procurer un passeport étranger par suite de la non-existence d'un consulat turc dans le pays où ils séjournaient.

Toutefois, à leur arrivée, ils seront tenus de se conformer aux prescriptions de la loi sur les passeports.

ANNEX 5.

Loi d'Amnistie générale du 16 *Avril* 1340/1924 (12 *Ramazan*, 1342).

("Journal officiel" du 17 Mai 1340/1924.)

Article 1er. L'amnistie générale est proclamée à l'egard de tous crimes ayant un caractère militaire ou politique commis entre la date du 1er août 1914 et celle du 20 novembre 1922, par toutes personnes habitant actuellement ou ayant habité le territoire de la Turquie ou bien faisant partie de la population des territoires détachés de la Turquie aux termes du Traité de Lausanne, de même qu'à l'égard de tous crimes résultant de l'assistance prêtée à une des Puissances signataires du Traité de Lausanne ou aux sujets d'une de ces Puissances, ou bien encore à l'égard de tous crimes ou délits connexes de façon évidente à de pareils actes. Les sujets desdites Puissances qui auraient commis les mêmes actes en Turquie avant la date du 20 novembre 1922 bénéficient également de la présente amnistie.

Art. 2. Les personnes qui ont fourni après la date du 20 novembre 1922 une aide dans les services non armés des forces desdites Puissances cantonnées dans des zones où l'existence de telles forces a été reconnue, bénéficient de la présente amnistie.

Art. 3. Les cent cinquante personnes visées dans le Protocole d'Amnistie annexé au Traité de Lausanne sont exclues du bénéfice de la présente amnistie.

Art. 4. La présente loi entre en vigueur à partir de la date de sa promulgation. Toutefois, les dispositions de la présente loi ne seront appliquées, en conformité de la Déclaration d'Amnistie du 24 juillet 1923, qu'à l'égard des sujets des Puissances qui auront rempli leurs obligations envers la Turquie.

Art. 5. Bénéficient également de la présente amnistie les personnes condamnées par les "tribunaux d'indépendance" pour délits de droit commun restant en dehors de ceux visés dans les articles précédents, ainsi que ceux qui sont impliqués dans les faits ayant donné lieu auxdites condamnations et qui sont à l'heure qu'il est en état d'accusation ou de condamnation.

Art. 6. Les Commissaires à la Justice et à la Défense nationale sont chargés de l'exécution des dispositions de la présente loi.

[E 11003/32/44] No. 96.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 8.)

(No. 885.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 2, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report, in continuation of my despatch No. 868 of the 25th November, that on the 25th ultimo Fethi Bey, the new Turkish Prime Minister, read the programme of his Government to the Assembly. It contains the references one would expect to the armed forces of the State, judicial reform, settlement of immigrants from Greece, public instruction and health. Of more interest to His Majesty's Government are the paragraphs relating to finance, public works and foreign affairs. The first includes the assurance that "our debts, both internal and external, will be regularly met, and by this and by other measures we shall endeavour to improve the national credit." With regard to the construction of railways, it is said that "for works beyond the budgetary power of the State we contemplate the collaboration of foreign capital. We are sure the Assembly will approve giving the widest guarantees and facilities to foreign capital willing to serve the public interest."

2. The paragraph relating to foreign affairs, after stating generally that policy will be based on a jealous regard for engagements and mutual rights, contains an

amiable reference to every single Power with which Turkey now entertains or contemplates relations. The section about Great Britain runs as follows :—

"The question of the Irak frontier entered on an acute phase, but, thanks to the perspicacity and conciliatory spirit of both parties, a pacific method has been found for the solution of the problem of Mosul. The League of Nations has undertaken its examination, and, as we expect an equitable result, there is nothing to prevent both parties from seeking to strengthen their friendship."

In regard to the League of Nations, the programme says :—

"Turkey has long followed the work of the League with attention. We have never ceased since Lausanne to show actively our attachment to this institution, which daily displays increased activity in the regularisation of international relations. We are convinced of the necessity for Turkey to take her place among the nations represented at Geneva."

3. The programme of the new Government was well received by the Assembly, and General Ali Fuad, speaking on behalf of the new Progressive party, expressed his satisfaction. Fethi Bey, he said, must turn away from anything that can foul the pure spring of public law; only sincerity and honesty in administration, politics and personal relations can bring success, and so long as the Government remains faithful to those principles it will command the support of the Assembly and the trust of the nation. Finally, the programme was approved by the unanimous vote of 188 members.

4. The development of parties in the Assembly continues, and altogether some 42 or 43 resignations from the People's party have been reported: of these about 4 are frankly reactionary and about 5 or 6 are called Independents, though I do not at present know what they stand for. The 32 or so left are the open supporters of the Progressive party, but the voting which took place last week when Kiazim Pasha, ex-Minister of War, and rather an extreme member of the People's party, was elected to the Presidency of the Assembly in replacement of Fethi Bey, seemed to show that about 20 to 25 members of the old party are unavowed supporters of the new. The new Government is well received all round, even by the press of Constantinople, and with its advent to power a shift of the centre of gravity in the Chamber has clearly taken place towards the Right. Indeed, there are not lacking signs of restiveness among extremists of the People's party, who cannot but view any such development with displeasure. There is a good deal of talk just now of a dissolution of the Assembly and of a general election; and people often tell me that feeling between individuals runs so high that some sort of explosion of an undefined character must soon take place. For the moment, however, I should say that the atmosphere is more calm than it has been at any time during the last six weeks.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 11277/109/44] No. 97.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 15.)

(No. 904.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 10, 1924.

SINCE the writing of my despatch No. 806 of the 28th October, little real progress has been made towards the solution of the questions outstanding between the Greek and Turkish Governments in connection with the Convention for the Exchange of Populations. As you are aware, the Brussels meeting of the Council of the League of Nations referred the vexed *établis* question back to the Mixed Commission for Exchange, adding that, if the convention should give rise to insoluble legal differences, the commission could ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

2. On the return of its three leading members from Brussels, the Mixed Commission lost no time in once more tackling the *établis* issue. Once more, however, all efforts to reach a settlement were vain, and, after a plenary meeting of the commission held on the 16th ultimo, it was announced that on the proposal of Tewfik Rushdi Bey it had been unanimously agreed to ask The Hague Tribunal for a ruling on the interpretation of the term *établis*. The Greek and Turkish delegations would,

it was further announced, prepare their respective cases for despatch to The Hague in a few days. A certain delay in this preparation has nevertheless occurred, but I understand that the necessary dossiers are about to be despatched to the Council of the League of Nations for transmission to the International Court of Justice.

3. With the *établis* question at least temporarily out of the way, the exchange delegates found themselves free to deal with other problems arising out of the Exchange Convention. Both the Greek and Turkish Governments were apparently of opinion that it was desirable to treat these questions as a whole, and ten days ago it was learnt that negotiations were in progress between the Greek and Turkish delegations with a view to the conclusion of a general agreement. Such an agreement would, it was assumed, be on the lines of that reached between Tewfik Rushdi Bey and M. Pappa in August last (Mr. Henderson's despatch No. 622 of the 19th August last), but which remained unsigned. The report that negotiations were actually in progress was unfavourably received by the Constantinople press, but the negotiators continued their work, and on the 2nd instant it was announced that a draft agreement had been prepared for submission to the Greek and Turkish Governments.

4. The following, according to the press and to official Greek sources, is a summary of the points covered by this draft agreement :—

(*a.*) All Moslems who have left Western Thrace since 1912, whether as fugitives or of their own free will, may freely return to their homes and re-establish themselves. Their immovable properties, lands, animals and implements, which were confiscated by the Greek Government, will be returned to them or to their representatives.

(*b.*) The movable property of these Moslems, which had been taken from them after the notification of the Treaty of Lausanne to the League of Nations, will be returned to them, or, failing this, they will be indemnified.

(*c.*) The revenues collected by the Greek Government from immovable properties, lands, animals, &c., so confiscated will be refunded to the proprietors or to their representatives. If no revenues have been collected, a fair rent will be fixed and paid as from the date of the occupation of the properties. All exceptional measures affecting these properties will be withdrawn.

(*d.*) All confiscated property of Moslems at present living in Western Thrace will be returned to them in good condition. Moslem villages occupied by Greek immigrants will be evacuated. The Greek Government is permitted to purchase large properties alone and can only purchase smaller properties with the consent of the owners.

(*e.*) All fugitive Constantinople Greeks, who are not subject to exchange, shall enjoy the same rights as those accorded by the present convention to the Moslems of Western Thrace. They will be free to return, move about, establish themselves and recover such of their property as had been confiscated. Revenues already collected from their real properties will be refunded to them or a fair rent will be paid to them as from the date of occupation. Movable property confiscated after the date of the notification of the Treaty of Lausanne to the League of Nations will also be returned or its value refunded.

5. With the publication of the draft agreement its final acceptance by the two Governments was taken for granted and its signature daily expected. Once again, however, difficulties were encountered. The Greek Government pleaded their inability to commence the evacuation of Moslem properties in Western Thrace before the end of 1925, while the Turkish Government, on the other hand, claimed that a considerable number of the Greek refugees already installed in Western Thrace should be sent elsewhere so as to give the returning Moslems a chance of supporting themselves. The Turkish Government were, I understand, prepared to meet the Greeks half-way in regard to the desired delay, but the Greek Government, on their side, refused to accept the demand of the Turks. By way of compromise, they, however, suggested that the Mixed Commission should visit Western Thrace after the end of 1925, and undertook that if, in the opinion of the commission, the number of recently installed Greeks were such as to deprive the Moslem population of a reasonable means of livelihood, they would transfer to other parts of Greece whatever number of surplus refugee Greeks the Mixed Commission might recommend. This counter-proposal was, however, deemed unacceptable by the Turkish Government, and the negotiations finally broke down three days ago.

6. It is, at the moment, impossible to state whether an endeavour will be made to reopen the discussions at a later date. Much will depend on the wishes of the Turkish Government in this connection. On the one hand, it has been suggested that, throughout the recent negotiations, the Turks were not sincere in their endeavours to reach an agreement, while, on the other, there have not been lacking signs that the present Turkish Government is desirous of liquidating outstanding Turco-Greek differences. Whatever the position, it is improbable that negotiations will be resumed here in the immediate future, as the chief Turkish and Greek exchange delegates, accompanied by the president of the Mixed Commission, left on the evening of the 8th December for Rome, where it is understood that the treatment of the Moslem population of Western Thrace and of the Greeks of Constantinople, as well as certain questions affecting the properties of the former, are to receive the consideration of the Council of the League of Nations. There is, however, a possibility that one further effort will be made to reach a direct settlement, apart from the *établis* issue, before the League Council commences the discussion of the points mentioned above, and, in view of this posibility, M. Exindaris has, I learn, asked his Government that fresh instructions should be sent to await his arrival at the Italian capital.

7. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

No. 98.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Secretary-General, League of Nations (Geneva).

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Foreign Office, December* 15, 1924.

HIS Majesty's Government desire that the Council of the League of Nations may be informed that a dispute has arisen in the sense of the final paragraph of article 47 of the Treaty of Lausanne in respect of the shares of the annual charges of the Ottoman Public Debt assigned to Irak, Palestine and Transjordan, and that the administrations of these three mandatory States desire formally to notify the council thereof. They accordingly request that the Council of the League of Nations may be moved to appoint an arbitrator as is provided in the above-mentioned article, and they will submit a detailed statement of their objections to the proposed partition as and when directed in due course.

It is further desired that the council may be informed that His Majesty's Government consider that the period of one month allowed under article 47 for appeal to arbitration should be held to run from the dates on which the mandatory States concerned received their formal notifications through His Majesty's Government.

[E 11542/210/44] No. 99.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 909.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 12, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report certain remarks about conditions at Angora which my Hungarian colleague made to a member of my staff yesterday. M. Tahy returned from the capital some ten days ago. He has his residence and chancery here, but, like my American colleague, he has bought one of three houses newly built by the Evkaf Department in the most malarial part of Angora. Much though he dislikes the journey to and fro, he finds that he can get so little done, either through the secretary whom he leaves at Angora or through Nusret Bey here, that he is forced to pay occasional visits to the capital. Once there he finds, like most other foreigners, that his business is readily attended to. Nevertheless, he is most reluctant to contemplate permanent residence at Angora, and is anxiously awaiting the decision of ourselves and the French, which he would follow. Latifé Hanem told Mme. Tahy emphatically that the capital would never be moved to Constantinople while Mustafa Kemal Pasha was at the head of affairs.

2. When consul in Bagdad during the war M. Tahy knew Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha and Ali Ihsan Pasha, and having spent several years in different parts of

Turkey he has a large enough circle of Turkish acquaintances to make his views of some interest. The rivalry between Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Rauf Bey he regards as a life-and-death struggle. Rauf, he thinks, found it prudent to leave Turkey for a cure last spring lest some misadventure should befall him. M. Tahy shares the common belief that the new Progressive party—of which Rauf is the most prominent member—is in close touch with Jahid, Javid and Rahmi Beys and other leaders of the old Committee of Union and Progress, whose attitude he describes as one of expectancy. The present Cabinet under Fethi Bey, M. Tahy believes, is not altogether agreeable, or indeed amenable, to Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and he thinks that if Ismet Pasha recovers his health the President will endeavour to put him in office again with a Cabinet of nonentities.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 11541/180/44] No. 100.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 908.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 13, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 878 of the 2nd December, I have the honour to transmit the accompanying copy of a letter, together with certain maps,* from the British representative on the Commission for the Delimitation of the Demilitarised Zones under the Thracian Frontier Convention, regarding the completion of the most important part of their work. A copy of a further explanatory letter from Colonel Cornwall to Mr. Forbes-Adam on the subject of the maps is also enclosed.†

2. I assume that the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom the Allied representatives on the commission have addressed their covering report, will concert with you and the Foreign Ministers of the other Governments represented on the commission regarding the final approval of the *tracé* of the zones as a preliminary to the actual placing of the boundary marks in the spring. Presumably, the French Government will also concert with the British and Italian Governments' joint representations at Sofia regarding the apparent reluctance of the Bulgarian Government on financial grounds to agree to the provision of boundary posts in their territory.

3. I fear that, in view of the course which the negotiation of this convention took at Lausanne, there is little or no hope that the Turkish Government, having successfully combated at Lausanne the establishment of any form of control over the demilitarised zones in Eastern Thrace and round the Straits, could now be induced to agree to such control, especially in the form (Allied military attachés at Constantinople) suggested by the Allied representatives on the commission in their enclosed report to the Quai d'Orsay. Possibly, if and when Turkey joins the League of Nations, and if and when further general plans for international security are worked out under the auspices of the League, the question of the control of these, and perhaps the Straits, zones by the League might again be raised with more chance of success. I believe that the proposal for a general control by the League of Nations of all demilitarised zones has been among the schemes discussed already at Geneva in connection with security and disarmament.

4. Although the work of the commission is not technically concluded, I should like to take this opportunity of drawing your attention to the part played by Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall in the work already done. All three Governments with which the commission has dealt have attempted in various degrees to impede its progress or to influence the nature of its decisions. I think that His Majesty's Government should know that the success and rapidity with which the labours of this commission have been pushed forward has been very largely due to the energy, tact and industry of its British member.

5. In view of the length of the enclosures, I am not sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Athens and Sofia, but I assume that the whole report will in due course be printed in the Foreign Office and distributed to His Majesty's representatives concerned.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

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* Not reproduced. † Not printed.

Enclosure 1 in No. 100.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwall to Mr. Lindsay.

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 10, 1924.

IN continuation of my previous reports relating to the progress of the work accomplished by the Commission for Delimiting the Demilitarised Zones in Thrace, I have the honour to inform you that the commission has now completed the most important part of its labours. The work of the past five months may be briefly summarised as follows:—

July: Preliminary conferences and drawing up of programmes of work by the three Allied representatives. Visit to Sofia to meet Bulgarian representative.
August: Field-work; reconnoitring line in Bulgaria.
September: Field-work; reconnoitring and selecting boundary line of zone in Greece.
October: Field-work; reconnoitring and selecting boundary line of zone in Turkey.
November: Plenary conference in Constantinople to discuss boundaries selected and record decisions.

The final plenary session of the commission was held in Constantinople on the 28th November, 1924, and a "Protocole de Clotûre" was signed by all the delegates. This protocol is accompanied by the large-scale maps showing in detail the boundary of the zone in the territories of the three countries concerned, and also by a "Protocole portant description du tracé-limite," which contains the geographical description of the line. Only one copy of the maps and protocols was signed by all the members of the commission., and this copy will be forwarded by the president to the archives of the Quai d'Orsay for custody.

2. I forward, for the information of His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a true copy of the maps* and of the protocol forwarded to Paris.† A copy is also being retained at the Italian Embassy as "local archive copy," to facilitate reference when the commission resumes its work in the spring of next year.

3. As is made clear in the *procès-verbal* of the second plenary session of the commission, the work of the commission cannot be considered as definitely concluded until the boundary stones have been erected and verified by the Allied representatives on the commission. We consider that this final part of our work cannot be carried out until next spring, because weather conditions in the area will render transport and communication practically impossible until the month of March or April. I have already forwarded my suggestions as regards reducing the future cost of the British delegation in this connection, and I propose to proceed myself to England within the next month.

4. I also include, for the information of His Britannic Majesty's Government, a copy of the covering report which the three Allied representatives felt is necessary to add to the actual protocols of the plenary commission. You will note from this that certain ambiguities and lacunæ in the wording of the Lausanne Treaty have given rise to difficulties in carrying out the work of delimitation. This report also makes certain suggestions, with a view to carrying out the spirit of the Thracian Convention, as regards the establishment of a permanent organ of control for the demilitarised zone. Without such a corollary, I feel that the work accomplished by the commission can have little real permanent value.

5. I cannot conclude this report without drawing attention to the excellent spirit of harmony and co-operation which has marked throughout the mutual relations of the three Allied representatives on the commission. Owing to the united Allied front thus presented, and equally to the tact and ability of our president, Colonel Vitelli, a number of difficult points were satisfactorily settled without ruffling the somewhat sensitive susceptibilities of the Bulgarian, Greek and Turkish representatives.

It would perhaps be invidious to differentiate between the hospitable reception we were accorded in the three countries concerned, or in the loyal and straightforward manner in which their representatives co-operated with the Allied delegates,

* Not reproduced. † Not printed.

but I have pleasure in recording the special efforts made by Lieutenant-Colonel Hairullah Bey, the Turkish representative, in facilitating our task, and particularly in arranging for a naval gunboat to be placed at the disposal of the commission for three days in order to complete the work in the Black Sea area.

I have, &c.
J. H. M. CORNWALL, *R.A.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 100.

Les Représentants britannique, français et italien à la Commission des Frontières de Thrace à son Excellence M. le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République française.

Objet.—Opérations de la Commission de Démilitarisation des Frontières de Thrace.

L'ARTICLE 2 de la Convention No. 3 annexée au Traité de Lausanne—convention concernant la démilitarisation des frontières de Thrace—institue, en vue de procéder aux opérations de démilitarisation, une commission dont les membres sont discriminés en deux catégories. La première de ces catégories est constituée par les représentants de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie, qui sont appelés à prendre part à l'intégralité des travaux. La deuxième comprend les représentants des Gouvernements bulgare, hellène et turc, qui n'ont qualité que pour participer aux opérations concernant les territoires respectifs de leurs propres pays. Toutefois, ces deux groupes doivent se réunir en commission plénière pour arrêter et enregistrer le travail d'ensemble des opérations partielles de démilitarisation.

Ces dispositions organiques de la Convention No. 3, qui assignaient implicitement le rôle de direction aux représentants permanents, ont été soigneusement respectées par la commission, depuis le 24 juillet 1924, date de l'ouverture de ses travaux. Les trois représentants permanents se sont adjoint successivement en Bulgarie, en Grèce et en Turquie, le représentant accrédité par l'État intéressé, et ont procédé, de concert avec celui-ci, aux opérations concernant exclusivement le territoire de cet Etat. Cette tâche s'étant trouvée achevée à la date du 5 novembre 1924, la commission plénière a été convoquée. Elle a tenu séance les 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 et 28 du même mois à Constantinople et a finalement arrêté et enregistré son travail d'ensemble sous forme des trois documents adressés, ci-joints, à votre Excellence et énumérés ci-dessous:

1. Un protocole de clôture et d'enregistrement du travail d'ensemble;
2. Un protocole portant description du tracé-limite des zones démilitarisées;
3. Une série de cartes avec figuration de ce tracé-limite.

Ces documents n'ont été tirés qu'à une seule expédition, celle dont il est fait envoi. Il n'a point paru en effet possible d'en délivrer des copies aux États intéressés aussi longtemps qu'ils n'auraient pas été approuvés.

Si les trois documents ci-dessus ont reçu les signatures de tous les membres de la commission, la présente lettre d'envoi, par contre, ne pouvait être, du fait de sa nature même, que l'œuvre exclusive des membres permanents de la commission. Elle devait en effet présenter à votre Excellence un tableau des idées directrices qui ont guidé la commission, idées qui ont été le fruit de l'initiative propre des seuls représentants alliés. Elle devait, en outre, caractériser l'attitude que les Gouvernements astreints à la clause de démilitarisation avaient respectivement adoptée à l'égard de la commission. Elle devait enfin soumettre un certain nombre de suggestions que l'étude des questions de démilitarisation conseillait de mentionner. Autant de points à l'exposé desquels il eût été inopportun d'associer les délégués bulgare, grec et turc. Autant de points également que nous nous proposons de développer ci-dessous. Toutefois, avant d'y procéder, nous rappellerons, pour mémoire, la composition de la commission:

Le Lieut.-Colonel Vitelli y représentait l'Italie et y exerçait la présidence;
Le Lieut.-Colonel Catroux y représentait la France;
Le Lieut.-Colonel Cornwall y représentait la Grande-Bretagne;
Le Colonel Popov y représentait la Bulgarie;
Le Commandant Minotakis y représentait la Grèce;
Le Lieut.-Colonel Hairoullah Bey y représentait la Turquie.

(A.) *Principes directeurs du Travail de la Commission.*

La commission s'est trouvée constituée à Constantinople, dans son groupe essentiel, par la réunion de ses trois membres permanents ou membres alliés, le 24 juillet 1924. Elle avait, comme première tâche à envisager les principes directeurs de ses futurs travaux. Elle s'attacha d'abord à définir ses opérations. Elle avait à "*déterminer et à tracer sur le terrain*" les limites de la zone à démilitariser. Elle devait donc parcourir, parallèlement à la frontière politique et à une distance d'environ 30 kilom. de cette frontière, la totalité du terrain, pour y reconnaître et y tracer la limite de la région à désarmer. Elle devait, en outre, matérialiser cette limite au moyen d'un abornement. Soit deux opérations qui ne pouvaient être menées simultanément, en premier lieu parce que la mise en place de bornes réclamait un long délai, secondement parce qu'il ne pouvait être procédé à un abornement définitif qu'après approbation du travail de la commission par l'organe international supérieur compétent. Ces considérations amenèrent les membres alliés de la commission à fixer comme il suit l'ordre de leurs travaux :

En premier lieu: Reconnaissance du tracé-limite sur le terrain. Marquage de ce tracé sur la carte. Matérialisation de ce tracé sur le sol au moyen de signaux provisoires que le Gouvernement intéressé s'engagerait à entretenir et à respecter. Consécration de ce travail par l'établissement d'un procès-verbal de description du tracé particulier à chaque territoire d'État. Durée vraisemblable de l'opération, qui devait s'étendre à un parcours total de 350 kilom. : trois mois.

En second lieu: Fixation définitive et enregistrement des travaux d'ensemble en commission plénière.

En troisième lieu: Présentation du travail au Ministère français des Affaires étrangères.

En quatrième lieu: En cas d'approbation du travail en haut lieu, édification des signaux définitifs d'abornement et surveillance de cette édification. En cas de non-approbation, revision des travaux sur le terrain et la carte, suivie de l'édification des bornes définitives sous le contrôle de la commission.

Ces points élucidés, la commission devait se préoccuper de se procurer les moyens, en matériel et en personnel, nécessaires à l'exécution de sa tâche. En personnel, elle ne disposait en propre que de deux sous-officiers topographes anglais, adjoints au représentant britannique. En matériel, en dehors de quelques instruments topographiques que détenait ce même délégué, elle était entièrement dépourvue. Après calcul de ses besoins, la commission reconnut qu'en ce qui touchait au personnel, elle pourrait se suffire, mais que, par contre, elle avait à s'équiper matériellement d'une manière complète. Les crédits lui manquant à cet effet, elle résolut, bien que le texte de la Convention No. 3 n'astreignît les États intéressés à aucune obligation de ce chef, de demander à chaque État d'assurer, pendant les opérations de la commission sur son territoire, la satisfaction de la majeure partie de ses besoins matériels (transports à l'intérieur, logement ou campement, sûreté, guides, courrier, main-d'oeuvre, &c.). Ce fut également aux États qu'elle décida de demander un élément essentiel de son travail : la documentation cartographique qui lui faisait défaut.

Ce recours obligatoire aux Gouvernements bulgare, grec et turc—la commission ne se le dissimulait point—liait l'exécution des travaux à la bonne volonté de ces Gouvernements. Or, quelles présomptions pouvait-on nourrir à l'endroit des dispositions qu'ils manifesteraient à l'égard de la commission? On pouvait envisager qu'une occasion de retarder les opérations de démilitarisation serait pour eux la bienvenue. Cependant, et en tout état de cause, on pouvait espérer trouver le Gouvernement bulgare plus malléable que celui d'Angora. S'il faisait droit aux demandes de la commission, le précédent serait créé et engagerait les deux autres Gouvernements. Cette raison, d'ordre psychologique, détermina la commission à décider de commencer ses travaux par la Bulgarie, de passer ensuite en Grèce et de terminer par la Turquie, et l'expérience prouva que le calcul avait été judicieux.

Le schéma pratique des travaux étant ainsi tracé, la commission avait à se faire une doctrine qu'elle appliquerait, sans partialité, à chacun des territoires à démilitariser. Quelles conditions devait réaliser le tracé-limite de ces territoires? La convention fixait, d'une manière qui pouvait prêter à équivoque, la distance à laquelle il devait être tenu de la frontière politique. Tandis qu'en effet, le préambule de son article 1er disposait que la démilitarisation devait être poussée dans les trois pays " à 30 kilom. environ " de la frontière politique, les paragraphes spéciaux à la Bulgarie et à la Turquie assignaient à cette distance " un minimum de 30 kilom."; le paragraphe particulier à la Grèce passait cette obligation sous silence. Fallait-il en conclure que les rédacteurs du traité avaient voulu discriminer le cas de la Grèce de celui commun aux deux autres États? Une raison d'équité empêchait de le penser; une raison de logique également, car on ne pouvait conférer au terme "environ 30 kilom." la valeur d'un principe général, puisque dans l'application ce principe se trouvait démenti dans deux cas particuliers sur trois. On devait plutôt admettre qu'on se trouvait en présence d'une erreur de rédaction qui avait trahi les intentions des contractants, lesquels se proposaient d'établir une règle commune aux trois États, et non d'instituer un régime qui eût permis un déséquilibre territorial en faveur de l'unique Grèce. Quoi qu'il en fût, la commission devait lever cette incertitude et opter. Elle le fit en décidant d'appliquer impartialement à la Grèce l'astreinte imposée explicitement par la convention à la Bulgarie et à la Turquie. Elle résolut donc d'établir, sur tout son parcours, le tracé-limite de la zone à démilitariser, en principe, à un minimum de 30 kilom. de la frontière politique.

Cependant à appliquer avec rigidité ce principe on eût pu aboutir, dans la pratique, à un tracé qui n'eût satisfait que la géométrie au détriment de la raison. Et, à la vérité, une pareille opération eût pu être faite sans aller sur le terrain, dans un cabinet avec l'aide d'une carte et d'un compas. Si le rédacteur du traité avait stipulé que la commission se rendrait sur les lieux, c'était qu'il avait voulu qu'il fût tenu compte effectivement du terrain. Aussi bien, ne s'agissait-il pas en quelque sorte de tracer, sous le nom de limite de la zone à démilitariser, la frontière de sûreté des pays intéressés? Dès lors, c'était énoncer une vérité d'évidence que d'ajouter que cette frontière ne pouvait faire abstraction du terrain. C'est là ce que la commission a considéré. Soucieuse de faire œuvre militairement logique, elle a décidé de se réserver la possibilité, lorsque des raisons d'ordre militaire le commanderaient, de laisser déborder le tracé en deçà du minimum de 30 kilom. Composée intentionnellement de militaires, elle apprécierait la valeur du terrain sous l'angle militaire, et abandonnant ici une bande de terrain, en reprenant une autre ailleurs, elle aboutirait à un tracé raisonné et tenu, en général, à la distance minima de 30 kilom.

Ce point de doctrine établi, la commission devait se préoccuper d'étudier si son rôle ne s'étendait pas au delà de la détermination et du marquage, sur le terrain et la carte, de la limite de la zone démilitarisée. Entrait-il dans ses attributions de faire procéder aux opérations de démilitarisation effective à l'intérieur des zones désarmées? Le traité ne le mentionnait pas et ne prévoyait aucune procédure ultérieure à cet effet. La commission n'avait donc pas ici à intervenir. Il lui sembla toutefois, en se référant à l'article 3 de la Convention No. 3, qu'en des circonstances données, il pourrait être avantageux que ses archives possédassent la liste exacte de toutes les organisations militaires proscrites, par ledit article, dans les zones démilitarisées. Elle jugea par suite opportun d'essayer de se la procurer en faisant la demande à chacun des États intéressés, sans d'ailleurs insister si elle rencontrait de la résistance. Cette initiative ne lui parut excéder ni ses droits ni l'esprit de la convention.

Telles furent les directions que se donna la commission. Nous examinerons maintenant dans quelle mesure et dans quelle atmosphère elle put les appliquer.

(B.) *Exécution des Opérations. Attitude des Gouvernements intéressés, à l'égard de la Commission.*

Il a été mentionné ci-dessus qu'en ce qui regarde la satisfaction de ses besoins matériels, la commission se trouvait dépendante des ressources en moyens et de la complaisance des trois Gouvernements territorialement intéressés. Eux seuls étaient notamment en mesure de lui procurer les cartes qui lui étaient indispensables. Ils s'y prêtèrent de bonne grâce. Malheureusement une difficulté apparut immédiatement : il n'existait point une carte à échelle suffisamment précise qui pût être utilisée indifféremment sur les trois territoires. Si l'État-Major bulgare possédait une bonne carte au 40,000e (qu'il fit d'ailleurs spécialement compléter au sud du cours de l'Arda), l'État-Major d'Athènes ne pouvait, par contre, présenter que la carte autrichienne au 200,000e, et l'État-Major turc que la carte russe au 63,000e (exception faite pour les régions de Kirk-Kilissa et du cap Ibridje), lesquelles cartes offraient une exactitude sensiblement moindre. Or, il ne pouvait être remédié à cette disparité de documentation cartographique sans un long délai et des frais importants pour la Turquie et la Grèce. La commission se vit donc contrainte de la subir. Elle tint cependant à mentionner, comme préambule à son procès-verbal de description pour

la partie concernant les territoires turcs et grecs, que les cartes utilisées par elle dans ces régions ne présentaient point suffisamment d'exactitude pour servir de base à un travail sûr. Elle a de même décidé qu'en cas de divergence entre le texte de description et le document cartographique le texte ferait foi. Elle remarque ici, à ce propos, que si l'on attache du prix à posséder une reproduction entièrement fidèle du tracé arrêté sur le terrain par la commission, il sera nécessaire d'en faire effectuer le levé spécial à grande échelle, ainsi qu'il est d'usage lors de la détermination des frontières politiques.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la commission a le devoir de constater que les demandes qu'elle a dû adresser aux Gouvernements bulgare, grec et turc, qu'elles concernassent les documents cartographiques ou tels autres de ses besoins, ont été accueillies avec le souci d'y satisfaire. Elle n'a enregistré de résistance, tant de la part du Gouvernement de Sofia que de celui d'Angora—et encore cette résistance ne tarda-t-elle point à céder—qu'au moment où elle négociait avec eux en vue d'entreprendre les opérations sur leurs territoires respectifs. Une objection de forme fut soulevée par la Bulgarie, une raison juridique par la Turquie. Nous relaterons les faits ci-dessous pour mémoire.

Dès leur constitution en commission le 24 juillet 1924, les trois représentants alliés prenant acte du fait que la mise en vigueur de la convention No. 3 était intervenue le 24 mai précédent, et constatant par suite que le délai de quinze jours, au terme duquel ils devaient entreprendre les opérations, était écoulé depuis deux mois, notifièrent par la voie diplomatique aux Gouvernements intéressés qu'ils étaient prêts à commencer leurs travaux et les invitèrent à désigner leurs représentants. Ils ajoutèrent à l'adresse de la Bulgarie que leur intention était de débuter par son territoire, et qu'aux fins de se mettre d'accord sur les mesures d'exécution, ils se rendraient à Sofia, le 29 du même mois. La Bulgarie éleva contre ce projet une objection de principe et une objection d'opportunité, qui furent présentées par M. Kalfov, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, d'abord aux représentants alliés à Sofia, puis à la commission elle-même quelques jours plus tard. Raison de principe: M. Kalfov exprima sa surprise que son Gouvernement n'eût pas été avisé, préalablement à toutes démarches de la commission, de la mise en vigueur de la Convention No. 3 et de la constitution de la commission. Raison d'opportunité: Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères répugnait, devant les menaces de troubles intérieurs qui pesaient sur le pays, à exposer une commission internationale à des incidents. Au cours de l'entrevue qu'ils eurent à Sofia avec M. Kalfov, les trois représentants alliés furent assez heureux pour le convaincre que la commission était fondée, par le texte même du traité, à entreprendre ses opérations sans aucune sorte de préavis émanant du Quai d'Orsay, à l'adresse des Gouvernements touchés par la clause de démilitarisation. Ils recueillirent l'impression que, tout en étant d'accord sur le fond, le Gouvernement bulgare aurait souhaité qu'on usât à son endroit de plus de forme. M. Kalfov, se rendant finalement aux raisons qui commandaient à la commission de mener ses travaux avec assez de célérité pour les avoir terminés avant la mauvaise saison, lui consentit tout son concours.

La difficulté soulevée du côté turc fut d'une nature différente. Le Gouvernement d'Angora fit valoir que toute détermination des zones démilitarisées serait prématurée aussi longtemps que la frontière politique entre la Turquie et la Grèce n'aurait pas été définitivement arrêtée. Il subordonna donc nos travaux à ceux de la commission de délimitation prévue par l'article 5 du Traité de Lausanne. La thèse n'était point sans force, mais elle avait le tort d'être présentée tardivement, et au moment où les opérations de démilitarisation étaient déjà achevées en Bulgarie et en Grèce. La commission ne pouvait y souscrire pour des raisons d'équilibre à maintenir entre les trois États. S'appuyant sur le caractère autonome de la Convention No. 3, elle présenta au Gouvernement turc que les délais impartis à la commission pour commencer ses travaux étaient impératifs et ne liaient point "dans le temps" les deux opérations, de démilitarisation d'une part, de délimitation de l'autre. Elle reconnaissait d'ailleurs que, par contre, délimitation et démilitarisation étaient liées "dans l'espace." Et, tirant de ce raisonnement la conclusion logique, elle convenait que le travail de démilitarisation entrepris par elle, de part et d'autre de la frontière gréco-turque, devrait être automatiquement modifié, si la ligne en tenant lieu provisoirement n'était pas confirmée dans l'avenir. Après une négociation laborieuse qui demanda environ trois semaines, et où les résistances furent inspirées par l'Etat-Major général d'Angora, la thèse de la commission fut agréée.

Telles furent les seules difficultés notables que la commission rencontra, et dès qu'elles eurent été levées, aucun obstacle ne lui fut plus suscité ni du côté bulgare, ni du côté turc, ni du côté grec. Chacun des États, dans la mesure de ses moyens

propres, de ses habitudes d'esprit et de la situation matérielle du pays, s'efforça de faciliter sa tâche loyalement et avec cordialité. Les Bulgares y apportèrent plus de conscience méthodique; les Grecs plus de bonne volonté et d'insouciance native les Turcs plus de courtoisie et d'hospitalité simple. Sur les détails du tracé, l'accord s'établit facilement. Il fut aussitôt consacré respectivement dans chacun des pays intéressés, par l'approbation d'un procès-verbal de description et des cartes de figuration de ce tracé.

Le même esprit de bonne entente se manifesta généralement, lors des séances de la commission plénière, dont les procès-verbaux peuvent être consultés au dossier ci-annexé. Le fusionnement des descriptions des trois tracés partiels en une description unique s'opéra facilement. Une seule observation fut présentée. Elle émana du représentant turc. Ce dernier faisant état d'un avantage de terrain consacré à la Grèce dans la région de Gelin Mouradi, avantage dont il appréciait la raison d'être, demanda pour cause d'analogie qu'il fût également accordé à la Turquie au nord de Kirk-Kilissa. La revendication étant légitime, et se réclamant du souci d'impartialité que la commission avait pris pour règle, il y fut fait droit.

La limite de la zone démilitarisée était dès lors déterminée *ne varietur*, et son acceptation, par les représentants des trois États territorialement intéressés, semblait indiquer que l'accord était complet, lorsqu'une intervention du délégué bulgare menaça de remettre en question les attributions mêmes de la commission, et par voie de conséquence la validité de son travail. Le Colonel Popov contesta en effet à la commission le droit de prescrire l'édification de bornes destinées à matérialiser sur le terrain la ligne-limite de la zone démilitarisée. Il déclara qu'une commission internationale ne pouvait juridiquement obliger la Bulgarie, État souverain et indépendant, à procéder à un abornement à l'intérieur de son propre territoire. Qu'au demeurant, le texte de la Convention No. 3 ne mentionnait pas qu'on dût faire élever des bornes. Qu'enfin la tâche de la commission, définie comme il suit dans ladite convention: "déterminer et tracer sur le terrain les limites, &c.," impliquait non pas que la commission matérialiserait ces limites par le moyen de signaux, mais qu'elle se contenterait, à l'aide du terrain et de la carte, de les arrêter et de les reporter sur un document cartographique.

Le point de vue était nouveau et il fut fait observer au représentant bulgare que, lors des opérations sur le terrain, il avait été entièrement d'accord avec la commission pour décider que, de distance en distance, le tracé serait signalé par des bornes. Le procès-verbal de description du tracé en territoire bulgare, approuvé par sa signature, mentionnait les emplacements et le numérotage de ces bornes. Bien plus, une matérialisation immédiate de l'abornement avait été effectuée devant la commission par les soins du Colonel Popov lui-même. L'observation était donc une surprise pour la commission. Elle était en outre spécieuse. L'expression employée par le rédacteur de la convention, "déterminer et tracer sur le terrain les limites, &c.," n'était susceptible que d'une seule interprétation, à savoir: étudier ces limites sur le terrain lui-même et les y matérialiser de façon que l'institution d'une zone démilitarisée devînt une réalité tangible sur le sol, et non point une mesure théorique. Bien pénétrée de l'esprit de la Convention No. 3, la commission faillirait à sa tâche si elle manquait de circonscrire exactement et matériellement une zone destinée, dans son principe, à éviter entre les États intéressés toute cause d'incidents.

Cette thèse, présentée par les représentants alliés, fut soutenue par les représentants grec et turc, mais ne rallia point le représentant bulgare. Il en donna une nouvelle preuve dans la suite des délibérations, lorsque furent fixées les caractéristiques que devaient présenter les bornes, excipant de la dépense que l'édification et l'entretien des bornes imposeraient à la Bulgarie, il déclara ne pas être autorisé à souscrire à des décisions entraînant des frais pour son Gouvernement.

Cette double argumentation: interprétation spécieuse du texte de la convention et évocation de l'aspect financier de l'abornement (la dépense serait à la vérité minime, car elle ne vise que l'édification de quinze bornes seulement), aboutirait, si elle prévalait, à laisser pratiquement dans le vague la limite de la zone démilitarisée, et à y permettre des empiétements. Or, on aperçoit aisément les avantages que la Bulgarie y trouverait. Sans lui prêter des desseins d'aggression contre ses voisins, on peut concevoir que, considérée du seul point de vue du maintien de l'ordre à l'intérieur, l'existence d'une zone démilitarisée, où il n'est autorisé qu'un effectif limité, représente une hypothèque pour l'Etat souverain. Cette zone peut être utilisée comme place de refuge par les fauteurs de désordre. Et, sans doute, désirerait-on à Sofia qu'on pût les y poursuivre sans risquer de s'en voir l'entrée

interdite, par une borne posée par une commission internationale. Tel pourrait être le ressort de la répugnance bulgare à se prêter à un abornement. Quel qu'en soit du reste le mobile, elle devait être signalée, car il ne fait point de doute que si la Bulgarie se refusait à édifier des bornes, les deux autres États suivraient cet exemple, et la garantie contre les risques de nouveaux conflits que le Traité de Lausanne a voulu instituer, menacerait d'être inopérante.

Deux derniers points doivent être mis en lumière pour que soit épuisé le compte rendu des questions essentielles qui ont été discutées par la commission plénière. Tout d'abord nous noterons que les six représentants sont tombés d'accord pour reconnaître que de part et d'autre du cours inférieur de la Maritza, dans le secteur où la frontière politique n'est pas encore déterminée, les limites assignées par la commission aux zones démilitarisées peuvent être éventuellement sujettes à revision. La commission a dû, pour compter la profondeur de ces zones (30 kilom. au minimum), faire choix, à défaut de frontière politique reconnue, d'une base de départ nette. Elle a opté à cet effet pour la branche orientale de la Maritza, que le Traité de Lausanne, si l'on en juge par la carte annexée à la description des frontières de la Turquie, semble avoir choisie comme ligne de démarcation provisoire entre la Grèce et la Turquie. Il est toutefois indiscutable qu'au cas où cette branche orientale de la Maritza ne formait point la frontière définitive, les tracés arrêtés par la commission pour limiter en territoire grec et turc les zones démilitarisées devaient être automatiquement rajustés à la distance impérative stipulée par la Convention No. 3.

Second et dernier point: Au cours des échanges de vues entre représentants, la question du contrôle ultérieur de la démilitarisation ayant été évoquée, le représentant turc a déclaré qu'il croyait pouvoir penser que son Gouvernement, tout en étant fermement résolu à exécuter loyalement ses engagements, se refuserait à laisser exercer un pareil contrôle sur son territoire. Cette déclaration nous ayant paru digne de retenir l'attention, nous la mentionnons ici.

(C.) *Suggestions et Conclusion.*

Par l'exposé qui précède nous croyons avoir défini la position actuelle de la question de la démilitarisation. La *partie essentielle* du travail de la commission, l'établissement du tracé, est effectuée, arrêtée et enregistrée. Le marquage de ce tracé sur le terrain, *deuxième tâche* que la commission s'était posée, demeure par contre à opérer. Son exécution est subordonnée à deux conditions. La première est que ce tracé soit approuvé; la seconde, que le Gouvernement bulgare consente non seulement à l'établissement d'un bornage, mais qu'il en assume également la charge financière.

Nous demandons à votre Excellence de vouloir bien nous notifier l'approbation donnée à notre travail ou nous transmettre les observations qu'il aurait pu susciter. Nous lui demandons en outre, si elle le juge légitime, de provoquer l'adhésion du Gouvernement de Sofia à notre thèse concernant l'abornement. C'est à cette adhésion qu'est lié l'achèvement de notre mission. La voici interrompue, autant du fait de l'obligation où nous sommes placés d'attendre vos instructions, que de celui de la saison. L'édification des bornes ne pourra avoir lieu qu'au printemps. Nous suggérons, en conséquence, que les États intéressés à la démilitarisation soient avisés que ces bornes devront être toutes en place au 1er mai prochain et que la commission en fera, à partir de cette date, la vérification.

Ainsi sera achevée la tâche de la commission. Est-ce à dire cependant que l'abornement réalisé, on puisse considérer avoir fait œuvre suffisante dans l'intérêt du maintien de la paix aux frontières de Thrace? Nous ne le croyons pas. Il nous paraît indispensable que l'exécution des mesures de démilitarisation à l'intérieur des zones désarmées, mesures que prévoit l'article 3 de la convention, soit surveillée, tout au moins vérifiée par un organe neutre. Il nous paraît également opportun de disposer du même organe pour arbitrer les contestations, réclamations ou incidents qui pourraient être soulevés à l'occasion de la démilitarisation. Le traité—nous l'avons dit plus haut—n'en prévoit point l'institution; nous pensons cependant que la nécessité pourra s'en faire sentir. Cette suggestion est-elle réalisable? Il ne nous appartient point d'en juger. Nous mentionnons seulement que si elle était admise, l'organe de contrôle pourrait être constitué, avec le minimum de frais, au moyen des trois attachés militaires britannique, français et italien, en résidence à Constantinople, lesquels s'adjoindraient un représentant du pays territorialement intéressé.

Ces réflexions, de même que celles qui traitent de la nécessité d'établir un abornement effectif et non la barrière morale que préconise le Gouvernement bulgare,

s'inspirent du souci de faire réellement jouer, aux zones démilitarisées en Thrace, le rôle de tampon que le traité a voulu lui assigner. Et cela dans l'intérêt du maintien de la paix en Orient. C'est à ce titre que, bien qu'elles débordent hors du cadre de notre mission, nous avons cru de notre devoir de les soumettre à votre Excellence.

En attendant les nouvelles instructions de votre Excellence, nous suspendons nos travaux à la date de ce jour. Deux d'entre nous, les représentants français et italien, demeurent à Constantinople, où les retiennent leurs attributions d'attachés militaires; le troisième, le représentant britannique, accompagné de son équipe de topographes, rentre provisoirement en Angleterre. Les archives de notre commission restent entre les mains du représentant italien, notre président, auquel toute communication éventuelle pourra être adressée à Constantinople.

Le Représentant italien, Président,	Le Représentant britannique,	Le Représentant français.
VITELLI.	J. H. M. CORNWALL. *Lieutenant-Colonel, R.N.*	CATROUX

Constantinople, le 24 *novembre* 1924.

[E 11546/632/44] No. 101.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 22.)

(No. 916.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 15, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of the budget law for the financial year 1925–26, which has appeared in the "Vatan," together with the provisional statement of revenues and expenditure attached thereto.

2. In order to facilitate comparison the corresponding estimates for the current financial year, in the form in which they have been reproduced in the local press, have been shown in parallel columns.

3. It will be observed, however, that the figures given in regard to the current year's revenues and expenditure do not correspond to those shown in despatch No. 72 of the 23rd January.

4. Any figures furnished, even from official sources, in regard to Government revenues and expenditure are of relative value only.

5. The budget estimates for 1923–24, in the form in which they were approved by the National Assembly, showed an admitted deficit of about £T. 24 million, but no statement has ever been issued by the Ministry of Finance showing how far the Government estimates of revenues were realised, or in what way the anticipated deficit was finally accounted for. At all events, no mention is made of it in the estimates for the current financial year, and one can only suppose that it was completely cancelled, either by a considerable reduction in departmental expenditure, or by various windfalls not anticipated in the estimates during the course of the financial year.

6. For the current year the deficit has been variously estimated at £T. 8 million to £T. 12 million, but no statement is forthcoming from the Ministry of Finance as to the realisation of the Government's expenditure and revenues, nor is any provision made in next year's estimates for a possible deficit during the current year. In any event, it is doubtful whether the existing fiscal machinery and statistical service is at all adequate or capable of the task of drawing up a reliable statement of the country's revenue possibilities.

7. The annexes to the budget law, attached herewith, are provisional only, and must await the sanction of the National Assembly.

8. Some modifications in the estimates will doubtless be effected, but, even should the budget in its final approved form be made public, I am of opinion that no great reliance can be placed on it, except perhaps as giving a rough and general idea of the amount which the Government hopes to raise by taxation and from other sources.

9. It will be observed that the total Government revenues are estimated at £T. 147,296,978, compared to £T. 129,224,610 for the current year, an increase of £T. 18,072,368.

10. Article 3 of the budget law states that all existing taxes and duties will

continue to be levied during the coming year, whilst in article 8 it is stated that no new taxes will be levied, so that the forecasted increase in the Government revenues is, therefore, expected to be realised from existing resources, or from such sources as newly created monopolies.

11. The principal sources of Government revenue are the following :—

	£T.
Direct taxes	42,420,500
Indirect taxes (customs, &c.)	35,127,628
Monopolies	25,181,000
Consumption taxes	16,060,000
Revenue from State properties	11,315,000

12. In the absence at present of any detailed statement showing the various sources from which these revenues are to be obtained, or of any indication of the basis upon which the returns are calculated, it is impossible to offer any useful comment upon them.

13. It is worthy of remark, however, that the revenues from monopolies, which are presumed to be principally those monopolies formerly ceded to and collected by the Ottoman Public Debt, show an increase over the current year of over £T. 9 million, whilst the revenues from "Contributions indirectes" are approximately £T. 7 million greater than the current year's estimate.

14. As no modification in the general customs tariff can be made, it is difficult to determine on what foundation the increased revenue from customs is based, as commerce shows no signs of any very considerable revival at present or in the near future.

15. Further items of interest in the list of Government revenues are the sums of £T. 2,500,000 from the transport tax and the recently created match monopoly, and £T. 2 million from the Government's administration of the Anatolian railway.

16. In regard to the sum of £T. 2,500,000, I am informed that £T. 1,700,000 represents the Government's share in the match monopoly, which has been farmed out to the Belgian company "La Flandre," whilst the remaining £T. 800,000 represents the revenue derived from a tax, known as the transport tax, levied on fares (steamers, trains and trams).

17. Government expenditure during the coming year shows an increase of approximately £T. 22 million compared to the current year's expenditure. With the exception of the vote allocated to the Commissariat of National Defence, which is increased by £T. 6½ million, the balance of approximately £T. 15½ million is distributed among the various Government departments.

18. The vote for the Department of Public Works is £T. 17,450,145, which is materially the same as last year, and which represents a considerable increase over the financial year 1923–24, and is of interest in that it indicates that the Government intends to pursue its policy of railway construction over the Samsoun–Sivas and Angora–Sivas lines from its own resources.

19. The credit allocated to the Ottoman Public Debt has been increased from £T. 7,560,567 to £T. 9,095,283, an increase of £T. 1,534,746.

20. I am at present at a loss to state what this credit represents. A year ago, when the Public Debt Administration maintained a reduced, but still effective, personnel, the sum of £T. 7½ million could reasonably be attributed to payments required for the upkeep of this administration. During the present year, however, as the result of the pressure exercised by the Government, the personnel has been further reduced.

21. The allocation of the increased sum next year is somewhat obscure, as the sum in question is too small to represent any effective payment to the bondholders, nor is the Turkish Government likely to take the initiative in making such payments until the division of the debt and the basis upon which interest is to be paid has been determined.

22. The credit allocated to the Ministry of Agriculture remains approximately unchanged at £T. 5,653,274.

23. The vote for the Department of Foreign Affairs has been practically doubled, but still remains at a comparatively modest figure. The increase will presumably be devoted to extending Turkey's diplomatic representation abroad.

24. According to information furnished to the commercial secretary to this mission, it has been proposed to allot a special credit of £T. 5 million to the Department of Commerce and Industry for the purpose of creating various industrial

enterprises in Turkey, but no provision appears to have been made in this connection in the present statement of expenditure.

25. The navy vote shows no great increase over that for the present year, so that, unless some modification is eventually made in this respect, the various proposals, such as the construction of a naval base at Ismidt, the purchase of submarines, the repairs to the "Yavouz," &c., must be modified to some extent, unless special credit facilities are granted by the firms which may be selected in connection with these undertakings, or that sums allocated in the current year's budget have not been expended.

26. As has been stated already, however, the credits allotted are provisional only, and are liable to extensive modifications.

27. With the exception of proposals to increase the salaries of minor functionaries and to commute at ten years purchase all small pensions, the budget law is of little interest.

28. Article 19 states that officials of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and of National Defence employed abroad shall be paid on a sterling basis.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

Budget Law, 1925–26.

La Loi de Finances pour l'exercice 1341 (1925–26) a été distribuée aux membres de la grande Assemblée nationale.

En voici les dispositions relatives aux dépenses et recettes provisionnelles d'après le "Vakit" du 4 novembre :

Article 1er. Un crédit de 162,288,942 livres turques est, suivant le tableau annexé à la présente loi, accordé en vue de faire face aux dépenses des services de l'État rentrant dans le budget général.

Art. 2. Les recettes qui devront balancer les dépenses du budget général de l'exercice 1341 (1er mars 1925–fin février 1926) ont été, suivant le Tableau (B) ci-joint, évaluées à 145,306,978.

Revenus.

Art. 3. Toutes les taxes et impositions, les différentes redevances et les recettes dites "muteferika" divers qui se trouvent énumérées au Tableau (B) ci-joint et qui constituent les revenus de la présente Loi de Finances, continueront à être perçues durant l'exercice 1341 (1925–26).

Art. 4. La redevance exigible par l'Hôtel des Monnaies sur les objets en or et en argent sera perçue d'après un tarif élaboré par le Commissariat des Finances, suivant le cours desdits métaux.

Art. 5. Les centimes additionnels à imposer et à percevoir durant l'exercice 1341, sur les impositions générales, pour le compte de l'administration locale des vilayets, sont ceux établis par les lois en vigueur.

Art. 6. Les personnes qui ne se conformeraient pas aux dispositions sur le monopole des allumettes ou qui pratiqueraient la contrebande, seront passibles des pénalités prévues par les lois sur les taxes de consommation des allumettes et des papiers à cigarettes.

Art. 7. Le Commissaire des Finances est autorisé à conclure durant l'exercice 1341, en dehors du compte courant du Trésor à la Banque ottomane, des avances et des comptes courants à courte échéance et à vendre les biens nationaux, au comptant ou en accordant des termes pour les paiements.

Art. 8. Sont interdits l'établissement et la perception de droits ou taxes autres que ceux qui sont en vigueur en vertu de la présente loi. Ceux qui donnent des ordres pour la perception, sous n'importe qu'elle dénomination, d'impositions autres que celles prévues par la présente loi, seront légalement poursuivis.

Art. 9. Les comptables qui n'auront pas opéré, en dû temps, les retenues pour la caisse de retraite ou qui n'auront pas versé aux caisses fiscales, dans un délai maximum de deux mois, les retenues fixes effectuées sur les appointements des fonctionnaires émargeant sur les budgets spéciaux ou annexes, payeront un intérêt de 90 pour cent.

Art. 10. L'impôt sur les transports militaires, établi par les commissions *ad hoc*, continuera à être perçu en 1341 également.

Dépenses.

Art. 11. Les services pour lesquels le Gouvernement est autorisé à accorder des crédits supplémentaires, pendant les vacances de la grande Assemblée nationale, en vertu de l'article 11 de la Loi sur la Comptabilité publique sont ceux énumérés dans le Tableau (D).

Art. 12. Ne sont pas soumis aux dispositions de l'article 13 de la Loi sur la Comptabilité publique, aussi bien en 1341 qu'en 1340 (l'exercice écoulé), les engagements concernant des crédits affectés dans les budgets des Départements au constructions et réparations des palais gouvernementaux, prisons, écoles, et autres édifices officiels similaires et aux rations, habillements et imprimés ainsi que ceux afférents à la réparation du vaisseau de guerre "Yavouz." Quant aux dépenses qui ont un caractère permanent, telles que la fourniture des matières nécessaires pour l'entretien et l'habillement des soldats, les contrats peuvent être conclus, par décision du Conseil des Commissaires et pour une période maximum de deux années.

Art. 13. Les rapports concernant les comptes des comptables responsables, élaborés par les Commissions de Revision des Comptes instituées en vertu de l'article 22 de la Loi de Finances de 1340 seront examinés par la Cour des Comptes.

Art. 14. Les personnes auxquelles sont servies des pensions viagères sur le chapitre des "Services rendus à la Patrie" se trouvent nominativement désignées dans le Tableau (C) ci-joint. L'attribution d'une pension d'une autre personne quelconque en dehors de celles portées dans ledit tableau est subordonnée au vote d'une loi spéciale par la grande Assemblée nationale.

Art. 15. La rétribution fixe attribuée par le Département *ad hoc*, en vertu de l'article 3 du décret-annexe sur les frais de route du 1er octobre 1335, aux fonctionnaires qui seront expédiés pour une affaire urgente et importante ne pourra pas dépasser 500 livres turques. Toute rétribution au-dessus de 500 livres turques sera fixée par le Conseil des Commissaires.

Art. 16. Un montant égal à celui représentant pour dix années les pensions de 100 piastres turques et au-dessus, y compris les majorations effectuées en vertu du décret-annexe du 12 décembre 1335 sur les allocations extraordinaires allouées aux retraités civils, religieux et militaires ainsi qu'aux veuves et orphelins, sera payé d'emblée, à partir du mois de mars 1341, auxdits retraités et veuves et orphelins, qui n'auront plus, de cette façon, aucun compte avec le Trésor. En ce qui concerne les orphelins du sexe masculin, ils recevront une somme équivalente à leur pension pour une période allant de la date à laquelle ils ont eu leur pension jusqu'au jour où ils auront achevé leur 19e année d'âge. Cette disposition n'est pas applicable à l'égard des pauvres qui sont en train de faire leurs études. Le Commissaire des Finances est autorisé à liquider, aux conditions ci-dessus, dans un délai de trois ans, les pensions jusqu'à 100 piastres allouées jusqu'à la fin de l'exercice 1340.

Art. 17. Les fonctionnaires civils et religieux émargeant sur le budget général, recevront à partir du mois de mars 1341, en dehors des appointements qui leur sont attribués de par leur poste, les allocations extraordinaires dans la proportion ci-dessous :

(*a*.) Ceux qui touchent jusqu'à 1,000 piastres auront une allocation extraordinaire égale au quadruple du chiffre de leurs appointements.

(*b*.) Ceux qui touchent plus de 1,000 piastres recevront une allocation extraordinaire égale au quadruple pour les 1,000 premières piastres, plus le chiffre au-dessous de 1,000.

(*c*.) Ceux qui touchent moins que 600 piastres recevront une allocation de 24 livres turques, et ceux qui touchent moins que 700 piastres auront une allocation de 28 livres turques.

(*d*.) Une allocation de 800 piastres sera attribuée aux fonctionnaires en disponibilité ainsi qu'aux retraités civils, religieux et militaires qui ont 400 piastres et au-dessous d'appointements. Ceux qui touchent plus que 400 piastres recevront une allocation extraordinaire égale à la moitié de celle des fonctionnaires en activité touchant le même chiffre d'appointements.

(*e*.) Les veuves et orphelins touchant 100 piastres et au-dessous, recevront une allocation extraordinaire représentant le double du chiffre de leur pension, et ceux qui touchent plus que 200 piastres auront une allocation équivalente à 1½ du chiffre de leur pension.

Il est à noter, cependant, que l'allocation extraordinaire allouée aux veuves et orphelins qui touchent plus que 100 piastres ne peut pas être

inférieure au chiffre attribué aux veuves et orphelins qui touchent une pension de 100 piastres.

(*f*.) Sont abrogées les dispositions du décret du 13 décembre 1335 sur les allocations extraordinaires qui sont contraires aux bases susindiquées.

Art. 18. Les montants non dépensés en 1340 sur les crédits affectés en vertu de la Loi No. 411 du 12 février 1340 à l'article 2 du chapitre 70 du budget du Commissariat des Finances pour acheter du bronze seront reportés à l'article 3 qui sera ouvert au chapitre 45 du budget du Malié pour 1341

Art. 19. Les traitements et allocations des fonctionnaires à l'étranger des Commissariats des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense nationale seront payés en livres sterling calculés d'après le prix fiscal d'avant-guerre.

Pour les pays dont le change est comparativement à celui d'avant-guerre plus élevé que le papier-monnaie turc, il sera ajouté une indemnité de vie chère dont le chiffre ne sera pas supérieur aux 100 pour cent du chiffre des appointements et allocations, suivant la localité.

Le chiffre de l'indemnité de vie chère sera fixé par les Commissariats des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense nationale chaque six mois. L'indemnité de vie chère n'est soumise à aucune retenue. L'article 30 de la Loi de Finances de 1340 est abrogé.

Art. 20. Le nombre des élèves acceptés gratuitement aux écoles internes en vertu de l'article 32 de la Loi de Finances de 1340 est porté à la moitié du chiffre des élèves payants.

Art. 21. Continuent à être en vigueur les dispositions des Lois de Finances de 1325–40, d'avances et des douzièmes provisoires qui n'ont pas été modifiées ou abrogées par la présente loi ou par des lois spéciales.

Art. 22. La présente loi entre en vigueur à partir du 1er mars 1341.

Art. 23. Le Commissaire des Finances est chargé de l'exécution de la présente loi.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

TABLEAU comparatif du Budget en Application de 1924 et de celui de 1925 présenté par le Gouvernement à l'Examen de la Chambre.

—	Dépenses. 1340/1924.	1341/1925.	Différences.
Défense nationale ..	27,279,386	33,700,000	+ 6,420,614
Dette publique ..	7,560,537	9,095,283	+ 1,534,746
Travaux publics ..	17,385,888	17,450,145	+ 64,257
Instruction publique ..	6,877,626	7,885,033 50	+ 1,007,407 50
Allocations et Pensions ..	10,922,883	12,740,214	+ 1,817,331
Justice	5,381,098	6,756,978	+ 1,375,880
Finances	10,886,279	11,025,666	+ 139,387
Marine	6,582,631	6,813,250	+ 230,619
Gendarmerie	10,101,596	10,578,034 50	+ 476,438 50
Échange et Reconstruction ..	6,020,000	6,369,585	+ 349,585
Agriculture	5,406,682	5,653,274	+ 246,592
Postes et Télégraphes ..	4,780,208	5,381,257	+ 601,039
Intérieur	4,156,763	5,080,144	+ 923,381
Santé	2,968,331	4,560,844	+ 1,592,513
Contributions indirectes ..	3,158,080	4,451,734	+ 1,293,654
Sûreté générale	3,123,004	4,193,094	+ 1,070,090
Grande Assemblée nationale ..	1,548,596·80	1,559,417 80	+ 10,821
Présidence de la République ..	280,770	210,426	− 70,344
Affaires étrangères	1,303,025	2,473,125	+ 1,170,100
Présidence du Conseil ..	329,248	70,706	− 258,542
Cours des Comptes	212,998	243,898	+ 30,900
Cadastres	718,625	1,073,060	+ 354,435
Presse	136,390	723,255	+ 586,865
Commerce et Industrie ..	1,962,676	2,541,581	+ 579,005
Présidence des Affaires religieuses	1,422,650	1,648,938	+ 226,288
	140,505,870·80	162,278,942·90	+ 21,773,062 10

—	Recettes. 1340/1924.	1341/1925.	Différences.
Impôts directs	13,930,500	12,420,500	− 1,510,000
Droits d'enregistrement ..	3,220,000	4,654,200	+ 1,434,200
Impôts indirects	28,170,000	35,127,628	+ 6,957,628
Monopoles	16,044,100	25,181,000	+ 9,136,900
Institutions diverses	703,000	843,000	+ 140,000
Revenus des biens de l'État ..	4,480,000	11,315,000	+ 6,835,000
Recettes diverses	5,204,296	7,084,296	+ 1,880,000
Rétrocessions	219,714	111,354	− 108,360
Impôt de consommation	14,461,000	16,060,000	+ 1,599,000
Revenus extraordinaires et recettes pour frais de guerre ..	12,792,000	..	− 12,792,000
Impôt sur les transports et monopole des allumettes	..	2,500,000	+ 2,500,000
Transport de chemins de fer d'Anatolie	..	2,000,000	+ 2,000,000
	129,224,610	147,296,978	+ 18,072,368

[E 11553/32/44] No. 102.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 22.)

(No. 924.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 17, 1924.

I HAVE the honour to report that since Fethi Bey's assumption of office the new Progressive party has scarcely added to its numbers. Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha has formally accepted the presidency of the party, but it was known from the beginning that he would lead it, and his formal acceptance was only delayed by technicalities. Among the later adherents to the party is Bekir Sami Bey, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs at Angora, who has been little heard of in the last two years. The Progressive party, as such, has taken no action either in the Assembly or at by-elections. These have taken place here and in four other districts. No Progressive candidate was put up here. The party explained that it had not had time for proper organisation. Ali Ihsan Pasha, the well-known general, who has recently left the army in order to join the Progressive party, stood as an independent; but the secondary electors, seeing the particular prominence given by the authorities to the name of the Government candidate and mistrusting, perhaps, the supposed secrecy of the ballot, returned the nominee of the Popular party. At the Broussa election, however, General Nureddin Pasha has easily beaten the Popular party's candidate, Dr. Emin Bey, the Prefect of Constantinople. This is interesting. Emin Bey was a fairly strong candidate. Nureddin Pasha, while appearing as an Independent, was known to be a leader of the Progressives and an opponent of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. For some unknown reason the Ghazi forced him to retire from the army shortly after the recapture of Smyrna, and since then the general has been inconspicuous but, it is believed, not inactive.

2. By calling Fethi Bey to office Mustafa Kemal Pasha seemed to have taken the wind out of the sails of the Progressives. The Constantinople press, which was full of criticism of Ismet Pasha, gave Fethi Bey its blessing on his advent to power, and has not yet found any thing to criticise in his administration. The tendency, however, still is to consider Fethi Bey's Cabinet one of transition. The return to Parliament of an avowed opponent like Nureddin may prompt Mustafa Kemal Pasha to take steps. If he decides on a strong line I think he may replace Fethi Bey by Rejeb Bey, the Minister of the Interior, who has shown himself a man of some force. Meanwhile, a draft Press Law, of somewhat Draconian character, has been put to the Assembly by a private member. It is very doubtful that a moderate man like Fethi Bey would accept it in its present form, but there are indications that it will be pressed forward by its extremist supporters, and thus a political crisis might be precipitated.

3. The part which Rauf Bey is likely to play in the near future is the subject of a good deal of speculation. That he is strongly opposed to Mustafa Kemal Pasha and is, indeed, the chief man in the Opposition, there is not much room to doubt. The strength behind him seems to be, firstly, the natural desire felt for the fruits of office by those who have been kept from them too long, and, secondly, conservative opinion, which is shocked at the irreligion of Mustafa Kemal and at his policy of secularisation. It is even suggested by those in touch with Rauf Bey that if he cannot moderate Mustafa Kemal Pasha's policy by constitutional means he will endeavour to bring back the late Sultan Vahid-ed-Din, perhaps not as Sultan but, at any rate, as Caliph. Meantime, Rauf Bey is here recuperating from Angora malaria, and I am glad to have good authority for stating that he bears no resentment against us for his internment at Malta, regarding it rather as a legitimate move in the game. In this connection I would refer to Fethi Bey's very reasonable tone on the same subject, in his speech on the Egyptian interpellation reported in my despatch No. 891 of the 3rd instant.

4. It was perhaps to be expected that the press here—possibly under Bolshevik inspiration—would look for trouble in the meetings which you have recently had with the French and Italian Prime Ministers. One purpose of these meetings was said to be the adoption of a joint policy of oppression of Moslem peoples. Western Imperialism was to be revived in North Africa, Syria and Mesopotamia; the Treaty of Sèvres was to be put into force after all. These assertions have been most loudly uttered by the "Tevhid-i-Efkiar," the "Vakt" and the "Jumhuriet," papers which are accustomed to indulge in diatribes against us. I do not attach much importance

to the matter, and I hardly think there is more in it than the instinctive uneasiness of Turks when they see great Powers getting on friendly terms together.

5. What has found less prominence in the newspapers, but probably moves the Turkish Government and people much more, is the suggestion that a result of a Franco-Soviet treaty might be the restoration to Russia of the Wrangel fleet now interned at Bizerta. I do not suppose that measured by European standards this fleet, which I believe consists of some dozen vessels and includes a dreadnought and submarines, is of much fighting value. But if repaired, say in Italian yards, it would certainly eclipse the Turkish fleet. The anxiety which the Turks feel on this account may, I think, account for the friendly disposition of the Turkish naval authorities at Angora, which has lately been noticed both by His Majesty's commercial secretary and by the representative of Messrs. Armstrong-Vickers.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 11599/43/44] No. 103.

League of Nations to Foreign Office.—(Received December 23.)

Sir, *Geneva, December 20, 1924.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram dated the 15th December, 1924, informing the council that a dispute has arisen in the sense of the final paragraph of article 47 of the Treaty of Lausanne in respect of the shares of the annual charges of the Ottoman Public Debt assigned to Irak, Palestine and Transjordan. A copy of this telegram is being communicated to the members of the council.

As His Majesty's Government is aware, the council at its last session decided, in accordance with the final paragraph of article 47 of the Treaty of Lausanne, to appoint an arbitrator, whose name will be notified in due course to the parties concerned.

I have, &c.
ERIC DRUMMOND,
Secretary-General.

[E 11679/43/44] No. 104.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 939.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 24, 1924.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 926 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report further on M. des Closières' mission to Angora in connection with the question of the Turkish debt.

2. As to the character of the mission, M. des Closières and M. Jessé Curély have given me independently diametrically opposite accounts, the one saying that it was a mission from the French Government, the other from the French bondholders. I do not think either was seeking to hide the truth, but rather that M. des Closières set out for Angora on very vague and undefined instructions, nobody in Constantinople knowing where they really came from. This explanation is the more likely as the journey was decided on in a great hurry at the last moment owing to the urgent request of the Turkish Government that someone should be sent to negotiate immediately. Discussions had, however, already been proceeding for a considerable period at Angora through General Mougin, who, M. des Closières tells me, had conveyed to the Turks the false impression that all would be very easily arranged. To his general weakness in all dealings with Turks the general adds complete ignorance of financial affairs, and I am inclined to think that if the British and French bondholders come to discuss together, the former might do well to have General Mougin expressly excluded from all participation in negotiations with the Turkish Government.

3. In the actual conversations M. des Closières confined himself to correcting misapprehensions created by the general, to listening to Turkish proposals, and to criticising them. He made it quite clear that he could not pledge the acceptance

of anything, and that the bondholders of other nationalities than French must also be consulted. The final proposals of the Turkish Government were formulated after a Cabinet meeting *ad hoc*, and their substance was communicated to me by word of mouth by M. des Closières. He embodied them in a note which he gave to the Minister of Finance and of which he has since sent me a copy to assist my understanding (enclosed herewith). Though the actual contents of this document need not be secret, I beg, in accordance with M. des Closières' earnest request, that the fact that he has communicated it to me may be kept quite confidential.

4. As to the actual Turkish proposals, the first, that the agreement should be for a strictly limited period of time, is one which M. des Closières did not mention to me verbally, but appears to have importance. Settlement on basis of the franc is one alternative put forward by the Turks, but more or less withdrawn in face of M. des Closières' criticism. The settlement on a sterling basis appears to me to be a mere gamble on the Turkish exchange, which has fallen slowly and steadily, even though the Government have not printed paper money. The guarantees offered are rather thin and their efficacy largely dependent on Turkish honesty and on the character of the Turkish Administration.

5. Yet both M. Jessé Curély and M. des Closières are pleased at the beginning that has been made. The Turks have taken the initiative in asking for negotiations, and in their course have recognised that they cannot have it all their own way. M. des Closières thinks their financial position extremely acute, and that it is this as much as anything else that is bringing them to reason. He anticipates that the next step will have to be a full dress discussion somewhere. Clearly it ought to be in Paris.

6. One further point perhaps is deserving of mention. When the Turks pleaded poverty to M. des Closières he always answered them that they must be embarrassed so long as their budget is encumbered with capital expenditure for such objects as railway construction, which in other countries is written in an extraordinary budget. M. Jessé Curély made the same point to me. I suppose it is inevitable that any settlement and consolidation of the Turkish debt will have to be accompanied by a new Turkish loan; but it may be significant that M. des Closières should be broadly hinting at this consummation before any conversations have taken place between the French and British bondholders.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Propositions de Base du Gouvernement turc en vue des Négociations prévues avec les Porteurs.

Séance du 14 décembre 1924, tenue à Angora, au Commissariat des Finances, sous la présidence de son Excellence Moustafa Abdul Halik Bey.

I.—*Monnaie de Paiement.*

Un accord sera conclu dans les conditions ci-après pour une période de deux, trois ou cinq ans.

A.—Règlement sur la base du franc.
B.—Règlement sur la base du shilling.

Annuité fixe égale au double (soit £T. 15,334,501·56)—somme calculée par emprunts—de la part contributive de la Turquie en livres turques, mais avec les conditions suivantes :

Si, pendant la période envisagée, la livre turque monte ou baisse de moins de 20 pour cent, aucun changement à l'annuité fixée comme ci-dessus.

Si la livre turque baisse de plus de 20 pour cent, le Gouvernement turc n'entend faire face à la charge découlant de cette baisse que jusqu'à concurrence de £T. 20,000,000.

Si la livre turque monte de plus de 20 pour cent, le surplus ainsi obtenu doit être partagé entre le Gouvernement turc et les porteurs dans une proportion à discuter ultérieurement.

Le Gouvernement turc prend l'engagement de maintenir la circulation monétaire fiduciaire au chiffre actuel pendant toute la période envisagée ci-dessus.

II.—*Gages.*

Le Gouvernement turc a en vue la substitution aux gages actuels d'un gage concentré, douanes, ou tout monopole éventuel (tabac, spiritueux, allumettes, &c.) constituant des revenus de premier ordre, agréant aux porteurs.

Il est entendu que ledit gage devra fournir une somme dépassant d'au moins un tiers la somme nécessaire pour couvrir l'annuité totale.

(A.)—*Administration des gages.*

Les revenus donnés en gages seront versés, au nom du Conseil de la Dette, dans une banque à désigner par les porteurs, les versements devant être effectués tous les jours ou, si la chose n'est pas pratiquement possible, tous les trois jours.

(B.)—*Conseil de la Dette.*

Le Conseil de la Dette n'aura plus l'administration des revenus, mais exercera un droit de surveillance sur l'application des clauses du présent accord, et sera chargé de la répartition des sommes encaissées. Le Gouvernement turc allouera au conseil, pour ses frais, une somme forfaitaire à fixer ultérieurement.

III.—*Liquidation.*

Les questions relatives à la liquidation de l'administration actuelle de la dette et notamment la question des indemnités de licenciement du personnel ont été réservées en vue d'un examen en temps opportun.

Angora, le 14 *décembre* 1924.

[E 11680/185/44] No. 105.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 29.)

(No. 940.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1924.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 848 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that on the 17th December Mgr. Constantine, Metropolitan of Dercos (Therapia), was elected Œcumenical Patriarch in succession to the late Patriarch Gregorius, and that on the same day he took his seat on the Patriarchal Throne under the title of Constantine VI.

2. On the day following his election the new Patriarch sent his dragoman to His Majesty's mission to inform me verbally of his appointment, the dragoman later making similar visits to the French and Italian Embassies. This course, the dragoman added, had been adopted in preference to the usual written notification which, the Patriarch feared, might in present circumstances be construed as having a certain political significance.

3. As my French and Italian colleagues were in agreement with me in thinking that we should take note of the Patriarch's communication in the simplest possible form, we decided that this could best be done by sending subordinate members of our staffs to the Phanar for the purpose. The dragoman's visit was accordingly returned on the afternoon of the 18th December by the native translator attached to this mission, who was instructed at the same time to convey my personal congratulations to his Holiness on his elevation. This visit apparently caused extreme satisfaction at the Patriarchate, as the translator was presented to the Patriarch himself, who expressed his great pleasure at the receipt of my message and promised to pray daily for the prosperity of Great Britain and for my own health, adding that but for Great Britain there would be no Patriarchate at the Phanar to-day.

4. Patriarch Constantine, who is rather over 60 years of age, is a man of good character and well educated, so that from this point of view the choice of the Synod may be regarded as a felicitous one. Born at Brusa, he was educated at the theological school at Halki. He became a bishop in 1894, and metropolitan in 1899, after which he was appointed to different bishoprics in Turkey. He has twice been

appointed to the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate, which he was compelled to leave on the advent of Mgr. Meletios, to whose election he had been a vigorous opponent. On the departure of Mgr. Meletios over a year ago, however, Mgr. Constantine returned to the Holy Synod from his temporary exile at Brusa and was appointed Metropolitan of Dercos.

5. The election was fortunately completed without any of the irregularities which marked those of the two immediate predecessors of Mgr. Constantine. Over sixty out of the possible eighty votes were received from the dioceses dependent on the Phanar, and of these more than half were in favour of the new Patriarch, while in the final stage the latter received the unanimous vote of the fifteen members of the Holy Synod. No direct interference was, moreover, encountered from the Turkish authorities, though it is true that on the morning of the election the police summoned three of the members of the Synod, who were kept at the Police Direction throughout the entire day and then dismissed without their having received any adequate explanation either for the summons or for their detention. If, as is supposed, the object of the authorities was to render the election difficult, their ruse failed as the three metropolitans in question had taken the precaution, before proceeding to the Police Direction, of giving to their colleagues in the Synod authority to vote on their behalf.

6. Previous to the election itself, Mgr. Constantine had been generally regarded as the probable choice of the Synod, and the Turkish press, never silent for long on matters affecting the Patriarchate, had already drawn attention to the fact that Mgr. Constantine, having as is shown above, arrived in Constantinople from Brusa after the 30th October, 1918, must be a subject for exchange. Surprise was, however, caused on the eve of the election when it was learnt that Mgr. Constantine had that day been summoned to the Police Direction, where he had been told that he was "exchangeable." Moreover, on the same day the Governor of the Constantinople Vilayet wrote to the Exchange Commission asking that a passport should be issued to "Constantine Araboglu," who should leave for Greece immediately. At the Police Direction Mgr. Constantine contested the point as to his being subject to exchange, and is stated to have declared that he would not leave Constantinople except by force.

7. The issue is, however, one of considerable importance, and on its solution the future of the Œcumenical Patriarchate may well depend. For the moment, the Mixed Commission is stated to be considering the Vali's request, and may play for time until The Hague Tribunal gives its ruling on the interpretation of the term "établis," but this respite can at best be of short duration, and the fundamental issue will still remain. The Patriarchate bases its case on the decision taken at Lausanne that the institution of the Patriarchate, meaning thereby the corporate body and not the building itself, was to be allowed to remain in Constantinople, and that, as the metropolitans constituting the Holy Synod are an essential part of that body, they are outside the provisions of the Convention for the Exchange of Populations, no matter to what parts of Turkey the supreme body may have sent individual members of the Synod in the execution of their duty before or after the 30th October, 1918. The Turkish authorities do and will, of course, contest this point of view, and it is not improbable that the issue raised, like that of "établis," may ultimately have to be referred to some authority outside Turkey for arbitration.

8. In this connection it should be mentioned that, in the event of the Turkish thesis prevailing, the entire Holy Synod, with the exception of its two youngest members, would become "exchangeable." This possible eventuality has, I understand, already received the consideration of the Patriarchate authorities, who are apparently prepared to face the issue and whose general opinion is that, as in these circumstances the position of the Patriarchate here would become finally impossible, there would be no alternative between its complete extinction and the wholesale removal of the Œcumenical Patriarchate to some place outside the frontiers of Turkey.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 11681/109/44] No. 106.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 29.)

(No. 941.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 24, 1924.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my despatch No. 904 of the 10th instant on the subject of the execution of the Turco-Greek Convention for the Exchange of Populations, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement showing the numbers of Turkish Greeks who left Turkey for Greece between August 1922 and the 30th November, 1924, as well as the numbers of Hellenic Moslems who have been transferred to Turkey within the same period, but chiefly during the last year under the auspices of the Mixed Commission. Further statements are also attached showing the areas in Turkey and Greece from which these Greeks and Moslems were chiefly drawn.

2. These statements may, I think, be regarded as the most reliable yet available, as, though they have reached me from the Greek Exchange delegation, they are based on official statistics furnished by the three delegations constituting the Mixed Commission for Exchange.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Statistique approximative des Grecs rentrés en Grèce.

1. Du 25 août au 15 septembre 1922 par les moyens du Gouvernement hellénique	850,000
2. Du 16 septembre 1922 au 6 octobre 1923 par l'intermédiaire de la Commission patriarchale opérant aux frais du Gouvernement hellénique	380,000
3. Du 7 octobre 1923 au 30 novembre 1924 par l'intermédiaire de la Commission mixte ...	150,031
	1,380,031
Nombre de décès causés par suite de la concentration et des conditions hygiéniques	100,000
	1,280,031
Par permis spéciaux (pas échangeables) du 7 octobre 1923 au 30 novembre 1924	28,000
	1,300,031

Statistique approximative des Musulmans rentrés en Turquie.

Jusqu'au 30 novembre 1924 par l'entremise de la Commission mixte	352,736
Par permis spéciaux	20,000
	372,736

Transports d'Emigrants grecs du 7 Octobre 1923 *jusqu'au* 30 *Novembre* 1924.

De Constantinople	36,404*		
De Tchataldja (évacué)	17,260		
		53,664	
		48,125	
De Mersine	...		
De Samsoun	26,937		
De Trébizonde	4,857		
De Kérassunde	4,315		
		36,109	
De Kirk-Kilissé	691		
De Andrinople	486		
		1,177	
		8,556	
De Angora		2,400	(environ)
De Smyrne (1923–24)			
		150,031	

Transports d'Emigrants musulmans jusqu'au 30 *Novembre* 1924.

De Salonique (Elassona y compris)	111,725
De Kozani-Kayalar (évacué)	98,718
De Candie (évacué)	14,277
De la Canée (évacué)	8,744
De Drama (évacué)	67,433
De Serrès (Drama) (évacué)	7,251
De Cavalla (évacué)	43,455
De Janina (évacué)	1,133
	352,736

o

* Le nombre de 28,000 Grecs qui ont quitté Constantinople du 7 octobre 1923 au 30 novembre 1924 vient d'être donné par les autorités du pays. Ainsi les Grecs qui ont quitté la ville sont 64,404.